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INTRODUCTION 
We are pleased to be joined by Law Review members Shannon 
Rieke, Lindsey Mundt, and Daniel Lee and the rest of the Seattle 
University Law Review staff, who performed the research required to 
update this Article. Many sections of this Article were improved 
through editing and revisions, clarifying the discussions and analysis 
of cases. This marks the fifth publication of the Survey that was orig-
inally authored by Justice Robert F. Utter, Washington State Su-
preme Court (retired) in 1985, with updates published in 1988, 1998, 
and 2005. 
This Survey is intended to serve as a resource to which Wash-
ington lawyers, judges, law enforcement officers, and others can turn 
as an authoritative starting point for researching Washington search 
and seizure law. In order to be useful as a research tool, this Survey 
requires periodic updates to address new cases interpreting the Wash-
ington constitution and the U.S. Constitution and to reflect the cur-
rent state of the law. Many of these cases involve the Washington 
State Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Washington constitution. 
Also, as the U.S. Supreme Court has continued to examine Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence, its decisions and re-
flections on Washington law are also discussed. 
Often the rules and approaches in interpreting the Washington 
constitution differ in certain areas from the analysis used by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Where that 
occurs, this Survey has identified the independent approach adopted 
by the Washington State Supreme Court. 
Article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution is a counter-
part to the Fourth Amendment. That section provides that “no person 
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without 
authority of law.” The Washington State Supreme Court historically 
applied the analytical framework outlined in State v. Gunwall, 106 
Wn.2d 54, 61–62, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), in its case-by-case determi-
nation of the scope of protection afforded under article I, section 7, 
and in situations where greater individual protection exists under the 
Washington constitution than under the Fourth Amendment. 
Gunwall adopted the following six neutral interpretive factors: 
(1) the textual language of the state constitution; (2) the significant 
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differences in the texts of parallel provisions of the federal and state 
constitutions; (3) the state constitutional and common law history; 
(4) the preexisting state law; (5) the differences in structure between 
the federal and state constitutions; and (6) matters of particular state 
interest or local concern. Id. 
This analytical framework adopted in Gunwall provides the 
structure and foundation from which Washington courts continue to 
define the scope of article I, section 7. Recognizing the structural 
approach to state constitutional interpretation, however, continues to 
provide a reasoned method for resolving issues of state constitutional 
law. 
This Survey contains updated case comments and statutory ref-
erences that are current through March 2013, and focuses primarily 
on search and seizure law in the criminal context; it omits discussion 
of many procedural issues, including those arising under court rules 
that implement constitutional protections. In addition, all references 
to Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment, have been updated to the fifth edition, published in 
2012. 
  1583
CHAPTER 1 
Triggering Article I, Section 7 and the Fourth 
Amendment: Defining Searches and Seizures 
This chapter addresses three questions: (1) what is a search; (2) 
what is a seizure; and (3) who has standing to challenge a search or sei-
zure? These questions represent the threshold inquiry in any search or 
seizure problem. Unless a search or seizure has occurred within the 
meaning of the federal or state constitution, constitutional protections 
are not triggered. This chapter first discusses when a search has oc-
curred, from entries into the home to the taking of blood samples. The 
chapter then discusses when a seizure has occurred, be it an arrest, an 
investigatory stop, or the detainment of property. The chapter con-
cludes with a discussion of who may raise claims concerning article I, 
section 7 or the Fourth Amendment. 
1.0 DEFINING “SEARCH” PRE-KATZ:  
“CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AREAS” 
Prior to 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court found Fourth Amendment 
protections in “constitutionally protected areas.” Berger v. New York, 
388 U.S. 41, 59, 87 S. Ct. 1873, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040 (1967); Lopez v. 
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438–39, 83 S. Ct. 1381, 10 L. Ed. 2d 462 
(1963). The Fourth Amendment’s guarantees applied only to those 
searches that intruded into one of the “protected areas” enumerated 
within the Fourth Amendment: “persons” (including the bodies and 
clothing of individuals); “houses” (including apartments, hotel rooms, 
garages, business offices, stores, and warehouses); “papers” (such as 
letters); and “effects” (such as automobiles). See generally 1 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.1(a), at 563–76 (5th ed. 2012). 
This conception of the Fourth Amendment changed in 1967 when 
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 
88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). In Katz, the Court found that 
the Fourth Amendment protects “people, not places.” Id. at 350–52, 88 
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S. Ct. 507. That is, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, 
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection. . . . [b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Id. at 
351, 88 S. Ct. 507. The Court thus defined a search as that which in-
vades an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 360, 
88 S. Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring). The following sections examine 
the nature of this “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis as well 
as the continued vitality of the “constitutionally protected area.” See 1 
LaFave, supra, § 2.1, at 562–96. 
1.1 DEFINING “SEARCH” POST-KATZ: THE “REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF 
PRIVACY” 
The concurring opinion in Katz, which has since come to be ac-
cepted as the Katz test, explained that the Fourth Amendment extends 
search and seizure protections to all situations in which a defendant has 
a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 360, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring); see 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.1, at 562–96 (5th 
ed. 2012). A reasonable expectation of privacy is measured by a two-
fold analysis. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S. Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). First, a person must have “exhibited an actual (subjective) expec-
tation of privacy.” Id. For example, a person has no expectation of pri-
vacy where illegal business is openly conducted. State v. Clark, 129 
Wn.2d 211, 226, 916 P.2d 384 (1996); State v. Hastings, 119 Wn.2d 
229, 232, 830 P.2d 658 (1992). Second, the individual’s expectation 
must be “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S. Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 
94 (2001); State v. Carter, 151 Wn.2d 118, 127, 85 P.3d 887 (2004); 
State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 189, 867 P.2d 593 (1994). This “legit-
imate” expectation of privacy “must have a source outside of the Fourth 
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal proper-
ty law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by socie-
ty.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143–44 n.12, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. 
Ed. 2d 387 (1978). 
Similarly, article I, section 7 extends search and seizure protec-
tions to one’s “private affairs” and home. Const. art I, § 7. The focus is 
on “those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and 
should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a war-
rant.” State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689, 695, 92 P.3d 202 (2004) (quoting 
State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151 (1984)). In the re-
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mainder of this section, we discuss the protection of a person’s “private 
affairs” under article I, section 7 and the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy under the Fourth Amendment, as both have been applied to the 
use of sensory-enhancing devices and techniques such as canine sniffs, 
aerial surveillance, GPS trackers, and recording devices. 
In applying article I, section 7, courts engage in a case-by-case 
analysis concerning the use of sensory-enhancing techniques in the 
course of police investigations. For example, whether a canine sniff 
constitutes a search remains an unanswered question in Washington. 
State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 181, 196 P.3d 658 (2008). Specifically, 
Washington courts have rejected a blanket rule that canine sniffs are 
not searches, focusing instead on the intrusiveness of the sniff and the 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Boyce, 44 Wn. 
App. 724, 730, 723 P.2d 28 (1986); see also State v. Hartzell, 156 Wn. 
App. 918, 929–30, 237 P.3d 928 (2010) (dog sniff of exterior of car 
door is not a search); State v. Stanphill, 53 Wn. App. 623, 631, 769 
P.2d 861 (1989) (dog sniff of package at post office is not a search). 
Furthermore, under article I, section 7, aerial surveillance at cer-
tain altitudes without the aid of enhancement devices does not consti-
tute a search. State v. Cord, 103 Wn.2d 361, 365, 693 P.2d 81 (1985) 
(aerial surveillance of defendant’s property at an altitude of 3,400 feet 
without the aid of visual enhancement devices does not constitute a 
search); Myrick, 102 Wn.2d at 514, 688 P.2d 151 (observation of de-
fendant’s marijuana plants at an altitude of 1,500 feet with the unaided 
eye is not a search); State v. Wilson, 97 Wn. App. 578, 581, 988 P.2d 
463 (1999) (“Aerial surveillance is not a search where the contraband is 
identifiable with the unaided eye, from a lawful vantage point, and 
from a nonintrusive altitude.”); 1 LaFave, supra, § 2.3, at 712–803. 
Regarding GPS devices, a search occurs when the device is installed 
on an individual’s vehicle. State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 264, 76 
P.3d 217, 224 (2003). However, the question remains whether GPS 
tracking through means other than physical installation of a tracking 
device constitutes a search. 
Although it is not a violation of article I, section 7 to record a 
conversation when a party consents, Clark, 129 Wn.2d at 221; State v. 
Pulido, 68 Wn. App. 59, 63, 841 P.2d 1251 (1992), it is unlawful to 
record any “[p]rivate communication transmitted by telephone, tele-
graph, radio, or other device between two or more individuals . . . with-
out first obtaining the consent of all the participants in the communica-
tion.” RCW 9.73.030(1)(a) (emphasis added). An individual has “con-
sented” to the recording of electronic communications, however, if the 
individual has knowledge that the communications will be recorded. 
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State v. Townsend, 147 Wn.2d 666, 676, 57 P.3d 255 (2002) (defendant 
was deemed to have consented to the recording of the communications 
because he constructively knew that his attempts to arrange sexual en-
counters with a minor over an Internet instant messaging service were 
automatically recorded by the receiving computer); see also In re Mar-
riage of Farr, 87 Wn. App. 177, 184, 940 P.2d 679 (1997) (because an 
answering machine’s only purpose is to record messages, a defendant 
who knowingly left messages on the answering machine has implicitly 
consented to the recording and has no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy as to the recording); State v. Hinton, 169 Wn. App. 28, 280 P.3d 
476 (2012), review granted, 175 Wn.2d 1022, 291 P.3d 253 (2012) 
(text messages sent to and received by another individual’s phone are 
not constitutionally protected). Lastly, although an individual does not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation with a police 
officer recorded on a dashboard camera during a traffic stop, RCW 
9.73.090 nevertheless requires that the officer inform the individual, on 
camera, that the conversation is being recorded. Lewis v. State, Dep’t of 
Licensing, 157 Wn.2d 446, 473, 139 P.3d 1078 (2006). 
Under the Fourth Amendment, a canine sniff does not normally 
constitute a “search” because “any interest in possessing contraband 
cannot be deemed ‘legitimate,’ and thus, governmental conduct that 
only reveals the possession of contraband ‘compromises no legitimate 
privacy interest.’” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409, 125 S. Ct. 
834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842 (2005) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 
U.S. 109, 123, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984)); Florida v. 
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013). For a discussion 
of the use of canine sniffs and probable cause, see Florida v. Harris, 
133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61 (2013); see also infra § 2.4(b). 
Also, under the Fourth Amendment, aerial surveillance is not pre-
cluded merely because precautions are taken against ground surveil-
lance. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 90 L. 
Ed. 2d 210 (1986) (aerial surveillance of marijuana growing in a fenced 
backyard does not implicate Fourth Amendment because officer’s ob-
servations were merely from a public vantage point); see also Florida 
v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450, 109 S. Ct. 693, 102 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1989) 
(surveillance of a residential backyard by a helicopter is not a search). 
However, if highly sophisticated equipment is used in conducting the 
aerial surveillance, the Fourth Amendment may be implicated. Dow 
Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 90 L. 
Ed. 2d 226 (1986). 
There is also no legitimate expectation of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment when one party consents to the recording of a con-
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versation. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 726, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 
82 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984); see 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (“It shall not be 
unlawful . . . for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, 
oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a party to the 
communication or one of the parties to the communication has given 
prior consent to such interception.” (emphasis added)). Therefore, a 
defendant who utilized a telephone answering service whereby both he 
and the caller were aware that a third party was taking messages had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the recorded message, and thus, no 
search occurred when the records were subsequently subpoenaed. Smith 
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 
(1979). 
In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the rule in Katz as add-
ing to, not substituting for, the common-law trespassory test that pre-
dated Katz. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952, 181 L. Ed. 2d 
911 (2012). In Jones, the police attached a GPS device to the defend-
ant’s vehicle without a warrant and tracked his movements for twenty-
eight days. Id. at 948, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911. Without addressing the de-
fendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court found that an 
improper “search” occurred because, in attaching the GPS device to the 
vehicle, the police had committed a common-law trespass. Id. at 952, 
181 L. Ed. 2d 911. This trespass, combined with an attempt to find 
something or obtain information, constituted a search. Id. at 951 n.5, 
181 L. Ed. 2d 911. Accordingly, behavior possibly constituting a search 
is analyzed under either the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
test or the common-law trespass test resurrected in Jones. 
1.2 DEFINING “SEARCH” POST-KATZ: “CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED 
AREAS” 
Although the concept of “constitutionally protected areas” does 
not “serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment prob-
lem,” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 n.9, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. 
Ed. 2d 576 (1967), the concept retains considerable clout. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has referred to “constitutionally protected areas” since 
Katz and has given special deference to the areas specifically enumer-
ated within the Fourth Amendment. Because they are specifically enu-
merated in both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, houses 
and homes can be understood as such constitutionally protected areas. 
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1.3 SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF POST-KATZ ANALYSIS 
1.3(a) Residential Premises 
Article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution states that no 
person shall have “his home invaded.” Const. art. I, § 7. The Washing-
ton State Supreme Court has held that article I, section 7 is more pro-
tective of the home than is the Fourth Amendment. State v. Groom, 133 
Wn.2d 679, 685, 947 P.2d 240 (1997). 
Similarly, the Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . shall not be violated.” U.S. 
Const. amend. IV. The core of the Fourth Amendment is “the right of a 
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
government intrusion.” Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 
81 S. Ct. 679, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1961); see also Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 34, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001) (“[I]n the 
case of the search of the interior of homes—the prototypical and hence 
most commonly litigated area of protected privacy—there is a ready 
criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal expecta-
tion of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasona-
ble.”). Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment prohibits police from mak-
ing a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home, ab-
sent exigent circumstances, to effect a routine felony arrest. Payton v. 
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 
(1980). In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and seizures 
of persons, courts have drawn the Fourth Amendment line at the en-
trance to the house. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511, 81 S. Ct. 679. 
A search of a home can occur even when government officers do 
not personally enter the home. State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 186, 
867 P.2d 593 (1994) (“The constitutional line of privacy that encircles 
the home is more than just a barrier to physical penetration.”). Specifi-
cally, a search can occur when the “[g]overnment uses a device that is 
not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would pre-
viously have been unknowable without physical intrusion.” Kyllo, 533 
U.S. at 40, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (search occurred when thermal imaging de-
vice monitored a home from a public street). Similarly, a search occurs 
when the government monitors an electronic device to determine 
whether a particular article or person is within an individual’s home at 
a particular time. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15, 104 S. 
Ct. 3296, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984); see also Clinton v. Virginia, 377 
U.S. 158, 158, 84 S. Ct. 1186, 12 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1964) (Clark, J., con-
curring) (the Fourth Amendment is implicated when a microphone used 
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by police officers “penetrate[s]” the petitioner’s premises in a manner 
sufficient to constitute trespass). 
In Washington, the use of infrared surveillance of a home consti-
tutes a search under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amend-
ment. Young, 123 Wn.2d at 186, 867 P.2d 593. In contrast, using a 
flashlight to look through a window at night is no more invasive than 
using natural eyesight to look through a window in daylight, and it is 
therefore not a search. State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 400, 909 P.2d 
280 (1996). 
The privacy interest in a home is not confined to houses, but it ex-
tends to other types of residences. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 
U.S. 483, 490, 84 S. Ct. 889, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856 (1964) (hotel rooms); 
State v. Murray, 84 Wn.2d 527, 534, 527 P.2d 1303 (1974) (apart-
ments); State v. Davis, 86 Wn. App. 414, 419, 937 P.2d 1110 (1997) 
(motel rooms); State v. Ramirez, 49 Wn. App. 814, 818, 746 P.2d 344 
(1987) (hotel rooms). However, there is a reduced expectation of priva-
cy in motor vehicles that are readily mobile but can also be used for 
sleeping. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 389, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 
L. Ed. 2d 406 (1985) (mobile motor home). Additionally, there is a 
reduced privacy interest when several persons or families occupy 
premises in common rather than individually, such as sharing com-
mon living quarters but maintaining separate bedrooms. State v. Alex-
ander, 41 Wn. App. 152, 155–56, 704 P.2d 618 (1985). 
Despite the heightened protection of the home, objects and activi-
ties that are exposed to the “plain view” of outsiders are not protected 
because no intention to keep them private has been exhibited. State v. 
Clark, 129 Wn.2d 211, 229–30, 916 P.2d 384 (1996). Accordingly, a 
person may relinquish his or her privacy interest in an activity or 
object in the home by making the activity or object observable to 
persons outside. State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 408, 47 P.3d 
127 (2002). For example, a privacy expectation in an individual’s 
home is not reasonable when the individual positions himself in front 
of a window with the lights on and drapes open. State v. Drumhiller, 36 
Wn. App. 592, 595, 675 P.2d 631 (1984). In contrast, drawing the cur-
tains demonstrates a reasonable expectation of privacy, and the fact that 
an individual failed to completely shut the curtains does not diminish 
the reasonableness of that expectation. State v. Jordan, 29 Wn. App. 
924, 927, 631 P.2d 989 (1981). Under this “open view” doctrine, no 
search has occurred when an officer is lawfully present at a vantage 
point and able to detect something by utilization of one or more of his 
senses. State v. Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304, 313, 4 P.3d 130 (2000). 
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A person may waive his or her right to privacy by willingly admit-
ting a visitor; for example, waiver may occur where a person admits an 
undercover police officer into the premises to conduct an illegal trans-
action. See State v. Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836, 848, 904 P.2d 290 (1995) 
(defendant waived any right to privacy by willingly admitting plain-
clothes officer into a motel room to conduct a drug transaction); see 
also State v. Dalton, 43 Wn. App. 279, 284–85, 716 P.2d 940 (1986) 
(student invited officer into college dormitory to conduct an illegal 
drug transaction; warrantless entry upheld as nonintrusive since police 
were invited in and took nothing except what would have been taken by 
a willing purchaser). A person does not, however, relinquish the priva-
cy interest in the home by opening the door in response to a police of-
ficer’s knock. State v. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89 
(1985). For a discussion of the distinction between the plain view doc-
trine and the open view doctrine, see infra § 5.5. 
Courts in some jurisdictions have held that common hallways of 
multiple-dwelling buildings that are accessible to the public are not 
protected areas. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 
1252–53 (3d Cir. 1992); 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
2.3(b), at 739–48 (5th ed. 2012). For example, even if a building is se-
cure and not accessible to the public, some courts have found no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the common hallways. See, e.g., 
United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(apartment dweller of “high security” apartment building has no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of the building—
search is valid even though officer trespassed). See generally 1 LaFave, 
supra, § 2.3(b), at 739–48. In addition, the Fourth Amendment is trig-
gered when a housing inspector enters to conduct an administrative 
search. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 
18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967); City of Seattle v. McCready, 124 Wn.2d 300, 
309, 877 P.2d 686 (1994). Administrative searches are discussed infra 
§ 2.9(a). 
1.3(b) The Curtilage and Adjoining Lands 
The “curtilage” of residential premises consists of “all buildings 
in close proximity to a dwelling, which are continually used for carry-
ing on domestic employment; or such place as is necessary and conven-
ient to a dwelling, and is habitually used for family purposes.” United 
States v. Potts, 297 F.2d 68, 69 (6th Cir. 1961). The curtilage has been 
considered “part of [the] home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes,” 
and thus receives Fourth Amendment protections. Oliver v. United 
States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1984). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has identified four factors that should be 
reviewed in determining the extent of a residence’s curtilage: 
the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, 
whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the 
home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps 
taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by peo-
ple passing by. 
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 94 L. 
Ed. 2d 326 (1987). The Dunn Court expressly declined to adopt a 
“bright-line” rule that the curtilage extends no farther than the 
nearest fence surrounding a fenced house. Id. at 301 n.4, 107 S. Ct. 
1134. Rather, a court is to use the factors identified above as a tool 
in determining whether the area in question is so intimately tied to 
the home as to fall within “the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth 
Amendment protection.” Id. at 301, 107 S. Ct. 1134; see, e.g., United 
States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 2010) (small, enclosed 
yard adjacent to a home in a residential neighborhood is “clearly 
marked” area “to which the activity of home life extends,” and there-
fore within the curtilage); United States v. Davis, 530 F.3d 1069, 1079–
80 (9th Cir. 2008) (workshop not within the curtilage when nearly 200 
feet from the house, not shielded from view, set apart from house by a 
fence, and from which no domestic activity was observed); State v. 
Niedergang, 43 Wn. App. 656, 662, 719 P.2d 576 (1986) (car parked 
in cul-de-sac is not within curtilage). 
The curtilage also includes lands adjacent to a dwelling in which 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. Wattenburg v. United 
States, 388 F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1968) (reasonable expectation of 
privacy extends to backyard of lodge); see also Oliver, 466 U.S. at 
178, 104 S. Ct. 1735, (individual may have legitimate expectation of 
privacy in “area immediately surrounding the home”); 1 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.3(f), at 780–92 (5th ed. 2012). 
Under Washington law, there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in areas of a home’s curtilage impliedly open to the public. 
State v. Smith, 118 Wn. App. 480, 484–85, 93 P.3d 877 (2003). An 
open curtilage is an area “apparently open to the public, such as the 
driveway, the walkway, or any access route leading to the resi-
dence.” State v. Dodson, 110 Wn. App. 112, 123, 39 P.3d 324 
(2002). A police officer with legitimate business, when acting in the 
same manner as a reasonably respectful citizen, may lawfully enter 
these open curtilage areas. State v. Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304, 312, 4 
P.3d 130 (2000); see also State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 392, 909 
P.2d 280 (1996) (officer entitled to walk up onto a porch, which was 
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the usual access route to the house); State v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d 
688, 698–99, 861 P.2d 460 (1993) (unenclosed front porch held to be 
a public place, not a constitutionally protected area); State v. Gave, 77 
Wn. App. 333, 337, 890 P.2d 1088 (1995) (driveway, walkway, or 
access routes leading to residence or to porch of residence are all are-
as of “curtilage” impliedly open to the public); State v. Graffius, 74 
Wn. App. 23, 24, 871 P.2d 1115 (1994) (driveway commonly used for 
guests and members of the public not protected). Upon entering these 
areas in the same manner as a reasonably respectful citizen, Ross, 
141 Wn.2d at 312, 4 P.3d 130, the officer is free to use his or her 
senses, State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 807, 92 P.3d 228 (2004). 
When a police officer enters a property through an impliedly open 
curtilage area and discovers evidence, a court will consider a combina-
tion of factors to analyze the admissibility of evidence, including 
whether the officer (1) spied into the residence; (2) acted secretly; (3) 
acted after dark; (4) used the most direct access route; (5) tried to con-
tact the resident; (6) created an artificial vantage point; or (7) made the 
discovery accidentally. State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 332, 345, 815 P.2d 
761 (1991) (citing State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 905, 632 P.2d 44 
(1981)); see State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 807, 92 P.3d 228 
(2004) (quoting Seagull, 95 Wn.2d at 901, 632 P.2d 44 (“‘The mere 
observation of that which is there to be seen does not necessarily con-
stitute a search.’”)); Ross, 141 Wn.2d at 312, 4 P.3d 130 (reasonably 
respectful citizen rule); State v. Boethin, 126 Wn. App. 695, 700, 109 
P.3d 461 (2005) (evidence suppressed when, in traversing from the 
stairs to the garage and putting their noses close to the garage door, of-
ficers deviated substantially from what a reasonably respectful citizen 
would have done); State v. Jesson, 142 Wn. App. 852, 859, 177 P.3d 
139 (2008) (“While the ‘No Trespassing’ signs alone are not sufficient 
to remove implied consent to the access of the property via the drive-
way, the closed gate, the primitive road, the secluded location of the 
home in addition to the posted signs are sufficient.”); State v. Mierz, 72 
Wn. App. 783, 791, 866 P.2d 65 (1994), aff’d, 127 Wn.2d 460, 901 
P.2d 286 (1995) (warrantless intrusion into a backyard, which was 
enclosed by a six-foot fence and padlocked gate, violated the Fourth 
Amendment). 
1.3(c) “Open Fields” 
The expectation of privacy in structures located and viewed from 
outside the curtilage, but on private property, is the same as the expec-
tation of privacy in those structures viewed from public places. United 
States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 94 L. Ed. 2d 326 
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(1987). Therefore, police officers standing in an open field could look 
into a barn, even if the defendant had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the barn. Id.; see also 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 2.4(a)–(b), at 804–32 (5th ed. 2012). Under this “open fields” doc-
trine, an expectation of privacy in open fields is unreasonable. Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214 
(1984) (“[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate ac-
tivities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government in-
terference or surveillance.”). 
Moreover, a person in possession of land falling within the pur-
view of the open fields doctrine cannot create a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in the area by taking steps to conceal activities such as post-
ing “no trespassing” signs or erecting fences around the secluded areas. 
Id. at 182, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (issue was whether “government’s intrusion 
infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth 
Amendment”); State v. Dodson, 110 Wn. App. 112, 123, 39 P.3d 324 
(2002) (presence of “no trespassing” signs is not dispositive of the 
homeowner’s reasonable expectation of privacy). In addition, the fact 
that police commit a common law trespass while observing an object or 
activity in an open field does not render the intrusion a search under the 
federal constitution. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183, 104 S. Ct. 1735. Thus, an 
intrusion may be onto the land itself as well as by aerial surveillance, 
and yet it still not be considered a search. See id. 
Under article I, section 7, the relevant inquiry is not whether the 
observed object was in a “protected place” or whether the defendant 
had a legitimate and subjective expectation of privacy in the observed 
location, but rather whether “the State unreasonably intruded into the 
defendant’s ‘private affairs.’” State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 510, 
688 P.2d 151 (1984); State v. Wilson, 97 Wn. App. 578, 581, 988 P.2d 
463 (1999). The nature of the property may be a factor in determining 
what constitutes “private affairs,” but the fact that the location of the 
search is an open field is not conclusive. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d at 513, 
688 P.2d 151. 
1.3(d) Business and Commercial Premises 
The Fourth Amendment privacy protections extend to most busi-
ness and commercial premises. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 
U.S. 227, 235, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 90 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1986); Marshall v. 
Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 
(1978) (OSHA inspector’s entry into the nonpublic working areas of 
electrical and plumbing business constituted a search). Some Washing-
ton courts have interpreted article I, section 7 to be coextensive with 
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the Fourth Amendment in this context. See Seymour v. Wash. State 
Dep’t of Health, Dental Quality Assur. Comm’n, 152 Wn. App. 156, 
160, 216 P.3d 1039 (2009); Centimark Corp. v. Dep’t of Labor & In-
dus., 129 Wn. App. 368, 375, 119 P.3d 865 (2005). The expectation of 
privacy in commercial properties, however, is less than in the home. 
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 96 L. Ed. 2d 
601 (1987). As a result, unlike searches of private homes, warrantless 
administrative searches of commercial property may be authorized by 
the Legislature without violating the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 702, 
107 S. Ct. 2636. The Fourth Amendment could be violated, however, if 
the Legislature, in authorizing these warrantless administrative search-
es, failed to make rules governing the inspection procedure. Donovan v. 
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599, 101 S. Ct. 2534, 69 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1981). 
Courts often consider certain factors in determining whether war-
rantless administrative searches are allowed. One factor considered is 
whether a business, such as the liquor or firearms business, has histori-
cally been extensively regulated. See, e.g., Burger, 482 U.S. at 707, 107 
S. Ct. 2636 (automobile junkyards have historically been “closely regu-
lated”). Due to such long histories of government oversight in these 
industries, businesses do not enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Barlow’s, 436 U.S. at 313, 98 S. Ct. 1816 (distinguishing the liquor and 
firearms industries from ordinary businesses on the basis of “a long 
tradition of close government supervision”). 
Whether a place is a personal residence or a business may also af-
fect whether it constitutes curtilage or an open field. Dow Chem. Co., 
476 U.S. at 235, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (aerial photographs from navigable 
airspace of open areas of an industrial plant complex with numerous 
structures spread over 2,000 acres not a search because area not “curti-
lage”). Thus, the warrantless entry into the public lobby of a motel or 
restaurant for the purpose of serving an administrative subpoena is 
permitted although the “administrative subpoena itself [does] not au-
thorize either entry or inspection of [the] premises.” Donovan v. Lone 
Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 413–14, 104 S. Ct. 769, 78 L. Ed. 2d 567 
(1984) (an employer may not insist on a warrant as a condition prece-
dent to a valid administrative subpoena unless government inspectors 
seek nonconsensual entry into “areas not open to the public”). 
Courts have generally upheld police investigative entries into bus 
terminals, pool halls, bars, restaurants, and general stores such as furni-
ture stores and variety stores. 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 2.4(b), at 816–32 (5th ed. 2012). But the “‘implied invitation for cus-
tomers to come in’ . . . extends only to those times when the premises 
are . . . ‘open to the public’; the mere fact that certain premises are 
2013] Chapter 1: Triggering Article I, Section 7 1595 
open to the public at certain times does not justify entry by the police 
on other occasions.” Id. 
Although an individual enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his or her commercial premises, the warrant requirements for admin-
istrative searches of commercial premises may differ from those for 
searches in general. See infra § 6.4(b); see also 1 LaFave, supra, § 
2.4(b), at 816–32. 
1.3(e) Automobiles and Other Motor Vehicles 
Under article I, section 7, the protection against governmental in-
trusion into one’s “private affairs” includes automobiles and their con-
tents. State v. Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486, 494, 987 P.2d 73 (1999). Pas-
sengers in a vehicle also have a constitutionally protected privacy inter-
est that does not diminish merely by virtue of entering a vehicle. Id. 
This privacy interest is independent of the driver’s privacy interest. Id. 
Thus, even when a driver is under arrest, “where officers do not have 
articulable suspicion that an individual is armed or dangerous and have 
nothing to independently connect such person to illegal activity,” a 
search of a passenger in an automobile is invalid. Id. at 498, 987 P.2d 
73. 
Similarly, under the Fourth Amendment, automobiles constitute 
“effects.” United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 
L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977), overruled on other grounds by California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991). As 
a result, constitutional protections against unreasonable searches apply 
to automobiles and other motor vehicles. California v. Carney, 471 
U.S. 386, 390, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1985); New York v. 
Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112, 106 S. Ct. 960, 89 L. Ed. 2d 81 (1986) (“A 
citizen does not surrender all the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
by entering an automobile.”). Passengers and drivers in automobiles, 
however, have a reduced expectation of privacy. Wyoming v. Hough-
ton, 526 U.S. 295, 303, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999); see 
also Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424, 124 S. Ct. 885, 157 L. Ed. 2d 
843 (2004). 
This reduced expectation of privacy derives from the pervasive 
schemes of regulation and ready mobility unique to vehicles. See Car-
ney, 471 U.S. at 392, 105 S. Ct. 2066. As a result, when a vehicle is 
used as a home, its owner has a lesser expectation of privacy when that 
vehicle is readily, mobile, and licensed to operate on public streets. Id. 
at 393, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (mobile home in public lot was treated as a ve-
hicle); cf. State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 449, 909 P.2d 293 (1996) 
(lessened privacy interest for sleeper compartment of a tractor-trailer 
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rig). Additionally, courts have held that there is no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in things that are located on a vehicle’s exterior, in plain 
view of passersby. State v. McKinney, 148 Wn.2d 20, 32, 60 P.3d 46 
(2002) (computerized check of defendant’s license plate and driving 
record did not constitute a search under article I, section 7); see also 
United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (no 
search under Fourth Amendment). 
Because closed containers are neither regulated nor intended to 
facilitate mobility, the expectation of privacy in a closed container 
within a vehicle is not automatically reduced. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 
13, 97 S. Ct. 2476. Nevertheless, a warrantless search of a container 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment if officers have probable cause 
to believe that the container is concealing contraband. Houghton, 526 
U.S. at 300, 119 S. Ct. 1297. Under article I, section 7, additional pri-
vacy expectations result from locking the container. State v. Stroud, 
106 Wn.2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761, 777, 224 P.3d 751 (2009). 
1.3(f) Personal Characteristics 
The Fourth Amendment provides no protection for what “a person 
knowingly exposes to the public.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
351, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). Personal characteristics 
such as facial features and voice tone are continually exposed to the 
public and therefore not protected under the Fourth Amendment. Unit-
ed States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14, 93 S. Ct. 764, 35 L. Ed. 2d 67 
(1973) (“No person can have a reasonable expectation that others will 
not know the sound of his voice any more than he can reasonably ex-
pect that his face will be a mystery to the world.”). Like speech, hand-
writing is also often exposed to the public. Accordingly, an individual 
has no more privacy in his handwriting than in the sound of his voice. 
United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21, 93 S. Ct. 774, 35 L. Ed. 2d 99 
(1973). Article I, section 7 has been interpreted using this same analy-
sis. In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121 Wn.2d 80, 91 n.6, 847 P.2d 455 
(1993); see also Bedford v. Sugarman, 112 Wn.2d 500, 512, 772 P.2d 
486 (1989) (no privacy with regard to one’s personality, appearance, 
and behavior, which would normally be exposed in public). 
In contrast to the seizure of facial characteristics, voice exemplars, 
and handwriting samples, the taking of blood, urine, or DNA samples is 
considered a search within the meaning of both the Fourth Amendment 
and article I, section 7. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 
76, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 149 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2001) (urine samples); 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 
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2d 908 (1966) (blood samples); State v. Surge, 122 Wn. App. 448, 454, 
94 P.3d 345 (2004), aff’d, 160 Wn.2d 65, 74, 156 P.3d 208 (2007) 
(DNA samples); State v. Baldwin, 109 Wn. App. 516, 523, 37 P.3d 
1220 (2001) (breath and blood sample); Robinson v. City of Seattle, 102 
Wn. App. 795, 818–19, 10 P.3d 452 (2000) (urine samples). 
In Washington, mandatory blood testing, although considered a 
search, may still not violate article I, section 7 or the Fourth Amend-
ment when testing an individual with a diminished privacy interest. See 
State v. Meacham, 93 Wn.2d 735, 739, 612 P.2d 795 (1980) (putative 
fathers); In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121 Wn.2d at 93–94, 847 P.2d 
455 (sexual offenders); State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wn.2d 525, 535–36, 
852 P.2d 1064 (1993) (suspected sexual offenders); Surge, 160 Wn.2d 
at 74, 156 P.3d 208 (convicted felons). These searches may be justified 
under the special needs doctrine. See infra § 6.2. 
An individual may also unknowingly consent to a seizure of his or 
her bodily fluids. For example, under RCW 46.20.308, any person who 
operates a vehicle is deemed to have consented to a blood alcohol test. 
See Baldwin, 109 Wn. App. at 525 (upholding constitutionality of im-
plied consent statute). Further, a person retains no privacy interest in 
his saliva when he licks an envelope and places it in the mail. State v. 
Athan, 160 Wn.2d 354, 367, 158 P.3d 27 (2007). 
1.3(g) Personal Effects and Papers 
The Fourth Amendment expressly protects the right of privacy in 
“papers . . . and effects.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Although it is not ex-
plicitly stated, article I, section 7 protects personal effects in so far as 
they constitute “private affairs.” Const. art. I, § 7. With regard to a per-
son’s banking and home telephone records, garbage, and motel registry 
information, article I, section 7’s protection is broader than the protec-
tion provided by the Fourth Amendment. 
Under the Washington constitution, a person’s banking records 
constitute “private affairs” that are protected from warrantless searches. 
State v. Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236, 244, 156 P.3d 864 (2007). In accord-
ance with the plain view doctrine, however, there may be no expecta-
tion of privacy when a person exposes evidence of bank transactions to 
a third party, such as an insurance company. State v. Farmer, 80 Wn. 
App. 795, 801, 911 P.2d 1030 (1996). Under the Fourth Amendment, 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a person’s bank rec-
ords, checks, deposit slips, and other records relating to bank accounts. 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 71 
(1976). 
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With regard to a telephone user’s privacy interests, the Washing-
ton constitution again provides broader protection than the U.S. Consti-
tution. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 69, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). Un-
der the U.S. Constitution, individuals using their home telephones have 
no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the phone numbers dialed. 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 
220 (1979). In State v. Gunwall, however, the Washington Supreme 
Court declined to follow Smith v. Maryland, finding that article I, sec-
tion 7 was violated when the police used a pen register—a device that 
records or decodes electronic impulses transmitted on a home telephone 
line, see RCW 9.73.260(1)(d), without lawful authority to make a rec-
ord of the local and long distance telephone numbers dialed on the cus-
tomer’s telephone. 106 Wn.2d at 68–69, 720 P.2d 808. An individual 
does not, however, have a privacy interest in text messages sent to and 
received by another person and stored on that person’s phone. State v. 
Hinton, 169 Wn. App. 28, 43, 280 P.3d 476 (2012), review granted, 
175 Wn.2d 1022, 291 P.3d 253 (2012). 
Likewise, although the U.S. Constitution does not protect an ex-
pectation of privacy in one’s trash after it has been left outside to be 
picked up, California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 
100 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1988), the Washington constitution does, State v. Bo-
land, 115 Wn.2d 571, 578, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990). This expectation of 
privacy, however, can be lost depending on the circumstances. For ex-
ample, one court has found that there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in garbage bags left in front of a neighboring abandoned house. 
State v. Hepton, 113 Wn. App. 673, 679, 54 P.3d 233 (2002). Another 
court has found no reasonable expectation of privacy in stolen goods 
hidden in a community garbage receptacle. State v. Rodriguez, 65 Wn. 
App. 409, 418, 828 P.2d 636 (1992). Another court, however, has 
found that a person’s privacy right in his or her garbage “is not limited 
by the location of the garbage or the act of placing the garbage in the 
can.” State v. Sweeney, 125 Wn. App. 881, 887, 107 P.3d 110 (2005). 
Article I, section 7 also protects information contained in a motel 
registry, including information as to where an individual is located 
within the motel, as a “private affair” that the police may not search 
without an individualized suspicion. State v. Jorden, 160 Wn.2d 121, 
130, 156 P.3d 893 (2007). Under the Fourth Amendment, however, 
courts have found that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
motel guest registration records. United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 
1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000). 
With regard to information contained on personal computers, the 
Ninth Circuit has held that an individual has a legitimate expectation of 
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privacy in a personal computer. United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 
1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). This privacy interest diminishes, however, 
when a person installs and uses file-sharing software, thereby exposing 
his or her computer to other people. U.S. v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117, 
1127 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit has also found that the use of 
pen registers for computers—which identified the “to” and “from” ad-
dresses for e-mail messages, the IP addresses of websites visited, and 
the total data transmitted—did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. 
U.S. v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510, 511 (9th Cir. 2008). Analogizing 
to both physical mail and the telephone information obtained in Smith 
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577, by means of a pen register, 
the court found dispositive the fact that the police only obtained ad-
dressing information and not the contents of the messages. Forrester, 
512 F.3d at 510. 
Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, a 
search does not occur when the police search property that was volun-
tarily abandoned. State v. Reynolds, 144 Wn.2d 282, 287–88, 27 P.3d 
200 (2001) (no expectation of privacy in contents of jacket that was 
abandoned during an arrest). Whether property has been abandoned 
depends on an individual’s actions and intent, which can be inferred 
from the circumstances. State v. Dugas, 109 Wn. App. 592, 595, 36 
P.3d 577 (2001) (no abandonment when defendant asked police if he 
could take off his jacket because he felt hot and then placed the jacket 
on the hood of his car); see also State v. Kealey, 80 Wn. App. 162, 173, 
907 P.2d 319 (1995) (lost or mislaid property is not considered aban-
doned). In Washington, abandonment does not occur when the property 
is located in an area that retains privacy protections, even if the indi-
vidual denies ownership of the property. State v. Evans, 159 Wn.2d 
402, 413, 150 P.3d 105 (2007) (briefcase found in defendant’s car that 
defendant denied owning was not abandoned property). 
Lastly, both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 protect 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of first-class mail 
and sealed packages. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114, 104 
S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984); State v. Hinton, 169 Wn. App. 28, 
43, 280 P.3d 476 (2012), review granted, 175 Wn.2d 1022, 291 P.3d 
253 (2012). However, senders of mail have no reasonable expectation 
of privacy prohibiting a canine sniff of the package or protecting their 
names and addresses on the exterior of a package. State v. Stanphill, 53 
Wn. App. 623, 627, 769 P.2d 861 (1989) (release of information at re-
quest of police regarding arrival of package did not unreasonably in-
trude into private affairs). Analogizing text messages to letters, at least 
one Washington court has found that there is no privacy interest in 
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one’s received and stored text messages. Hinton, 169 Wn. App. at 44, 
280 P.3d 476; see infra § 5.23. 
1.4 DEFINING SEIZURES OF THE PERSON 
The definition of a seizure is comparatively the same under both 
article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment. A seizure occurs when 
an officer, by physical force or by show of authority, restrains an indi-
vidual’s freedom of movement. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544, 553, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980). More specifically, 
a seizure occurs when a police officer’s behavior would communicate 
to a reasonable, innocent person that he or she is not free to ignore the 
officer’s presence and walk away. Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 629, 
123 S. Ct. 1843, 155 L. Ed. 2d 814 (2003); United States v. Drayton, 
536 U.S. 194, 201, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242 
(2002); United States v. Guzman–Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th 
Cir. 2009); State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 574, 62 P.3d 489 
(2003). If the individual’s movement was already restricted by 
something independent from police behavior—for example, the in-
dividual was a passenger on a bus and wanted to remain on the bus, 
or the individual was at work and thus obligated to the employer—
the appropriate test is whether the individual felt free to terminate 
the encounter and ignore the officer’s questions. Florida v. Bostick, 
501 U.S. 429, 436, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991); see also 
I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247 
(1984) (finding no seizure of the workplace or of the individual work-
ers when INS agents moved systematically through the factory in-
quiring about the workers’ citizenship while other INS agents were sta-
tioned at the exits). 
Whether a seizure occurs depends on both the police officer’s 
conduct as well as the setting in which that conduct occurs. Michigan v. 
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565 
(1988). Under federal law, an individual is not seized until he or she 
acquiesces to an officer’s show of force. California v. Hodari D., 499 
U.S. 621, 629, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991). Rejecting 
this subjective element of the test, the Washington Supreme Court has 
held that the standard under article I, section 7 is a “purely objective” 
one. State v. Young, 135 Wn.2d 498, 510, 957 P.2d 681 (1998). Police 
behavior that could amount to a show of authority constituting a seizure 
includes “the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a 
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citi-
zen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance 
with the officer’s request might be compelled.” Id. at 512, 957 P.2d 681 
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(quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554–55, 100 S. Ct. 1870). According-
ly, a person cannot avoid seizure by failing to yield to an officer’s show 
of authority. State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 388, 219 P.3d 651 (2009) 
(citing Young, 135 Wn.2d 498, 957 P.2d 681). 
An arrest occurs when a police officer “manifests an intent to take 
a person into custody and actually seizes or detains such person.” Id. at 
387, 219 P.3d 651. Not every seizure, however, is considered an arrest. 
Brief, investigative detentions, often called Terry stops, do not consti-
tute arrests, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 
2d 889 (1968), because they are limited in scope and duration. State v. 
Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747, 64 P.3d 594 (2003) (citing State v. Wil-
liams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 740, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984)). For an in-depth 
discussion of Terry stops, see infra § 4.5. For a discussion of the level 
of proof needed to make seizures of the person, see infra §§ 2.1 (arrest) 
and 2.9(b) (Terry stop). 
Both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment may be trig-
gered when a person is detained in his or her own home. Michigan v. 
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981); 
State v. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89 (1985). Absent 
exigent circumstances, the police are prohibited from arresting individ-
uals in their homes without authority of law, usually an arrest warrant. 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 
(1980); State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 402, 166 P.3d 698 (2007); 
Holeman, 103 Wn.2d at 429, 693 P.2d 89; see also supra § 1.3(a). “Af-
ter the police obtain a valid warrant they have lawful authority for a 
limited intrusion to enter a residence, execute the arrest, and then 
promptly leave.” Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d at 402, 166 P.3d 698. In execut-
ing a valid search warrant at a home, it is also reasonable for an officer 
to “briefly detain occupants of that residence, to insure officer safety 
and an orderly completion of the search.” State v. King, 89 Wn. 
App. 612, 618–19, 949 P.2d 856 (1998). Further, because there is a 
lesser expectation of privacy, the police may arrest someone without 
a warrant when the person voluntarily exits the home to speak to 
officers on an unenclosed front porch. State v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d 
688, 696, 861 P.2d 460 (1993); see also infra § 4.2. 
1.4(a) Consensual Encounters 
Not every encounter with a police officer amounts to a seizure. 
Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 
185–86, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2004). A consensual en-
counter with an officer does not trigger the Fourth Amendment, 
even when the individual has been approached by an officer and is 
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aware of the officer’s identity as an officer. United States v. Dray-
ton, 536 U.S. 194, 200–01, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242 
(2002) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 
75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983)); see also State v. Belanger, 36 Wn. App. 
818, 820, 677 P.2d 781 (1984). 
There is no clear definition of a consensual social contact; it lies 
somewhere between a cordial greeting and a detention for investigative 
purposes. State v. Harrington, 167 Wn.2d 656, 664, 222 P.3d 92 
(2009). A common example of behavior constituting a consensual en-
counter rather than a seizure is when an officer asks for someone’s 
identification. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185–86, 124 S. Ct. 2451; see also 
State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 577, 62 P.3d 489 (2003); State v. 
Hansen, 99 Wn. App. 575, 578, 994 P.2d 855 (2000). A request for 
identification may constitute a seizure, however, when it follows a 
“considerable display of authority.” State v. Carney, 142 Wn. App. 
197, 202, 174 P.3d 142 (2007). 
Under article I, section 7, a social contact can evolve into a sei-
zure. Harrington, 167 Wn.2d at 665–66; 222 P.3d 92. For example, in 
Harrington, the Washington State Supreme Court found that although 
the interaction between the officer and defendant may have begun as a 
social contact on the street, it evolved into a seizure when another po-
lice officer arrived, and the first officer asked the defendant to remove 
his hands from his pockets and subsequently frisked him. Id. at 669, 
222 P.3d 92. Although the officers’ actions, when viewed individually, 
may not have amounted to a seizure, the actions did constitute a seizure 
when viewed cumulatively. Id. at 668, 222 P.3d 92; see also United 
States v. Washington, 490 F.3d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 2007) (initial consen-
sual encounter escalated into a seizure when late at night, uniformed 
officers questioned defendant, without informing him of his right to 
leave, and directed defendant to move to a location where the officers 
were in between defendant and his car); cf. State v. Smith, 154 Wn. 
App. 695, 700–02, 226 P.3d 195 (2010) (defendant’s interactions with 
the police did not evolve into a seizure when police requested, but did 
not order, defendant to exit hotel room, asked for identification, and 
asked for consent to search defendant’s openly displayed wallet). 
1.4(b) Seizures in Vehicles 
A seizure of an automobile driver occurs as soon as an officer in a 
police car switches on the flashing lights. State v. Gantt, 163 Wn. App. 
133, 141, 257 P.3d 682 (2011); State v. DeArman, 54 Wn. App. 621, 
624, 774 P.2d 1247 (1989). A vehicle that voluntarily stops in response 
to emergency lights and police actions directed at other individuals, 
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however, is not seized. United States v. Al Nasser, 555 F.3d 722, 731 
(9th Cir. 2009). The analysis differs somewhat with regard to parked 
vehicles because, once a vehicle is parked, its occupants are ostensibly 
pedestrians. State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 579, 62 P.3d 489 
(2003); see also State v. Johnson 156 Wn. App. 82, 92, 231 P.3d 225 
(2010) (no seizure when officer parked behind illegally parked car 
and asked for, but did not demand, defendant’s identification); State 
v. Cerrillo, 122 Wn. App. 341, 350, 93 P.3d 960 (2004) (no seizure 
when officer knocked on window of parked car and asked for identi-
fication). Such an encounter, however, can still ripen into a seizure 
when the police take additional actions. See State v. Beito, 147 Wn. 
App. 504, 510, 195 P.3d 1023 (2008) (seizure of passenger occurred 
when officer stood outside of passenger door, blocking passenger 
from exiting, told driver she was not allowed to leave, and persisted 
in asking passenger for identification). 
Under article I, section 7, absent a reasonable basis for the in-
quiry, a request for identification from a passenger of a vehicle for in-
vestigatory purposes constitutes a seizure. State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 
689, 697, 92 P.3d 202 (2004). At least one Washington court, howev-
er, has narrowed this rule to only circumstances in which a police of-
ficer has stopped a moving car with cause to detain and question the 
driver but not necessarily the passengers. State v. Mote, 129 Wn. App. 
276, 291, 120 P.3d 596 (2005). 
Under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, a sei-
zure also occurs when an officer stops automobiles pursuant to a sys-
tematic “spot check” or roadblock looking for drivers’ licenses, vehicle 
registrations, drunk drivers, or illegal alien smuggling. City of Indian-
apolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41, 121 S. Ct. 447, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333 
(2000); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449–50, 110 
S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555–56, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 
(1976); City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 457–60, 755 P.2d 
775 (1988). These seizures are often justified under the “special needs” 
doctrine and examined under a reasonableness standard. See infra § 6.3. 
1.5 DEFINING SEIZURES OF PROPERTY 
The Fourth Amendment protects both a person’s possessory inter-
est in his or her “effects” and his or her privacy interest. United States 
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1983). 
“A ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful inter-
ference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. 
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Ed. 2d 85 (1984); State v. Jackson, 82 Wn. App. 594, 603, 918 P.2d 
945 (1996). Put differently, an object is seized when government agents 
exercise “dominion and control” over the object. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 
120, 104 S. Ct. 1652; Jackson, 82 Wn. App. at 603–04, 918 P.2d 945. 
Thus, impounding a room or securing a home constitutes a seizure un-
der the Fourth Amendment. State v. Ng, 104 Wn.2d 763, 770, 713 P.2d 
63 (1985) (citing State v. Bean, 89 Wn.2d 467, 472, 572 P.2d 1102 
(1978)). At least one Washington court has found that transferring 
property within a home from one room to another could constitute a 
seizure. State v. Cotten, 75 Wn. App. 669, 682, 879 P.2d 971 (1994) 
(agents asserted dominion and control over a shotgun, even though that 
control was temporary, by taking shotgun from the bedroom, unloading 
it, and carrying it into another room). 
In some circumstances, interference with an individual’s posses-
sory interests may also implicate an individual’s liberty interests. For 
example, in Place, the seizure of luggage at an airport was determined 
to “effectively restrain the person since he is subjected to the possible 
disruption of his travel plans in order to remain with his luggage or to 
arrange for its return.” 462 U.S. at 708, 103 S. Ct. 2637; see also 4 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.8(e), at 1006–27 (5th ed. 
2012). 
1.6 STANDING TO RAISE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CLAIMS 
In Washington, standing to challenge police action under article I, 
section 7 may take one of two forms: automatic standing or asserting a 
violation of a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the object 
or place searched or seized. State v. Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836, 841, 904 
P.2d 290 (1995) (citing United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 86–
87, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1980)); see also State v. Wil-
liams, 142 Wn.2d 17, 23–24, 11 P.3d 714 (2000); State v. Libero, 
168 Wn. App. 612, 277 P.3d 708 (2012); State v. Kypreos, 110 Wn. 
App. 612, 39 P.3d 371 (2002) (discussing history of automatic 
standing doctrine). 
The first form of standing is automatic standing. Article I, section 
7 of the Washington constitution confers automatic standing upon any-
one charged with a possessory crime. State v. Evans, 159 Wn.2d 402, 
407, 150 P.3d 105 (2007) (citing State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 179, 
622 P.2d 1199 (1980) (plurality opinion) (upholding the use of auto-
matic standing based on the state constitution)). Put another way, “a 
defendant who has been charged with an offense that has possession as 
an element has automatic standing to challenge the search that led to 
the discovery of the substance the defendant is charged with pos-
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sessing.” State v. Chelly, 94 Wn. App. 254, 258, 970 P.2d 376 (1999); 
State v. Johnston, 38 Wn. App. 793, 801, 690 P.2d 591 (1984). In order 
to claim automatic standing, the defendant must show that (1) posses-
sion is an “essential” element of the offense for which the defendant is 
charged and (2) the defendant was in possession of the seized property 
at the time of the contested search. State v. Jones, 146 Wn.2d 328, 332, 
45 P.3d 1062 (2002). The “fruits of the search” must directly relate to 
the search the defendant is challenging. State v. Williams, 142 Wn.2d 
17, 24, 11 P.3d 714 (2000). 
The second form of standing analysis under article I, section 7 
tracks the standing analysis under the Fourth Amendment, see State v. 
Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836, 841, 904 P.2d 290 (1995) (citing Salvucci, 448 
U.S. at 86–87, 100 S. Ct. 2547), and more often applies to persons 
charged with non-possessory crimes, State v. Francisco, 107 Wn. App. 
247, 249, 26 P.3d 1008 (2001). Under the Fourth Amendment, the con-
cept of standing has been merged with the substantive law of the Fourth 
Amendment’s privacy analysis. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138–
40, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978). Accordingly, 
in order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a de-
fendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of 
privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is rea-
sonable; i.e., one that has “a source outside of the Fourth Amend-
ment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property 
law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by so-
ciety.” 
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 87–88, 119 S. Ct. 469, 142 L. Ed. 
2d 373 (1998) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12, 99 S. Ct. 421); 
see also Williams, 142 Wn.2d at 23, 11 P.3d 714; State v. Link, 136 
Wn. App. 685, 692, 150 P.3d 610 (2007); Francisco, 107 Wn. App. 
at 252, 26 P.3d 1008. 
By merging the standing issue with the privacy analysis, the fed-
eral courts abandoned the concept of automatic standing. Salvucci, 448 
U.S. at 92–93, 100 S. Ct. 2547. Hence, although the Fourth Amend-
ment no longer applies to searches of stolen goods, it does apply to 
searches of legally possessed items discovered in the search of stolen 
goods. Accordingly, an “illegal search only violates the rights of those 
who have ‘a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.’” 
Id. (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S. Ct. 421) (holding that unlaw-
ful possession of stolen goods stored in the apartment of another does 
not confer on thieves a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the inte-
rior of apartment). A person who resides in an apartment with the per-
mission of the lessee and who has a key to the apartment may therefore 
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assert a privacy interest in the interior of the apartment. Rakas, 439 
U.S. at 141–42, 99 S. Ct. 421 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 
257, 267, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960)). In many instances, an 
individual may be able to show both forms of standing because, gener-
ally, an individual “who owns or lawfully possesses or controls proper-
ty will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by vir-
tue of [his or her] right to exclude.” Id. at 143 n.12, 99 S. Ct. 421. Spe-
cific applications of this standing analysis often involve passengers in 
vehicles and houseguests. 
A mere passenger in a motor vehicle may not assert a personal 
privacy interest in the interior of the vehicle, but may challenge his or 
her own seizure. Id. at 148–50, 99 S. Ct. 421; United States v. Pulliam, 
405 F.3d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 2005); State v. Byrd, 110 Wn. App. 259, 
264, 39 P.3d 1010 (2002) (“[A] passenger in a vehicle stopped by po-
lice officers can contest the lawfulness of the stop.”). An unauthorized 
driver, however, may have standing to challenge a search of the vehicle 
if he or she has received permission to use the car. United States v. 
Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2006). 
With regard to a person’s presence in someone else’s home, an 
overnight guest has standing to challenge a search of the 
home. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96–97, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 109 L. 
Ed. 2d 85 (1990). A defendant who was legitimately, but only casually, 
on the premises, however, does not necessarily demonstrate a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the home. State v. Boot, 81 Wn. App. 
546, 551, 915 P.2d 592 (1996). Four relevant but nonexhaustive factors 
for analyzing whether a social guest had standing are (1) the defend-
ant’s relationship with the homeowner or tenant; (2) the context and 
duration of the visit during which the search took place; (3) the fre-
quency and duration of the defendant’s previous visits to the home; and 
(4) whether the defendant kept personal effects in the home. Link, 136 
Wn. App. at 693, 150 P.3d 610. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Standards of Proof 
2.0 THE NATURE OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
This chapter summarizes the standards for probable cause for 
searches and seizures conducted with or without a warrant. Sections 2.1 
and 2.2 discuss the nature of the standard, while sections 2.3 through 2.8 
discuss specific types of information considered in the probable cause 
determination. Finally, section 2.9 summarizes the types of searches and 
seizures for which probable cause is either not required or a lesser stan-
dard is applied. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides 
that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const. 
amend. IV. Under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution, 
“[n]o person shall be disturbed . . . without authority of law.” Const. art I, 
§ 7. As under the Fourth Amendment, this “authority of law” is fulfilled 
by a warrant, issued upon probable cause that is established by sworn 
affidavit. State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 465, 158 P.3d 595 (2007); 
see also State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 108, 59 P.3d 58 (2002). The 
probable cause analysis is thus substantively the same under article I, 
section 7 and the Fourth Amendment. State v. Grande, 164 Wn.2d 135, 
141, 187 P.3d 248 (2008). 
The probable cause requirement is a fact-based determination rep-
resenting a compromise between society’s competing interests of enforc-
ing the law and protecting the individual’s right to privacy. State v. Neth, 
165 Wn.2d 177, 182, 196 P.3d 658 (2008) (citing Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)). Prob-
able cause requires reasonable grounds to believe that a defendant is 
guilty of a crime. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S. Ct. 
795, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769 (2003). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 3.2 (5th ed. 2012) (discussing the general nature of 
probable cause). The police officer must be aware of reasonably trust-
worthy information that would cause a reasonable officer to believe that 
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a crime has been committed. State v. Potter, 156 Wn.2d 835, 840, 132 
P.3d 1089 (2006); State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 70, 93 P.3d 872 
(2004); State v. Reeb, 63 Wn. App. 678, 681–82, 821 P.2d 84 (1992) (in-
formation need only be reasonably trustworthy, not absolutely accurate). 
The belief must be specific to the person to be searched or seized. 
Grande, 164 Wn.2d at 144, 187 P.3d 248 (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 
U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979)). 
Probable cause is required for searches and seizures regardless of 
whether a search warrant is required, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 479–80, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963), or an arrest is 
made, State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107, 112, 874 P.2d 160 (1994). 
Where a valid search or seizure occurs without a warrant, police may 
initially determine whether probable cause exists, but the grounds for the 
search or seizure must be strong enough to obtain a warrant. Wong Sun, 
371 U.S. at 480, 83 S. Ct. 407. A neutral and detached magistrate must 
make the probable cause determination for a warrant to issue. Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948). In 
addition, a suspect arrested without a warrant may not be detained for an 
extended period of time without a judicial determination of probable 
cause. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 124–25, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L. Ed. 
2d 54 (1975). See generally 2 LaFave, supra § 3.1. 
When federal officers are working with and assisting state officials, 
they must comply with the Washington constitution. State v. Johnson, 75 
Wn. App. 692, 700, 879 P.2d 984 (1994). Conversely, when federal of-
ficers obtain evidence pursuant to federal law and independent of state 
officials, the evidence may be used in a state criminal proceeding even if 
the procedure involved would have violated the Washington constitution. 
State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 591, 940 P.2d 54, (1997); In re 
Teddington, 116 Wn.2d 761, 772–73, 808 P.2d 156 (1991). Courts have 
reasoned that the Washington constitution cannot control the independent 
conduct of federal agents. State v. Bradley, 105 Wn.2d 898, 902–03, 719 
P.2d 546 (1986). Accordingly, where a federal warrant is served, the fed-
eral standard for probable cause applies even though the evidence would 
be used in state courts. See Johnson, 75 Wn. App. at 699, 879 P.2d 984. 
Though the probable cause requirement is a fact-based determina-
tion, it may be satisfied even when police officers make a reasonable 
mistake of fact. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d at 117, 59 P.3d 58 (incorrect date of 
informant’s observations in affidavit did not affect the finding of proba-
ble cause); In re Yim, 139 Wn.2d 581, 597, 989 P.2d 512 (1999) (failure 
to assert in affidavit that defendant lacked a license to sell explosives was 
not critical when magistrate could reasonably infer that defendant was 
probably engaged in the unlicensed manufacture and sale of explosives); 
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State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 900, 908, 632 P.2d 44 (1981) (warrant 
valid even though officer misidentified tomato plant as marijuana). 
Likewise, negligent or innocent mistakes are insufficient to void a find-
ing of probable cause. State v. Gore, 143 Wn.2d 288, 296, 21 P.3d 262 
(2001), overruled on other grounds, State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 
110 P.3d 192 (2005); In re Yim, 139 Wn.2d at 597, 989 P.2d 512; 
Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 479, 158 P.3d 595. Probable cause can exist 
even where an incongruity is legal rather than factual: probable cause 
may still exist at the time of arrest even if the statute under which an in-
dividual is being arrested is later declared unconstitutional. State v. 
Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 183, 233 P.3d 879 (2010); State v. Potter, 129 
Wn. App. 494, 497, 119 P.3d 877 (2005). 
The probable cause requirement may not, however, be satisfied 
when the police make an “inexcusable mistake of law” (in other words, 
they incorrectly believe that certain conduct is unlawful), State v. Mel-
rose, 2 Wn. App. 824, 828, 470 P.2d 552 (1970), or when probable cause 
is based on a law “so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any per-
son of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws,” Michigan 
v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1979). 
Additionally, if the defendant can show, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the affidavit on which probable cause was based contained 
“intentional material omissions or material omissions made with reckless 
disregard for the truth,” then the omitted evidence must be considered in 
the probable cause finding. Gore, 143 Wn.2d at 297, 21 P.3d 262. The 
defendant, however, must make a substantial showing as to both materi-
ality and intentionality for the omission. State v. Garrison, 118 Wn.2d 
870, 872–73, 827 P.2d 1388 (1992) (per curiam) (mere showing of the 
omission of material that is critical to a finding of probable cause is not a 
sufficient preliminary showing that the omission was a reckless disregard 
for the truth). See generally Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56, 
98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978). 
2.1 PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD: ARREST VERSUS SEARCH 
Generally, probable cause requires the same sufficiency of evidence 
regardless of whether it concerns a search or an arrest. State v. Grande, 
164 Wn.2d 135, 142, 187 P.3d 248 (2008) (citing 2 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 3.1(b) (4th ed. 2004)). In practice, however, the 
standards are not necessarily identical: probable cause for a search does 
not always constitute probable cause for an arrest, and probable cause for 
an arrest does not necessarily justify a search. See State v. Dalton, 73 
Wn. App. 132, 140, 868 P.2d 873 (1994) (“[P]robable cause to believe a 
man has committed a crime on the street does not necessarily give rise to 
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probable cause to search his home.”) (citing Commonwealth v. 
Kline, 234 Pa. Super. 12, 17, 335 A.2d 361 (1975)). 
For a search, the officer must have probable cause to believe that 
the items to be seized are connected with criminal activity and will be 
found in the place to be searched. State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 145–
47, 151, 977 P.2d 582 (1999); State v. McReynolds, 104 Wn. App. 560, 
570, 17 P.3d 608 (2001) (inscribed crow bar alone provided insufficient 
nexus between alleged crimes and the defendant’s residence). Broad 
generalizations of criminal activity alone, by themselves, may not be suf-
ficient. Thein, 138 Wn.2d at 147, 977 P.2d 582 (rejecting generalization 
that drug dealers keep drugs at home); State v. Jackson, 111 Wn. App. 
660, 688, 46 P.3d 257 (2002) (rejecting generalization that criminals 
commonly return to the scene of their crime); State v. Nordlund, 113 Wn. 
App. 171, 182–84, 53 P.3d 520 (2002) (generalized statements about the 
computer habits of sex offenders insufficient to justify search of defend-
ant’s personal computer); State v. McGovern, 111 Wn. App. 495, 499–
501, 45 P.3d 624 (2002) (magistrate could infer that evidence of drug 
dealing would be found in defendant’s home based on generalization that 
drug dealers keep drugs at their home plus additional facts suggesting 
that “this drug dealer probably keeps drugs at his or her residence”); see 
also United States v. Rodgers, 656 F.3d 1023, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(“[A]n assumption that most sixteen-year-old passengers have identifica-
tion does not lead to probable cause to search every car carrying a teen-
ager absent some individualized suspicion . . . .”). The item sought need 
not be at the place to be searched at the time the warrant is issued, but the 
magistrate must have reasonable grounds to believe it will be there at the 
time of the search. State v. Maddox, 116 Wn. App. 796, 804, 67 P.3d 
1135 (2003) (magistrate could reasonably infer that drugs or evidence of 
drug dealing were in the defendant’s home based on evidence that the 
defendant was dealing drugs from his home); State v. Perez, 92 Wn. 
App. 1, 7–9, 963 P.2d 881 (1998) (sufficient facts supported inference of 
large-scale drug dealing to support search of alleged safe house). 
For an arrest, probable cause exists when the arresting officer has 
information that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the sus-
pect has committed a crime. State v. Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711, 724, 927 
P.2d 227 (1996); State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 70, 93 P.3d 872 (2004); 
State v. Cerrillo, 122 Wn. App. 341, 350–51, 93 P.3d 960 (2004). Proba-
ble cause to arrest is a nontechnical standard based on the facts and cir-
cumstances known to the officer at the time of arrest. State v. Baxter, 68 
Wn.2d 416, 420, 413 P.2d 638 (1966); State v. Lewellyn, 78 Wn. App. 
788, 797–98, 895 P.2d 418 (1995), aff’d, 130 Wn.2d 215, 922 P.2d 811 
(1996) (officer’s observations, defendant’s driving, and field sobriety 
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tests supported probable cause for DWI arrest); State v. Garcia, 63 Wn. 
App. 868, 870–75, 824 P.2d 1220 (1992) (hotel maid’s observations of 
folded papers in a drawer, diesel fuel smell, and telephone calls at all 
hours were not sufficient by themselves, but when combined with the 
police information of the suspect’s car on a drug trafficking tip sheet, did 
constitute sufficient probable cause); State v. Griffith, 61 Wn. App. 35, 
39, 808 P.2d 1171 (1991) (police had probable cause to arrest the de-
fendant on a DWI charge when the defendant drove erratically, hit a 
roadway construction sign, did not stop in response to police emergency 
flashers, and proceeded to a home); State v. Fore, 56 Wn. App. 339, 
343–44, 783 P.2d 626 (1989) (probable cause existed based on officer’s 
observation of drug transactions in area with reported narcotics activity 
and performed in a manner similar to undercover buys made by the of-
ficer); see also State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 824–825, 147 P.3d 
1201 (2006) (probable cause existed for blood draw of suspect to com-
pare with DNA samples from hospital rape-kit performed on victim); 
State v. Mance, 82 Wn. App. 539, 541–42, 918 P.2d 527 (1996) (infor-
mation obtained after defendant was arrested could not be used to estab-
lish probable cause for the arrest). Facts that arise after a warrant is is-
sued are immaterial unless they were reasonably inferable when the war-
rant was issued. State v. Goble, 88 Wn. App. 503, 508, 945 P.2d 263 
(1997). Finally, where a seizure does not amount to an arrest, varied 
standards may apply. See infra § 2.9. 
2.2 PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD: CHARACTERISTICS  
2.2(a) Objective Test 
Under both the federal and state constitutions, the probable cause 
standard is an objective one. State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 70, 93 P.3d 
872 (2004); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 
142 (1964). The officer’s subjective belief is not determinative. State v. 
Huff, 64 Wn. App. 641, 645, 826 P.2d 698 (1992), review denied, 119 
Wn.2d 1007, 833 P.2d 387 (1992). Accordingly, an officer’s good faith 
is not enough to justify a search absent probable cause, and likewise, an 
officer’s belief that probable cause was not present is also not determina-
tive. Id.; see also State v. Gaddy, 114 Wn. App. 702, 706, 60 P.3d 116 
(2002), aff’d on other grounds by 152 Wn.2d 64, 93 P.3d 872 (officer’s 
good faith reliance on an agency “hot sheet” would not validate an arrest 
if the “hot sheet” was not based upon probable cause); State v. Rodri-
guez-Torres, 77 Wn. App. 687, 693, 893 P.2d 650 (1995) (officer’s sub-
jective belief that probable cause did not exist was not dispositive); Huff, 
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64 Wn. App. at 645–46, 826 P.2d 698 (officer’s subjective belief that an 
offense has been committed does not cure a lack of probable cause). 
Additionally, the probable cause standard is determined with refer-
ence to a reasonable person with the expertise and experience of the of-
ficer in question. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897–98, 95 S. 
Ct. 2585, 45 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1975) (border patrol officers are entitled to 
draw inferences in light of their prior experience with aliens and smug-
glers). As a result, an officer’s particular training and expertise is highly 
important. State v. Cole, 128 Wn.2d 262, 289, 906 P.2d 925 (1995), ab-
rogated on other grounds by In re Det. of Petersen, 145 Wn.2d 789, 42 
P.3d 952 (2002) (acknowledging officer’s drug enforcement experience 
and ability to identify marijuana smell); Rodriguez-Torres, 77 Wn. App. 
at 693–94, 893 P.2d 650 (probable cause existed when an officer with 
specialized training in narcotics enforcement observed exchange of mon-
ey for hidden, cupped object in an area known for narcotics, and de-
fendant fled upon notice of officer’s presence). The officer’s basis of 
knowledge, specific training, and experience must be included in the af-
fidavit so that the magistrate may make an independent determination of 
probable cause and establish more than the officer’s personal belief. 
State v. Jacobs, 121 Wn. App. 669, 678, 89 P.3d 232 (2004), reversed on 
other grounds by 154 Wn.2d 596, 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (noting that an 
affidavit’s failure to indicate an officer’s experience and education is not 
fatal to the resulting warrant’s validity if other facts establish probable 
cause); State v. Johnson, 79 Wn. App. 776, 780, 904 P.2d 1188 (1995). 
Similarly, a dog’s training and experience is important for establishing 
probable cause predicated on a canine sniff alert. See Florida v. Harris, 
133 S. Ct. 1050, 1057, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61 (2013). 
2.2(b) Quantum of Evidence Required 
Probable cause is a quantum of evidence “less than . . . would jus-
tify . . . conviction,” yet “more than bare suspicion.” Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949). Alt-
hough a single fact in isolation may not be sufficient, probable cause 
may exist when that fact is read together with other facts stated in the 
affidavit. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 110, 59 P.3d 58 (2002); State 
v. Tarter, 111 Wn. App. 336, 341, 44 P.3d 889 (2002). 
Accordingly, to make an arrest, the officer need only have reasona-
ble grounds for suspicion and evidence of circumstances sufficiently 
strong enough to justify a cautious and disinterested person in believing 
that the suspect is guilty. State v. Scott, 93 Wn.2d 7, 10–11, 604 P.2d 943 
(1980) (officers possessing description of car used in robbery and license 
number of similar car used in robbery involving similar modus operandi 
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had probable cause to arrest persons who were driving a similar vehicle 
toward the address where the car’s license number was traced). The exact 
quantum of evidence required is unclear and may depend in part on the 
nature of the intrusion and the seriousness of the offense. See generally 2 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(e) (5th ed. 2012). 
2.2(c) Individualized Suspicion 
Probable cause to arrest an individual exists only if police have rea-
sonable grounds to believe that the particular individual has committed 
the crime. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 
2d 238 (1979); State v. Grande 164 Wn.2d 135, 145, 187 P.3d 248 
(2008). Accordingly, Washington courts have required individualized 
suspicion as to each occupant of a vehicle; the passenger cannot be ar-
rested based solely on individualized suspicion as to the driver. Grande, 
164 Wn.2d at 146–47, 187 P.3d 248. Under the Fourth Amendment, 
however, a police officer may reasonably infer a “common enterprise” 
among passengers in a vehicle. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371–
73, 124 S. Ct. 795, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769 (2003). 
Individualized suspicion may also be described as a sufficient nex-
us between the suspects to be searched and the criminal activity. State v. 
Carter, 79 Wn. App. 154, 158, 901 P.2d 335 (1995). This was not the 
case in Carter, where a police informant observed residents and non-
residents of a building buying, selling, and using illegal drugs, but the 
informant was unable to identify any of the individuals by name. Id. at 
156, 901 P.2d 335. Based upon the informant’s observations, the police 
obtained a warrant to search “all ‘persons at the residence at the time the 
warrant i[s] being served as well as persons arriving at and leaving the 
residence at the time the warrant is being executed for controlled sub-
stances and papers of identification.’” Id. Upon execution of the warrant, 
the police found the defendant asleep on a mattress in the living room 
and discovered rock cocaine in his pants pocket. Id. at 157, 901 P.2d 335. 
The court held that the warrant did not justify a search of the defendant’s 
person because the observations of the informant did not support the 
conclusion that only illegal conduct occurred within the apartment and 
that any person present was likely to be involved with criminal activity 
“in such a way as to have evidence of the criminal activity on his per-
son.” Id. at 161, 901 P.2d 335 (quoting Stokes v. State, 604 So.2d 836, 
838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)). However, the court carefully noted that it 
was not deciding whether warrants with “all persons present” language 
would be valid under different circumstances. Id. Washington courts also 
require individualized suspicion before the police search motel registries 
for outstanding warrants. See State v. Jorden, 160 Wn.2d 121, 130, 156 
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P.3d 893 (2007); In re Nichols, 171 Wn.2d 370, 377, 256 P.3d 1131 
(2011). 
Individualized suspicion may not be required when the police are 
conducting a valid vehicle roadblock or spot check. See infra § 5.18. Fur-
ther, individualized suspicion may also not be required for some admin-
istrative searches. See generally infra § 6.4(b), (c). 
2.3 INFORMATION CONSIDERED: IN GENERAL 
A court reviewing a probable cause determination considers only 
the information that was available to the magistrate at the time that the 
warrant was issued to the officer. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 481–82, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963); State v. Murray, 
110 Wn.2d 706, 709–10, 757 P.2d 487 (1988). Probable cause must be 
based on facts and not on mere conclusions. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 
108, 113, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964), abrogated on other 
grounds by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 
527 (1983); State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 145–47, 977 P.2d 582 
(1999). In addition, probable cause must exist at the actual time of arrest 
or search, and it cannot be stale. See State v. Lyons, 174 Wn.2d 354, 368, 
275 P.3d 314 (2012) (no timely probable cause when affidavit failed to 
state when the informant observed a marijuana grow operation); State v. 
Maddox, 152 Wn.2d 499, 505–06, 98 P.3d 1199 (2004) (delay in execut-
ing a warrant “may render the magistrate’s probable cause determination 
stale,” but common sense is the test for staleness based on the facts and 
circumstances identified in the affidavit). 
Affidavits for search warrants must be evaluated in a com-
monsense, non-hypertechnical manner. In re Yim, 139 Wn.2d 581, 597, 
989 P.2d 512 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by In re Jagana, 170 
Wn. App. 32, 282 P.3d 1153 (2012); State v. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d 962, 965, 
639 P.2d 743 (1982); see infra § 3.3(b). “The support for issuance of a 
search warrant is sufficient if, on reading the affidavits, an ordinary per-
son would understand that a violation existed and was continuing at the 
time of the application.” Fisher, 96 Wn.2d at 965, 639 P.2d 743 (quoting 
State v. Clay, 7 Wn. App. 631, 637, 501 P.2d 603 (1972)). All doubts are 
resolved in favor of the warrant’s validity. Maddox, 152 Wn.2d at 509, 
98 P.3d 1199; State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 195, 867 P.2d 593 (1994); 
State v. Olson, 73 Wn. App. 348, 354, 869 P.2d 110 (1994). 
Information need not be admissible at trial in order to support prob-
able cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172–74, 69 S. Ct. 
1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949); Bokor v. Dep’t of Licensing, 74 Wn. App. 
523, 526, 874 P.2d 168 (1994). For example, marital privilege does not 
prevent a spouse’s statements from being used to establish probable 
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cause. State v. Bonaparte, 34 Wn. App. 285, 289, 660 P.2d 334 (1983). 
See generally infra § 7.3. 
Even if a search may have occurred illegally, “a search warrant 
[will] not [be] rendered totally invalid if the affidavit contains sufficient 
facts to establish probable cause independent of the illegally obtained 
information.” State v. Coates, 107 Wn.2d 882, 887, 735 P.2d 64 (1987). 
In Coates, for example, the police obtained a search warrant based par-
tially on facts that were obtained in violation of the defendant’s right to 
remain silent. Id. However, the court upheld the search warrant because 
other facts in the affidavit supported a finding of probable cause. Id. at 
888–89, 735 P.2d 64. 
2.3(a) Hearsay 
Hearsay from an informant can establish probable cause for a war-
rant as long as there is evidence that provides reason to believe that the 
informant is reliable and has an adequate basis of knowledge. State v. 
Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 437–38, 688 P.2d 136 (1984) (“If the inform-
ant’s information is hearsay, the basis of knowledge prong can be satis-
fied if there is sufficient information so that the hearsay establishes a ba-
sis of knowledge.”); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416, 89 S. 
Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969), abrogated on other grounds by Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983); Agui-
lar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 113–14, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 
(1964), abrogated on other grounds by Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 
2317. As a result, a magistrate may rely on a police officer’s affidavit or 
other testimony that relays hearsay information based on a fellow of-
ficer’s personal knowledge. State v. Lodge, 42 Wn. App. 380, 386, 711 
P.2d 1078 (1985). The affidavit may also relate hearsay from informants 
as long as there is a basis for crediting it. State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 
209–10, 720 P.2d 838 (1986); State v. Lund, 70 Wn. App. 437, 449–50 
n.9, 853 P.2d 1379 (1993); see infra § 2.5. Multiple levels of hearsay 
may also be considered if the requirements are met for each person in the 
chain of information. See Huft, 106 Wn.2d at 209–10, 720 P.2d 838 
(concerned citizen information not sufficient without basis of informant’s 
knowledge); State v. Vanzant, 14 Wn. App. 679, 683, 544 P.2d 786 
(1975) (information passed to second detective by detective with person-
al knowledge of informant’s reliability sufficient to establish probable 
cause for arrest). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 3.2(d) (5th ed. 2012). 
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2.3(b) Prior Arrests, Prior Convictions, and Reputation 
A magistrate or police officer making a probable cause determina-
tion may consider prior convictions that have probative value to the spe-
cific probable cause inquiry. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 111 n.51, 
59 P.3d 58 (2002); State v. Clark, 143 Wn.2d 731, 749, 24 P.3d 1006 
(2001) (defendant’s prior conviction was “helpful in establishing proba-
ble cause” when the conviction was of the same general nature as the 
crime under investigation); State v. Sterling, 43 Wn. App. 846, 851, 719 
P.2d 1357 (1986) (occupant’s two prior convictions for narcotics can be 
a factor in determining probable cause). A prior criminal record—even 
of the same type of criminal conduct—does not alone justify a warrant-
less search. State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437, 446, 617 P.2d 429 (1980); 
State v. Duncan, 81 Wn. App. 70, 78, 912 P.2d 1090 (1996); see Beck v. 
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964); 2 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(d) (5th ed. 2012). While prior acts 
may establish probable cause when the modus operandi is similar and 
distinctive, see 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.2(d), a general assertion of criminal 
reputation is insufficient, Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416, 89 
S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969), abrogated on other grounds by Illi-
nois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted that an officer’s knowledge 
of a suspect’s reputation is a “practical consideration of everyday life” 
upon which an officer (or a magistrate) may rely in determining the reli-
ability of an informant. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S. 
Ct. 2075, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1971) (plurality opinion). Specific facts lead-
ing to a conclusion that a suspect has a bad reputation may also be con-
sidered. Id.; see 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.2(d). 
2.3(c) Increased Electrical Consumption 
Standing alone, an increase in electrical use does not constitute suf-
ficient probable cause to issue a search warrant. State v. Olson, 73 Wn. 
App. 348, 356, 869 P.2d 110 (1994); State v. Sterling, 43 Wn. App. 846, 
851, 719 P.2d 1357 (1986); State v. McPherson, 40 Wn. App. 298, 301, 
698 P.2d 563 (1985). Evidence of increased power consumption, absent 
other information, is an innocuous fact and cannot corroborate an anon-
ymous tip of suspected criminal activity. State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 
196, 867 P.2d 593 (1994); see also State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 211, 
720 P.2d 838 (1986) (“[T]here are too many plausible reasons for in-
creased electrical use to allow a search warrant to be issued based on in-
creased consumption.”). When the increase in power consumption is 
combined with other factors, however, the increase may be considered in 
determining whether probable cause exists. State v. Cole, 128 Wn.2d 
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262, 291, 906 P.2d 925 (1995), overruled on other grounds by In re Det. 
of Petersen, 145 Wn.2d 789, 801, 42 P.3d 952 (2002) (increase in elec-
trical consumption is a proper factor in determining probable cause when 
combined with other suspicious factors); Sterling, 43 Wn. App. at 851–
52, 719 P.2d 1357 (400–500 percent increase in power usage combined 
with suspicious facts supported probable cause for search warrant). For 
example, Washington courts have considered evidence of power usage 
three to four times greater than the previous occupant’s, in combination 
with the absence of accumulated snow on the roof when neighboring 
buildings had 20 to 30 inches, in determining that probable cause was not 
established. State v. Rakosky, 79 Wn. App. 229, 239–40, 901 P.2d 364 
(1995). 
An individual has a protected privacy interest in power usage rec-
ords such that a disclosure of this information is prohibited unless there 
is written notice to the utility company that the person is suspected of 
criminal activity. RCW 42.56.314 (formerly RCW 42.17.314, prohibiting 
the inspection or copying of a person’s utility records by law enforce-
ment unless the utility is provided a written statement that indicates the 
person is suspected of committing a crime and there is a reasonable be-
lief that the records could determine or help determine whether the sus-
picion is true). See generally Cole, 128 Wn.2d at 290, 906 P.2d 925 (a 
search warrant satisfies the requirements of former RCW 42.17.314); In 
re Maxfield, 133 Wn.2d 332, 341–42, 945 P.2d 196 (1997) (no reasona-
ble suspicion of criminal activity because electrical service was new and 
records showed high electrical consumption pottery kilns were to be used 
at location); State v. Maxwell, 114 Wn.2d 761, 767–69, 791 P.2d 223 
(1990) (telephonic request for utility record not admissible because ver-
bal request was in violation of former RCW 42.17.314); In re Rosier, 
105 Wn.2d 606, 613–16, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986) (recognizing the need to 
balance the public’s interest in disclosure of information leading to ar-
rests and the individual and societal interest in preventing “fishing expe-
ditions” by the government). 
2.3(d) Polygraph Results 
The results of a polygraph test may be considered in a magistrate’s 
probable cause determination, even though such results are inadmissible 
at trial unless stringent conditions are satisfied. State v. Clark, 143 
Wn.2d 731, 749–50, 24 P.3d 1006 (2001). Although the qualifications of 
the FBI agent who administered the polygraph test in Clark were not set 
forth in the affidavit, the court noted that information from a reliable in-
formant has corroborative value even if the informant’s basis of 
knowledge is not specified. Id. at 750, 24 P.3d 1006 (citing State v. Lair, 
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95 Wn.2d 706, 712, 630 P.2d 427 (1981)). In Clark, the FBI agent’s ba-
sis of knowledge was “the administration of the polygraph test and his 
clinical and common sense observation of Clark’s performance.” Id. 
2.3(e) Taking of Blood Samples 
The police have probable cause to believe that a person’s blood 
sample will provide evidence of criminal activity justifying the seizure if 
the facts and circumstances known to the officers justify their belief that 
the person is intoxicated and has committed a crime of which intoxica-
tion is an element. State v. Curran, 116 Wn.2d 174, 184, 804 P.2d 558 
(1991), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Berlin, 133 Wn.2d 541, 
947 P.2d 700 (1997); see also State v. Schulze, 116 Wn.2d 154, 161, 
804 P.2d 566 (1991) (no right to counsel prior to undergoing a manda-
tory blood draw); State v. Komoto, 40 Wn. App. 200, 208, 697 P.2d 
1025 (1985) (police may enter the home of a suspected drunk driver if 
police “have probable cause to believe that the suspect was under the 
influence, that he has committed a felony of which being under the 
influence of alcohol is an element, and that he is presently at home”). 
2.4 LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS’ FIRST-HAND OBSERVATIONS 
Because the existence of probable cause is dependent on a fact-
based inquiry, it is impossible to define when an officer’s observations 
are sufficient to constitute probable cause. However, the following com-
mon factual situations provide some general guidance. 
2.4(a) Particular Crimes: Stolen Property 
Suspicious conduct suggesting that property is stolen does not al-
ways establish probable cause. For example, when officers saw two men 
park a car in an alley, load it with cartons, drive away, and later return 
and repeat their conduct, the officers did not have probable cause to be-
lieve that the cartons contained stolen property. Henry v. United States, 
361 U.S. 98, 99, 103, 80 S. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1959). 
The alternative outcome occurred in a case where officers stopped a 
vehicle after learning that its owner had an outstanding warrant for a traf-
fic violation. State v. Glasper, 84 Wn.2d 17, 18, 523 P.2d 937 (1974). 
The police then saw an unpadded, unsecured television in the open trunk. 
Id. A passenger in the car claimed ownership of the set, but was unable 
to identify the brand. Id. The court held that the police had reasonable 
cause to believe that the television was stolen. Id. at 21, 523 P.2d 937. 
Similarly, items wrapped in a blanket on a street and thrown into bushes 
when police approached were indicative of stolen property when police 
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had previous experience with similar situations. State v. Barber, 118 
Wn.2d 335, 337–38, 340, 823 P.2d 1068 (1992). However, in another 
case, the existence of an expensive briefcase in a car that had not been 
reported stolen was not sufficient to establish probable cause for a vehi-
cle search. State v. Ozuna, 80 Wn. App. 684, 688–89, 911 P.2d 395 
(1996). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.6(a), 
(5th ed. 2012). 
2.4(b) Particular Crimes: Illegal Substances 
The odor of an illegal substance may establish probable cause as 
long as the odor is detected by someone trained and experienced in de-
tecting illegal substances. State v. Jacobs, 121 Wn. App. 669, 678, 89 
P.3d 232 (2004), rev’d on other grounds, 154 Wn.2d 596, 115 P.3d 281 
(2005); State v. Olson, 73 Wn. App. 348, 356, 869 P.2d 110 (1994) 
(trained officer’s detection of marijuana odor); State v. Vonhof, 51 Wn. 
App. 33, 41–42, 751 P.2d 1221 (1988) (odor combined with experience 
in smelling the illegal substance constituted probable cause). The affida-
vit in support of a warrant must set forth the officer’s training and experi-
ence in identifying the odor. See State v. Remboldt, 64 Wn. App. 505, 
510, 827 P.2d 282 (1992); State v. Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711, 724–725, 
927 P.2d 227 (1996); State v. Solberg, 66 Wn. App. 66, 79, 831 P.2d 754 
(1992), rev’d on other grounds, 122 Wn.2d 688, 861 P.2d 460 (1993) 
(officer had experience in identifying marijuana grow operations); State 
v. Fore, 56 Wn. App. 339, 343–44, 783 P.2d 626 (1989) (officer training 
relevant to surveillance of drug transactions in park). However, even if 
the officer’s experience and education is not in the affidavit, the omission 
is not fatal to the search warrant’s validity if other facts in the affidavit 
demonstrate probable cause. Jacobs, 121 Wn. App. at 678, 89 P.3d 232. 
Absolute certainty as to the identity of a substance is not required. 
Graham, 130 Wn.2d at 725, 927 P.2d 227 (quoting Fore, 56 Wn. App. at 
345, 783 P.2d 626). Moreover, odor may be used in concert with other 
suspicious activities to establish probable cause. See State v. Huff, 64 
Wn. App. 641, 647–48, 826 P.2d 698 (1992) (odor of methamphetamine 
combined with furtive gestures and lying to police during car stop creat-
ed probable cause). Documentation purporting to authorize a defendant’s 
use of marijuana will not negate an officer’s probable cause. State v. Fry, 
168 Wn.2d 1, 6, 228 P.3d 1 (2010). The authorization creates only a po-
tential affirmative defense that would excuse the criminal act. Id. at 7–8, 
228 P.3d 1. However, the officer’s experience and training on the charac-
teristics of those who cultivate illegal substances, without more, is not 
enough to establish probable cause. Olson, 73 Wn. App. at 357, 869 P.2d 
110 (officer’s experience that those who cultivate marijuana usually hide 
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records and materials in a safe house under their control does not satisfy 
probable cause for search warrant of the safe house premises); State v. 
Perez, 92 Wn. App. 1, 7–8, 963 P.2d 881 (1998) (sufficient facts sup-
ported inference of large-scale drug dealing to support search of alleged 
safe house); see State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 150, 977 P.2d 582 
(1999) (magistrate could not infer that evidence might be found in the 
defendant’s home based solely on generalization that drug dealers likely 
keep drugs at their home). See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
3.6(b) (5th ed. 2012). 
In the case of a drug enforcement dog sniff, an alert establishes 
probable cause if the dog’s training and reliability are known to the offi-
cers and set forth in the affidavit for a warrant. State v. Jackson, 82 Wn. 
App. 594, 606–07, 918 P.2d 945 (1996) (alert by police dog after tempo-
rary seizure of Federal Express package constituted probable cause); 
State v. Flores-Moreno, 72 Wn. App. 733, 740–41, 866 P.2d 648 (1994) 
(probable cause established from observations of drug deal combined 
with positive canine sniff); State v. Stanphill, 53 Wn. App. 623, 632, 769 
P.2d 861 (1989) (corroborating canine sniff overcame any deficiency in 
the reliability of an informant). The U.S. Supreme Court has found that 
“evidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification or train-
ing program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust [the dog’s] 
alert[]” such that a court can initially presume that the alert provides 
probable cause to search. Florida v. Harris, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 
2d 61 (2013). In Harris, however, the Court used the “totality of the cir-
cumstances” test established in Illinois v. Gates to determine that the ab-
sence of records establishing the dog’s track record in locating substanc-
es in the field did not invalidate probable cause. Id., at 1055, 185 L. Ed. 
2d. 61. The Washington State Supreme Court, however, has declined to 
follow the test set out in Illinois v. Gates, and therefore the applicability 
of the totality of the circumstances test to probable cause predicated on a 
canine sniff alert under article I, section 7 remains unclear. State v. Jack-
son, 102 Wn.2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); see Florida v. Jardines, 133 
S. Ct. 1409, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013). 
2.4(c) Association: Persons and Places 
Because of the individualized suspicion requirement, mere associa-
tion with a person whom police have grounds to arrest does not consti-
tute probable cause for arrest. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587, 
68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L. Ed. 210 (1948) (search of a car passenger unjustified 
when the driver was arrested for possession of counterfeit ration cou-
pons). Mere proximity to others suspected of criminal activity does not in 
itself establish probable cause for a search of the associate. State v. 
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Crane, 105 Wn. App. 301, 312, 19 P.3d 1100 (2001), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 62 P.3d 489 (2003); State v. 
Dorsey, 40 Wn. App. 459, 466, 698 P.2d 1109 (1985) (probable cause 
based on association with others engaged in criminal activity requires an 
additional circumstance that reasonably implies knowledge of or partici-
pation in that activity). An officer must establish an individualized find-
ing of probable cause to make a lawful arrest. State v. Grande, 164 
Wn.2d 135, 140, 187 P.3d 248 (2008). In Grande, the court held that the 
officer did not have probable cause to arrest and search a car passenger 
based solely on the smell of marijuana emanating from the car. Id. at 
146, 187 P.3d 248. Additionally, race or color alone, including “racial 
incongruity” (“a person of any race being allegedly ‘out of place’ in a 
particular geographic area”) can never constitute probable cause of crim-
inal activity. State v. Barber, 118 Wn.2d 335, 346, 823 P.2d 1068 
(1992); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–87, 
95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975). 
Neither is an individual’s presence in a high-crime area sufficient, 
by itself, to establish probable cause. See Crane, 105 Wn. App. at 312, 
19 P.3d 1100; see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 
61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979). Suspicion of dangerousness must relate to the 
person searched, not to the area in which he is found. State v. Smith, 102 
Wn.2d 449, 452–53, 688 P.2d 146 (1984) (general practice of frisking 
individuals in particularly dangerous area of the city is not justified by 
probable cause). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
3.6(g) (5th ed. 2012).  
2.4(d) Furtive Gestures and Flight 
A suspect’s furtive gestures or flight, without more, cannot estab-
lish probable cause; however, they may be a factor in determining 
whether probable cause exists. State v. Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711, 725–26, 
927 P.2d 227 (1996) (finding probable cause when the defendant quickly 
concealed an object in his pants pockets, ignored the officers’ request to 
stop, looked nervous, and sweated profusely on a cold night); State v. 
Hobart, 24 Wn. App. 240, 243, 600 P.2d 660 (1979), rev’d on other 
grounds, 94 Wn.2d 437, 617 P.2d 429 (1980) (defendant grabbed his 
pocket and turned away from an officer after the officer asked if the de-
fendant had cocaine in his pocket). This is because furtive gestures, eva-
sive behavior, and flight from police are circumstantial evidence of crim-
inal activity. Graham, 130 Wn.2d at 725–26, 927 P.2d 227 (concealing 
item that looked like rock cocaine in hand, ignoring an officer’s request 
to stop, and profusely sweating in cold temperature); State v. Glover, 116 
Wn.2d 509, 512, 514–15, 806 P.2d 760 (1991) (defendant’s conduct of 
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turning away from the officers, walking faster, playing with his ball cap, 
and looking toward the officers and then looking away, coupled with 
officer’s disbelief of defendant’s statement that he lived at housing com-
plex constituted probable cause for criminal trespass); State v. Baxter, 68 
Wn.2d 416, 421–22, 413 P.2d 638 (1966) (“[F]light is an element of 
probable cause. . . .”); State v. Huff, 64 Wn. App. 641, 647, 826 P.2d 698 
(1992) (furtive movements and lying to police about identity support 
probable cause); see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66–67, 88 S. 
Ct. 1889, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917 (1968) (probable cause existed when 
strangers tiptoed from apartment and fled from police officer); State v. 
Larson, 93 Wn.2d 638, 645, 611 P.2d 771 (1980) (suspect’s leaving at 
the time a police cruiser arrives does not necessarily lead to the conclu-
sion that it is reasonable to suspect the person of committing a crime). 
Probable cause, however, is not negated merely because it is possible to 
imagine an innocent explanation for observed activities. Graham, 130 
Wn.2d at 725, 927 P.2d 227 (quoting State v. Fore, 56 Wn. App. 339, 
344, 783 P.2d 626 (1989)) (noting that absolute certainty as to the identi-
ty of a suspicious substance is not required). 
2.4(e) Response to Questioning 
A suspect’s response to police questioning can establish probable 
cause when combined with other circumstances. State v. Huff, 64 Wn. 
App. 641, 647, 826 P.2d 698 (1992) (lying to police about identity cou-
pled with furtive gestures and identification of illegal substance odor es-
tablished probable cause); State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d 509, 514, 806 P.2d 
760 (1991) (officer’s disbelief of defendant’s statement that he lived at 
housing complex, combined with suspicious gestures, constituted proba-
ble cause for criminal trespass); see also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 
891, 897, 95 S. Ct. 2585, 45 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1975) (border patrol may 
consider nature of responses to questioning to help establish probable 
cause). 
A suspect’s failure or refusal to answer an officer’s questions, how-
ever, may not be taken into account. State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 106, 
640 P.2d 1061 (1982); see Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 n.3, 99 S. Ct. 
2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 3.6(f) (5th ed. 2012). Similarly, a suspect’s silence 
after Miranda warnings have been given may not be considered in de-
termining probable cause. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617–18, 96 S. 
Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976). Nor may the suspect’s failure to chal-
lenge the officer’s actions be considered. United States v. Di Re, 332 
U.S. 581, 594, 68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L. Ed. 210 (1948) (officers could not 
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infer probable cause from suspect’s failure to protest arrest or to pro-
claim innocence). 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amend-
ment cannot compel a suspect to answer questions, a state may criminal-
ize a suspect’s refusal to identify herself if the request for identification 
is reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the investigative 
stop. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nevada, Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 
177, 187–89, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2004); see State v. 
Turner, 103 Wn. App. 515, 525–26, 13 P.3d 234 (2000) (holding the de-
fendant’s refusal to provide his name combined with the defendant’s 
lunging at the officer were sufficient to support an arrest for obstruction 
of a law enforcement officer); State v. Contreras, 92 Wn. App. 307, 316, 
966 P.2d 915 (1998) (recognizing the defendant’s right to refuse to an-
swer questions, but including the defendant’s giving a false name as one 
reason that supported a charge for obstruction of justice). See generally 
RCW 9A.76.020(1) (Washington’s obstruction of justice statute). 
2.5 INFORMATION FROM AN INFORMANT: IN GENERAL 
Different sets of rules govern information received from an infor-
mant depending on whether the informant is a criminal informant, a citi-
zen informant, a police informant, or an anonymous informant. This sec-
tion discusses general rules that apply to all informants; section 2.6 fo-
cuses on citizen informants; section 2.7 covers the rules for when the 
informant is a fellow police officer; and section 2.8 deals with anony-
mous informants. 
Traditionally, under the Fourth Amendment, information from an 
informant could establish probable cause only when the information 
available to the police satisfied the two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test, 
which requires that an informant’s basis of knowledge and reliability be 
established. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415–16, 89 S. Ct. 
584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S. 
Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964); see 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 3.3(a) (5th ed. 2012). While the Supreme Court has since re-
jected Aguilar-Spinelli in favor of a less stringent totality of the circum-
stances approach for determining when an informant’s tip may estab-
lish probable cause, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231–32, 103 
S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), the Washington State Supreme 
Court has held that article I, section 7 requires adherence to the Agui-
lar-Spinelli test. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 111–12, 59 P.3d 58 
(2002) (citing State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 440, 688 P.2d 136 
(1984)). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has since replaced the Aguilar-Spinelli test 
with a less stringent totality of the circumstances approach for determin-
ing when an informant’s tip may establish probable cause. Gates, 462 
U.S. at 230–32, 103 S. Ct. 2317. A Washington trial court, however, may 
not use the Gates “totality of the circumstances” test. State v. Gaddy, 152 
Wn.2d 64, 71 n.2, 93 P.3d 872 (2004); Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 443, 688 
P.2d 136; see 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.3(a). As a result, under article I, sec-
tion 7, a strong showing as to an informant’s basis of knowledge cannot 
overcome a deficiency in the informant’s credibility and vice versa. 
Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 441, 688 P.2d 136. But probable cause may still 
be established despite such a deficiency if the police can support this 
missing prong by sufficiently corroborating the informant’s tip. Id. at 
445, 688 P.2d 136. 
Under the “basis of knowledge” prong, the facts must enable the 
person making the probable cause determination, such as a magistrate, to 
decide whether the informant had a basis for the allegation of criminal 
conduct. Id. at 444, 688 P.2d 136 (basis of knowledge not satisfied when 
informant could not establish how he knew the defendant was a drug 
dealer). Under the “veracity” prong, the facts must enable the magistrate 
to determine either the informant’s inherent credibility or reliability on 
the particular occasion. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415–16, 89 S. Ct. 584. An 
informant’s tip may provide police with grounds to stop a person only if 
there are some indicia of reliability. State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d 449, 455, 
688 P.2d 146 (1984) (officers’ reliance on street kids to lead them to 
suspect is not permissible when the officers questioned the reliability 
of children). If either the basis of knowledge or veracity prong is de-
ficient, the police may cure the deficiency by corroborating the in-
formant’s tip through an independent investigation. Vickers, 148 
Wn.2d at 112, 59 P.3d 58. 
2.5(a) Satisfying the “Basis of Knowledge” Prong by  
Personal Knowledge 
The best way to satisfy the “basis of knowledge” prong is to show 
that the informant based his or her information on personal knowledge. 
See, e.g., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 
2d 723 (1964); State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 112, 59 P.3d 58 (2002); 
State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 437, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); State v. 
Bauer, 98 Wn. App. 870, 875, 991 P.2d 668 (2000). For example, an in-
formant’s statement that he had observed a marijuana grow operation in 
the defendant’s residence will satisfy the basis of knowledge prong. State 
v. Wolken, 103 Wn.2d 823, 827, 700 P.2d 319 (1985). The affidavit need 
only show that the informant had personal knowledge of the facts as-
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serted. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d at 113, 59 P.3d 58 (affidavit did not need to 
establish that informant had actually seen the weapons or ammunition 
used in a robbery, but did need to establish that the informant had per-
sonal knowledge of the facts asserted in the affidavit regarding the de-
fendants’ conversations about committing an armed robbery). Personal 
knowledge of only innocuous facts about the defendant, however, is in-
sufficient. State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 196, 867 P.2d 593 (1994) 
(phone number, address, and abnormally high electrical consumption 
considered innocuous facts); State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 211, 720 P.2d 
838 (1986) (1986). Lastly, the basis of an informant’s knowledge may be 
established by hearsay. See State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 437, 688 P.2d 
136; State v. Casto, 39 Wn. App. 229, 233, 692 P.2d 890 (1984). 
Under article I, section 7, a deficiency in the basis of knowledge 
prong may be remedied by “independent police investigatory work that 
corroborates the tip to such an extent that it supports the missing ele-
ments.” Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 438, 688 P.2d 136; see also State v. Ken-
nedy, 72 Wn. App. 244, 249–50, 864 P.2d 410 (1993); State v. Adame, 
39 Wn. App. 574, 576–77, 694 P.2d 676 (1985). The corroborated in-
formation, like an informant’s first-hand knowledge, must itself suggest 
criminal activity; “[m]erely verifying ‘innocuous details,’ commonly 
known facts or easily predictable events should not suffice to remedy 
[the] deficiency.” Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 438, 688 P.2d 136; State v. 
Maddox, 116 Wn. App. 796, 803, 67 P.3d 1135 (2003), aff’d, 152 Wn.2d 
499, 98 P.3d 1199 (2004) (corroboration of alleged drug dealing suffi-
cient when police searched informant before a controlled buy, observed 
his entrance and exit, and then re-searched the informant after the con-
trolled buy); State v. Maxwell, 114 Wn.2d 761, 769–70, 791 P.2d 223 
(1990) (frequent visitors, tin foil on windows, and suspicious conversa-
tion not sufficient evidence of illegal activity). 
Lastly, even if a deficiency in the information renders it insufficient 
to establish probable cause, it may be used to corroborate other cogniza-
ble information. State v. Lund, 70 Wn. App. 437, 450 n.10, 853 P.2d 
1379 (1993) (anonymous police informant’s tip of possible drug activity 
in prison not enough to establish probable cause, but could be considered 
in corroborating another police informant’s similar information and for 
independent police investigation of tip); State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 
712, 630 P.2d 427 (1981) (statements by a reliable informant may estab-
lish probable cause when used to corroborate information provided by an 
informant whose reliability has not yet been established). See generally 2 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3(f) (5th ed. 2012). 
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2.5(b) Satisfying the “Veracity” Prong by Past Performance 
The veracity prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test is a measure of an 
informant’s truthfulness. State v. Chamberlin, 161 Wn.2d 30, 41, 162 
P.3d 389 (2007). This prong is met when the affidavit supporting the 
search warrant shows the informant’s credibility or contains sufficient 
facts from which a magistrate can independently determine the veracity 
of the informant. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 112, 59 P.3d 58 (2002); 
State v. Garcia, 140 Wn. App. 609, 619, 166 P.3d 848 (2007) (quoting 
State v. McCord, 125 Wn. App. 888, 893, 106 P.3d 832 (2005)); State v. 
Maddox, 116 Wn. App. 796, 803, 67 P.3d 1135, aff’d, 152 Wn.2d 499, 
98 P.3d 1199 (2004) (informant’s “track record” of two successful con-
trolled buys sufficient to support an inference of veracity). 
An informant’s reliability may be established if the informant has 
previously provided information that was proven to be reliable, thereby 
establishing a “track record” of reliability. State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 
432, 437, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); State v. Shaver, 116 Wn. App. 375, 380–
81, 65 P.3d 688 (2003) (confidential informant had provided reliable in-
formation to the officer in the past); State v. Lopez, 70 Wn. App. 259, 
264, 856 P.2d 390 (1993) (informant’s successful assistance in prior con-
trolled buys established a track record of reliability); see 2 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3(b) (5th ed. 2012). In the absence of 
circumstances demonstrating unreliability, an officer need not have per-
sonal knowledge of the informant’s track record, but may rely on infor-
mation from fellow officers. State v. Vanzant, 14 Wn. App. 679, 681–82, 
544 P.2d 786 (1975); see infra § 2.7(b). Further, similar to an inform-
ant’s basis of knowledge, an informant’s credibility may be verified by 
independent police investigation. See Shaver, 116 Wn. App. at 380–81, 
65 P.3d 688 (confidential informant’s credibility corroborated by offi-
cer’s ongoing investigation of drug activity at a residence for many years 
prior to informant’s tip and officer’s observations that residence was fre-
quented by known drug users); State v. Emery, 161 Wn. App. 172, 202, 
253 P.3d 413 (2011) (informant’s veracity confirmed by police investiga-
tion). 
2.5(c) Satisfying the “Veracity” Prong with Admissions Against  
Interest and Motive 
The veracity prong may also be established when the informant has 
a clear motive for being truthful, such as receiving a benefit in return for 
good information. State v. Bean, 89 Wn.2d 467, 469–71, 572 P.2d 1102 
(1978) (offer of a favorable sentence recommendation gave informant a 
strong motive to provide accurate information); State v. Estorga, 60 Wn. 
App. 298, 305, 803 P.2d 813 (1991) (offer to drop charges in exchange 
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for accurate information established strong motive to be truthful); State 
v. Smith, 39 Wn. App. 642, 647–48, 694 P.2d 660 (1984) (offer of reduc-
tion in charge from felony to misdemeanor gave informant strong motive 
to be truthful). An informant’s statement against penal interest, or recita-
tion of another person’s statement against interest, particularly when 
supported by other indicia of reliability, may also demonstrate a motive 
for being truthful and thereby establish credibility. State v. Chamberlin, 
161 Wn.2d 30, 42, 162 P.3d 389 (2007) (informant’s confession of driv-
ing under the influence of narcotics, supported by his willingness to be a 
named informant, established reliability); State v. Merkt, 124 Wn. App. 
607, 613−14, 102 P.3d 828 (2004); State v. Shaver, 116 Wn. App. 375, 
380–81, 65 P.3d 688 (2003) (confidential informant relayed comments 
against penal interest made by suspected drug dealer). 
2.6 CITIZEN INFORMANTS: VICTIM/WITNESS INFORMANTS IN GENERAL 
The Aguilar-Spinelli test also applies to the use of information from 
a citizen informant. State v. Wible, 113 Wn. App. 18, 22, 51 P.3d 830 
(2002); State v. Tarter, 111 Wn. App. 336, 340, 44 P.3d 899 (2002) 
(Aguilar-Spinelli test applied where informants were named citizens). 
Again, multiple levels of hearsay are acceptable as long as each instance 
in the chain meets the two-prong test. See, e.g., State v. Vanzant, 14 Wn. 
App. 679, 683, 544 P.2d 786 (1975) (information passed to second detec-
tive by detective with personal knowledge of informant’s reliability suf-
ficient to establish probable cause for arrest). See generally 2 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.4 (5th ed. 2012). Lastly, a demonstration 
of reliability may not be required if a citizen provides noncriminal, 
nonaccusatory information that strongly suggests that the informant is 
relating personal observations. State v. Nordlund, 113 Wn. App. 171, 
181, 53 P.3d 520 (2002); State v. Stone, 56 Wn. App. 153, 156, 782 P.2d 
1093 (1989). 
2.6(a) Satisfying the “Basis of Knowledge” Prong 
The basis for the citizen informant’s knowledge must be estab-
lished. See State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 211, 720 P.2d 838 (1986). In-
formation showing that the informant has personally seen the facts as-
serted and is passing on firsthand information satisfies the basis of the 
knowledge prong. State v. Smith, 110 Wn.2d 658, 663, 756 P.2d 722 
(1988); State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d. 432, 437, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); 
State v. Wible, 113 Wn. App. 18, 23, 51 P.3d 830 (2002). However, if the 
informant was not the eyewitness, or when the information requires some 
expertise, such as the identification of the odor of marijuana, the basis of 
the informant’s knowledge must be demonstrated. State v. Boyer, 124 
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Wn. App. 593, 606, 102 P.3d 833 (2004) (affidavit failed to establish 
citizen informant’s expertise in identifying cocaine); see 2 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.4(b) (5th ed. 2012). 
2.6(b) Satisfying the “Veracity” Prong by Partial Corroboration of  
Informant’s Tip and by Self-Verifying Detail 
Washington courts require a showing of reliability for citizen in-
formants. State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 72–73, 93 P.3d 872 (2004); 
State v. Ibarra, 61 Wn. App. 695, 698–99, 812 P.2d 114 (1991) (noting 
the different types of informants). Accordingly, the police must present 
the issuing magistrate with sufficient facts to determine the informant’s 
inherent credibility or reliability, unless the police corroborate the in-
formant’s tip. State v. Duncan, 81 Wn. App. 70, 76, 912 P.2d 1090 
(1996); State v. Huff, 33 Wn. App. 304, 307–08, 654 P.2d 1211 (1982); 
State v. Bauer, 98 Wn. App. 870, 876–77, 991 P.2d 668 (2000) (credibil-
ity established when informant was a concerned citizen, had been a 
Washington citizen for more than nine years, was a registered voter, and 
feared retaliation). 
With an identified citizen informant, however, the burden for estab-
lishing credibility is generally lower, and the court will presume the citi-
zen informant’s reliability. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d at 72–73, 93 P.3d 872; 
Ibarra, 61 Wn. App. at 699, 812 P.2d 114; State v. Franklin, 49 Wn. 
App. 106, 109, 741 P.2d 83 (1987) (noting that the standard is relaxed 
but the information must support an inference of truthfulness and must 
establish a basis of knowledge); State v. McReynolds, 104 Wn. App. 560, 
572–73, 17 P.3d 608 (2001) (citizen informant was readily identifiable 
from affidavit and provided information in “entirely unsuspicious cir-
cumstances”). This is because a citizen informant is unlikely to have an 
established “track record” of providing information to the police, such 
that the citizen informant’s veracity may be otherwise difficult to estab-
lish. Ibarra, 61 Wn. App. at 699, 812 P.2d 114. Naming an informant is 
not alone a sufficient ground on which to credit an informant, but it is 
considered in the determination of whether the informant is actually a 
citizen informant. State v. McCord, 125 Wn. App. 888, 893, 106 P.3d 
832 (2005) (citing Duncan, 81 Wn. App. at 78, 912 P.2d 1090); see also 
State v. Atchley, 142 Wn. App. 147, 162, 173 P.3d 323 (2007) (credibil-
ity of citizen informant established when the informant provided his or 
her name and contact information, received no compensation for the tip, 
and a background check made no indication of untrustworthiness). The 
standard is generally not relaxed, however, when the citizen informant 
remains unidentified to the magistrate. State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 
211, 720 P.2d 838 (1986); State v. Garcia, 140 Wn. App. 609, 619, 166 
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P.3d 848 (2007); Ibarra, 61 Wn. App. at 699, 812 P.2d 114. Lastly, an 
informant is presumed reliable if the circumstances that establish person-
al knowledge are sufficiently detailed. State v. Gaddy, 114 Wn. App. 
702, 707, 60 P.3d 116 (2002), aff’d on other grounds by 152 Wn.2d 64, 
93 P.3d 872; State v. Wible, 113 Wn. App. 18, 24, 51 P.3d 830 (2002) 
(no independent corroboration required); State v. Tarter, 111 Wn. App. 
336, 340, 44 P.3d 899 (2002) (State’s burden is “relaxed” with regard to 
the veracity of citizen informants). 
2.6(c) Sufficiency of Information Supplied 
Factors that have been considered in determining whether sufficient 
information has been provided by a victim informant or witness infor-
mant include (1) the particularity of the description of the offender or the 
vehicle; (2) the size of the area in which the perpetrator might be found; 
(3) the number of persons in the area; (4) the direction of flight; (5) the 
activity or condition of the person arrested; and (6) the person’s 
knowledge that his vehicle has been involved in other similar criminal 
activity. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.4(c) (5th ed. 
2012). 
When a citizen can identify a suspect by photograph, the infor-
mation is sufficient to establish probable cause. See Simmons v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S. Ct. 967, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247 (1968). Wit-
ness descriptions of the attire, vehicle, and physical build of the suspect 
may also provide probable cause when used in combination. State v. 
Palmer, 73 Wn.2d 462, 464–65, 438 P.2d 876 (1968) (probable cause for 
arrest was established when 45 minutes after robbery the victim identi-
fied an automobile by make, year, color, and dirty white top, and de-
scribed suspect by hair color and attire); State v. Kohler, 70 Wn.2d 599, 
605, 424 P.2d 656 (1967) (probable cause established when two wit-
nesses provided descriptions of vehicle, clothing, and build of suspects, 
and when probability was slight that two similar cars would be traveling 
within limited area of Seattle at 12:30 a.m.); State v. Baker, 68 Wn.2d 
517, 520, 413 P.2d 965 (1966) (probable cause established when robbery 
victims identified make, color, and license number of suspect vehicle). 
2.7 POLICE AS INFORMANTS 
2.7(a) Satisfying the “Veracity” and “Basis of Knowledge” Prongs 
As with citizen informants’ veracity under federal law, the veracity 
of police informants’ statements may be presumed. See United States v. 
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 110, 85 S. Ct. 741, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1965); 
State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 71–73, 93 P.3d 872 (2004). Generally, 
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there must be a showing that the officer had a basis for his or her 
knowledge. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d at 72, 93 P.3d 872. Conclusory allega-
tions will suffice in limited, complex situations, when explaining the 
grounds for the belief may be difficult. Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 
214, 223–24, 85 S. Ct. 1365, 14 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1965) (in tax evasion 
case, affidavit need not explain every basis of the allegation). 
2.7(b) Multiple Hearsay 
An arresting officer need not have personal knowledge of the facts 
establishing probable cause, but may rely on another officer’s assess-
ment. State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 70–71, 93 P.3d 872 (2004) (officer 
may rely on information from a police bulletin or “hot sheet” if the issu-
ing agency has probable cause); Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568, 
91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971) (“fellow officer rule”). However, 
probable cause must actually exist for the arrest to be valid. Gaddy, 152 
Wn.2d at 70–71, 93 P.3d 872; Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 568–69, 91 S. Ct. 
1031; see 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.5(b) (5th ed. 
2012). An arresting officer’s good faith reliance is irrelevant. State v. 
Gaddy, 114 Wn. App. 702, 706, 60 P.3d 116 (2002), aff’d, 152 Wn.2d 
64, 93 P.3d 872. 
Although determining probable cause on the basis of collective in-
formation in an agency is generally permissible, the chain of communi-
cation must be shown. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 12 Wn. App. 309, 310, 
529 P.2d 873 (1974). See generally 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.5(c). Whether 
the State must prove the reliability of the agency’s records may depend 
on whether the court considers the agency to be a citizen informant. See 
Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d at 71–74, 93 P.3d 872 (treating Department of Li-
censing as a citizen informant and finding Department’s information pre-
sumptively reliable regarding defendant’s driving record); State v. 
Sandholm, 96 Wn. App. 846, 848, 980 P.2d 1292 (1999) (no evidence 
provided to show reliability of information from WACIC radio). 
2.8 INFORMATION FROM ANONYMOUS OR UNKNOWN INFORMANTS: 
SATISFYING THE “VERACITY” PRONG 
Generally, an anonymous informant’s tip fails to meet the Aguilar-
Spinelli requirements of basis of knowledge and veracity unless the tip is 
corroborated. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413, 89 S. Ct. 584, 
21 L.Ed. 2d 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S. Ct. 
1509, 12 L.Ed. 2d 723 (1964); State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 195, 867 
P.2d 593 (1994). Even a named but unknown informant is not entitled to 
a presumption of reliability. See State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 48, 621 
P.2d 1272 (1980) (reliability of named but unknown telephone informant 
2013] Chapter 2: Standards of Proof 1631 
not significantly different from anonymous telephone informant). If the 
informant is a citizen informant and wishes to remain anonymous, “the 
affidavit must contain background facts to support a reasonable inference 
that the information is credible and without motive to falsify.” State v. 
Wilke, 55 Wn. App. 470, 477, 778 P.2d 1054 (1989); see also State v. 
Cole, 128 Wn.2d 262, 287−88, 906 P.2d 925 (1995); State v. Ibarra, 61 
Wn. App. 695, 700, 812 P.2d 114 (1991). 
If, however, a police investigation corroborates the informant’s in-
formation and constitutes more than mere public or innocuous facts, the 
Aguilar-Spinelli test will be satisfied. Young, 123 Wn.2d at 195, 867 P.2d 
593; State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 438, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); State v. 
Kennedy, 72 Wn. App. 244, 249, 864 P.2d 410 (1993). The fact that the 
anonymous informant accurately describes a vehicle is insufficient. State 
v. Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940, 943–44, 530 P.2d 243 (1975) (citing Whiteley 
v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971)). 
2.9 SPECIAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES REQUIRING  
LESSER OR GREATER LEVELS OF PROOF 
Although a majority of searches will fall under the general rubric 
discussed above, three types of searches are either conducted on less than 
probable cause or, in contrast, require additional constitutional safe-
guards. Administrative searches, discussed in section 2.9(a), and Terry 
investigatory stops, covered in section 2.9(b), are permissible under re-
laxed standards. Searches that intrude into an individual’s body require a 
greater level of proof and are discussed in section 2.9(c). 
2.9(a) Administrative Searches 
The protections of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 of 
the Washington constitution extend to administrative and regulatory 
searches. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528–34, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 
18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967); Rental Owners Ass’n v. Thurston Cnty., 85 Wn. 
App. 171, 183, 931 P.2d 208 (1997). Therefore, such searches must ei-
ther be conducted pursuant to a warrant or fall within one of the narrowly 
drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 
534, 87 S. Ct. 1727. To obtain an administrative warrant to search com-
mercial or residential premises, law enforcement officers must either of-
fer specific proof of a violation, or show that “reasonable legislative or 
administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied 
with respect to a particular [establishment].” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 
436 U.S. 307, 320–21, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978) (brackets 
in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 538, 87 S. 
Ct. 1727). Administrative searches excepted from the warrant require-
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ment must be reasonable in light of the individual’s expectation of priva-
cy and the asserted government interest. Murphy v. State, 115 Wn. App. 
297, 307–08, 62 P.3d 533 (2003). For a discussion of administrative 
searches in general, see infra § 6.4. 
When officers seek a warrant based on a general administrative 
program, they must set forth sufficient details of the program to enable 
the magistrate to determine whether the program is reasonable. Seattle v. 
Leach, 29 Wn. App. 81, 85, 627 P.2d 159 (1981). Inventory searches are 
one type of search based on a general administrative program that can be 
justified without probable cause. State v. White, 135 Wn.2d 761, 766, 
958 P.2d 982 (1998) (inventory searches pursuant to standard police pro-
cedures are “reasonable”). 
2.9(b) Terry Stops and Frisks 
Police may stop an individual for investigation with less than prob-
able cause if they have reasonable and articulable facts that point toward 
criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 
2d 889 (1968); State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689, 698−99, 92 P.3d 202 
(2004) (police may request identification from a passenger for investiga-
tory purposes with an articulable suspicion of criminal activity by the 
passenger); State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 8, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). 
However, the stop must not exceed the scope and purpose of a Terry 
stop—the stop must be reasonably limited in scope to “whatever reason-
able suspicions legally justified the stop in the first place.” State v. 
Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 293–94, 290 P.3d 983 (2012) (citing State v. 
Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 350, 979 P.2d 833 (1999)). If the officer has 
reasonable grounds to believe the person is armed and currently danger-
ous, he or she may perform a limited frisk of the suspect for weapons. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S. Ct. 1868; State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107, 
112, 874 P.2d 160 (1994). For a complete discussion of Terry stops and 
frisks, see generally infra Chapter 4. 
2.9(c) Intrusions into the Body 
Under article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, taking a 
blood sample is a search and seizure that must be supported by probable 
cause. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616, 109 S. Ct. 
1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989); State v. Garcia-Salgado, 170 Wn.2d 
176, 184, 240 P.3d 153 (2010). If probable cause exists, neither an ad-
versarial hearing nor notice to defense counsel is required before a search 
warrant to obtain a blood sample may be issued. State v. Kalakosky, 121 
Wn.2d 525, 534−36, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993). However, due to the invasive 
nature of intrusions into the body, the U.S. Supreme Court has iterated 
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three additional requirements beyond the probable cause requirement. In 
order for the search to be lawful, there must be (1) a “clear indication” 
that the desired evidence will be found if the search is performed, (2) the 
method of searching must be reasonable, and (3) the search must be per-
formed in a reasonable manner. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
769–70, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (finding that the “inter-
ests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects 
[sic]” require a heightened standard). One question that remains unan-
swered is whether the police may obtain and test an individual’s DNA 
before he or she is charged with a crime. See King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 
42 A.3d 549 (2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 594, 184 L.Ed.2d 390 
(2012).  
More intrusive procedures may be permitted in special environ-
ments. For example, in prisons and jails, strip searches and cavity 
searches may be done without a warrant. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 
560, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979) (finding full body cavity 
searches of prison inmates following contact visits not unreasonable); 
State v. Harris, 66 Wn. App. 636, 642, 833 P.2d 402 (1992) (finding exi-
gent circumstances justified strip search of juvenile before placement in 
holding cell when police had prior experience with gang members taping 
razor blades to their skin). For a full discussion of forced intrusions into 
the body, see infra § 3.13(b). 
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CHAPTER 3 
Search Warrants  
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
Article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution requires 
that a search warrant be supported by probable cause to be valid. State v. 
Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 182−83, 196 P.3d 658 (2008); State v. Thein, 138 
Wn.2d 133, 140, 977 P.2d 582 (1999) (citing State v. Cole, 128 Wn.2d 
262, 286, 906 P.2d 925 (1995)). Likewise, the Fourth Amendment pro-
vides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
In part, these provisions were enacted as a response to the evils of 
general warrants and writs of assistance. See Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 626−27, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886). General warrants 
and writs had provided law enforcement officers virtually unlimited dis-
cretion to search whenever, wherever, and whomever they chose. With 
the Fourth Amendment, the Framers sought to curb the abuses of uncon-
strained searches. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760−61, 89 S. 
Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969). Despite this, there are a number of 
situations in which searches and seizures may be made without warrants. 
See infra, Chapter 5. 
This chapter focuses on a valid search warrant and its execution 
under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. The chap-
ter addresses general requirements for a valid warrant, the description of 
the place to be searched and the items to be seized, the scope and intensi-
ty of the search, the “knock and announce” requirement, detentions of 
persons on the premises, and challenges to an affidavit. For the most part, 
the standards discussed below apply to arrest warrants as well as to 
search warrants. Issues pertaining specifically to arrests are discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
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3.1 TYPES OF ITEMS THAT MAY BE SEARCHED AND SEIZED 
Most commonly, warrants are issued to recover contraband or in-
strumentalities of a crime. See State v. Fry, 168 Wn.2d 1, 4−6, 228 P.3d 
1 (2010) (procuring warrant to search a suspected marijuana grow opera-
tion); State v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 811, 167 P.3d 1156 (2007) (issuing 
warrants to search for a possible methamphetamine lab and evidence of 
child pornography). However, warrants may also be issued for “mere 
evidence” of a crime. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307, 87 S. Ct. 
1642, L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967); State v. Bullock, 71 Wn.2d 886, 890−91, 431 
P.2d 195 (1967) (adopting Warden and admitting a letter found with ma-
rijuana in an apartment search). When the State seeks a warrant for 
“mere evidence,” it must show probable cause to believe that the evi-
dence will aid in apprehending or convicting a suspect. See CrR 2.3(b); 
Bullock, 71 Wn.2d at 890−91, 431 P.2d 195. 
In addition to “mere evidence” and instrumentalities, warrants may 
be issued for evidence containing incriminating statements without vio-
lating the Fifth Amendment because the Fifth Amendment provides pro-
tection only where the act of producing evidence is, itself, testimonial. In 
re Teddington, 116 Wn.2d 761, 776, 808 P.2d 156 (1991) (citing An-
dresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 
(1976)) (finding that a letter written voluntarily by the defendant to his 
friend did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights). 
3.2 WHO MAY ISSUE WARRANTS: REQUIREMENT OF A NEUTRAL AND 
DETACHED MAGISTRATE 
Warrants provide protection against abuse because the determina-
tion of probable cause is made by a neutral and detached magistrate ra-
ther than by a police officer. The requirement provides protection from 
“overzealous police officers” because “the judicial officer will more ob-
jectively balance the interests of privacy against the interests of criminal 
investigations than will the investigating police officer, who might distort 
the independent judgment of probable cause required by the Fourth 
Amendment.” State v. Smith, 16 Wn. App. 425, 427, 558 P.2d 265 
(1976). Thus, the requirement removes the determination from the police 
officer who is “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting 
out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 
L. Ed. 436 (1948). 
In Washington, a district court’s territorial jurisdiction is within the 
boundaries of the county. RCW 3.66.060. Thus, after a showing of prob-
able cause, a district court judge may issue a warrant for the search and 
seizure of controlled substances within the county, even outside the 
court’s district. RCW 69.50.509. The judge may do this without the ap-
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proval of the prosecutor. Id.; State v. Uhthoff, 45 Wn. App. 261, 264, 724 
P.2d 1103 (1986). Even after felony information has been filed in superi-
or court, the district court may still issue a warrant relating to the case. 
State v. Stock, 44 Wn. App. 467, 475, 722 P.2d 1330 (1986); see general-
ly 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.2(a)−(f) (5th ed. 2012). 
3.2(a) Qualifications of a “Magistrate” 
Washington State has limited those empowered to issue warrants to 
judges in the state supreme court, court of appeals, superior court, and 
district court, as well as “all municipal officers authorized to exercise the 
powers and perform the duties of district judges.” RCW 2.20.020(4). But 
the magistrate need not be an attorney or a judge so long as he or she is 
“neutral and detached” and “capable of determining whether probable 
cause exists for the requested arrest or search.” State v. Porter, 88 Wn.2d 
512, 515, 563 P.2d 829 (1977). Thus, case law has also specifically in-
cluded court commissioners. State v. Gross, 78 Wn. App. 58, 62, 895 
P.2d 861 (1995) (citing State v. Porter, 88 Wn.2d at 514, 563 P.2d 829). 
However, this power does not extend to court clerks. State v. Walker, 101 
Wn. App. 1, 7−8, 999 P.2d 1296 (2000) (finding that a court clerk, acting 
alone, was not empowered to issue a bench warrant); see also 2 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.2(c), at 620−24 (5th ed. 2012). 
Even when the person issuing the warrant is a magistrate in title, he 
or she must make an independent probable cause determination and may 
not act as a “rubber stamp for the police.” Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 
111, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964); State v. Lyons, 174 Wn.2d 
354, 360, 275 P.3d 314 (2012). 
3.2(b) Neutrality 
Most importantly, the magistrate issuing the warrant must be neu-
tral. This requires that the warrant be issued by a judge who is divorced 
from law enforcement investigation and activities. State v. Neslund, 103 
Wn.2d 79, 88, 690 P.2d 1153 (1984). If a state officer acts as prosecutor 
in a case, that officer is automatically disqualified from acting as a mag-
istrate in the same case. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450, 
91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971). Similarly, the magistrate’s in-
volvement in the execution of a warrant may constitute a violation of the 
neutrality requirement. Id. at 450, 91 S. Ct. 2022. For example, an ad-
ministrative “warrant” signed by the parole officer conducting the search 
is invalid. Hocker v. Woody, 95 Wn.2d 822, 825−26, 631 P.2d 372 
(1981) (holding that a search of a third party’s residence was unlawful 
because the warrant was not signed by a neutral and detached magistrate). 
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A pro-tempore judge that is also a part-time prosecutor is not auto-
matically disqualified if he or she has not been involved in the prosecu-
tion of that particular case and there is no evidence of bias. State v. Hill, 
17 Wn. App. 678, 683, 564 P.2d 841 (1977). Similarly, there is no per se 
disqualification for a judge who issued a search warrant in a case that 
was before him on special inquiry. Neslund, 103 Wn.2d at 88, 690 P.2d 
1153. In Neslund, the court did not per se disqualify the judge from issu-
ing warrants because the warrants were not issued in subsequent court 
proceedings “arising” from the inquiry. Id. at 82−83, 690 P.2d 1153; see 
RCW 10.27.180. A search warrant has been upheld when the issuing ju-
dicial officer was aware from the affidavit that he might be a witness 
against the defendant. State v. Smith, 16 Wn. App. 425, 427−28, 558 
P.2d 265 (1976); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.2(b), at 
619 (5th ed. 2012). 
Lastly, a magistrate is no longer neutral when he or she receives a 
fee for each search warrant issued. Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 
250, 97 S. Ct. 546, 50 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1977) (having a pecuniary interest 
in issuing warrants compared with denying them renders a magistrate 
neither neutral nor detached). 
3.2(c) Presentation of Evidence to a Second Magistrate 
Washington courts have not yet squarely addressed the question of 
whether or under what circumstances a prosecuting authority may, in an 
attempt to obtain a search warrant, present the same evidence to a second 
magistrate after one denial. However, commentators appear to agree that 
a magistrate’s initial probable cause determination is not a final order 
and that principles of collateral estoppel or res judicata do not preclude 
the government from presenting the same evidence to a second judicial 
officer, so long as the government notifies the second officer that the ap-
plication was previously denied. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 4.2(e), at 631−33 (5th ed. 2012); see also United States v. 
Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding the second warrant 
valid but expressing disapproval that the second judge had not been in-
formed of the prior attempt). 
The presentation of the same evidence to a second magistrate is not 
tantamount to forum shopping unless the government visits numerous 
magistrates before convincing one to issue the disputed warrant. United 
States v. Czuprynski, 8 F.3d 1113, 1115 (6th Cir. 1993), on reh’g en banc, 
46 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 1995), supplemented, 65 F.3d 169 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(condemning prosecutor who took the case to two district court judges 
before taking it to a magistrate who he knew had hard feelings for the 
defendant). 
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3.2(d) Burden of Proof 
Unless a magistrate is disqualified under the per se rule of Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 
(1971), the defendant bears the burden of proving a magistrate’s lack of 
neutrality. See State v. Hill, 17 Wn. App. 678, 683, 564 P.2d 841 (1977). 
3.3 CONTENT OF THE WARRANT 
3.3(a) Oath or Affirmation; Pseudonym Affiants 
The person presenting the supporting affidavit must swear to the in-
formation that the affidavit contains. U.S. Const. amend. IV; CrR 2.3(c). 
However, the Washington State Supreme Court has upheld a warrant 
when the affidavit was not sworn to, but was signed in the presence of 
the magistrate. State v. Douglas, 71 Wn.2d 303, 309−10, 428 P.2d 535 
(1967). Washington courts have yet to rule on whether an incorrect name 
or pseudonym on the affidavit makes it defective. However, a handful of 
federal circuits have found the warrant still effective in this circumstance. 
See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.3(f), at 663−65 (5th ed. 
2012); see also United States v. Causey, 9 F.3d 1341 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(finding the affidavit effective when “the issuing judge has an opportuni-
ty to question the affiant, the judge is in fact not deceived, and there is 
sufficient probable cause notwithstanding the false information”). 
3.3(b) Insufficient Information, Omissions, and Staleness 
A warrant is most commonly defective for one of three reasons: (1) 
there is insufficient information to establish probable cause; (2) the in-
formation in the affidavits is stale; or (3) material information was omit-
ted during the warrant process. 
First, an affidavit establishes probable cause to support a search 
warrant if the affidavit sets forth facts sufficient to allow a reasonable 
person to conclude both that the defendant is involved in criminal activi-
ty and that evidence of the crime can be found at the place to be searched. 
See State v. Maddox, 152 Wn.2d 499, 509, 98 P.3d. 1199 (2004); In re 
Yim, 139 Wn.2d 581, 594−95, 989 P.2d 512 (1999); see also State v. Fry, 
168 Wn.2d 1, 6, 228 P.3d 1 (2010) (finding probable cause when the of-
ficer smelled marijuana wafting from the house, even when the defend-
ant produced a marijuana permit). Evidence from a prior warrantless 
search conducted under an exception to general search and seizure rules 
may be used by the issuing magistrate in determining probable cause. A 
magistrate may also rely on hearsay statements from a police officer’s 
affidavits. State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 465, 158 P.3d 595 
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(2007); see CrR 2.3(c). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 3.5(b) (5th ed. 2012). 
A prima facie showing of criminal activity is not required, although 
the affidavit must go beyond mere suspicion or personal belief that evi-
dence of a crime will be found on the premises to be searched. Maddox, 
152 Wn.2d at 505, 98 P.3d. 1199; see State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 196 
P.3d 658 (2008) (holding that empty baggies and prior criminal history 
are insufficient to support probable cause). For example, generalizations 
about the behavior of drug dealers concerning where they keep con-
trolled substances are insufficient. See State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 
147, 977 P.2d 582 (1999); see also Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 
5, 47 S. Ct. 250, 71 L. Ed. 505 (1927). At the same time, however, affi-
davits for search warrants must be tested in a commonsense, not 
hypertechnical, manner. State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 265, 76 P.3d 
217 (2003). 
The court must determine if the warrant is valid by “consider[ing] 
only the information that was brought to the attention of the issuing judge 
or magistrate at the time the warrant was requested.” State v. Garcia-
Salgado, 170 Wn.2d 176, 187, 240 P.3d 153 (2010). Thus, if the warrant 
is invalid due to insufficient information, it cannot be made valid later by 
adding further information, even if that information was known at the 
time of issuance but not presented to the magistrate. See Whiteley v. 
Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971) 
(holding that permitting the record to be expanded with information 
known to the police, but not disclosed to the magistrate, would “render 
the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment meaningless”). 
Second, if the warrant is facially valid⎯if there is sufficient infor-
mation to find probable cause⎯but there is an omission in the affidavit, 
under article I, section 7, the warrant is valid so long as the omission is 
neither intentional nor made with a reckless disregard for the truth. See 
Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 478, 158 P.3d 595. Thus, an incorrect date on 
an affidavit is immaterial. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 109, 59 P.3d 
58 (2002). Similarly, in In re Yim, the court found the warrant valid even 
though the affidavit failed to expressly state that the defendant did not 
have an explosives license, a necessary element of the crime. 139 Wn.2d 
581, 595−96, 989 P.2d 512 (1999). In State v. Chenoweth, the court 
found that the warrant was valid even though the prosecutor had failed to 
do a complete search of the informant’s criminal history. See 160 Wn.2d 
at 458−62, 158 P.3d 595. Had she run a search, she would have turned up 
a large criminal history, including crimes implicating veracity. Id. How-
ever, the court found that the prosecutor, “who prosecutes more than 200 
cases a year, did not intentionally hide any information from the magis-
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trate and did not act in bad faith in failing to gather relevant information,” 
and she was therefore not reckless. Id. at 481, 158 P.3d 595. 
Lastly, the information establishing probable cause must not be 
stale at the time it is presented to the judge. State v. Lyons, 174 Wn.2d 
354, 275 P.3d 314 (2012) (finding the warrant stale when there was no 
date on the affidavit detailing when the informant had witnessed the 
grow operation). The information is not stale so long as “the facts and 
circumstances in the affidavit support a commonsense determination that 
there is continuing and contemporaneous possession of the property in-
tended to be seized.” Maddox, 152 Wn.2d at 505−06, 98 P.3d. 1199 
(holding that information discovered in the interim does not render the 
first probable cause determination stale so long as it does not negate 
probable cause). 
In evaluating the staleness of facts underlying a warrant, courts ex-
amine the totality of the circumstances; the period of time between the 
issuance and execution of the warrant is only one factor to be considered. 
Id. Other relevant factors include the “nature of the criminal, the charac-
ter of the evidence to be seized, and the nature of the place to be 
searched.” State v. Hosier, 124 Wn. App. 696, 715, 103 P.3d 217 (2004). 
The facts and circumstances taken together must establish that “criminal 
activity is occurring at or about the time the warrant is issued.” State v. 
Perez, 92 Wn. App. 1, 8−9, 963 P.2d 881 (1998); see also State v. Ague-
Masters, 138 Wn. App. 86, 101, 156 P.3d 265 (2007) (information was 
not stale after two days when it appeared there could be continued manu-
facture of controlled substances). 
3.3(c) Oral Testimony 
In Washington, a search warrant may be based on a single affidavit, 
on several affidavits, or on oral testimony. CrR 2.3(c). Oral testimony 
includes situations in which an affiant makes a sworn telephonic state-
ment to a judge. Id.; see also State v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 818, 167 
P.3d 1156 (2007); State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 701, 674 P.2d 1240 
(1983) (overruled on other grounds) (finding that the availability of tele-
phonic warrants increased the quality of police work). However, after the 
magistrate has taken a sworn telephonic statement, the magistrate must 
produce a record of the conversation. State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 332, 
338, 815 P.2d 761 (1991); State v. Ettenhofer, 119 Wn. App. 300, 
304−06, 79 P.3d 478 (2003). And the judge must record a summary of 
any additional evidence on which the warrant was based. Ettenhofer, 119 
Wn. App. at 303 n.2, 79 P.3d 478 (quoting CrR 2.3(c)). 
If the affiant’s sworn testimony was not recorded during the tele-
phonic process, the State is not allowed to reconstruct the affidavit with-
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out corroboration of the magistrate. Myers, 117 Wn.2d at 338, 815 P.2d 
761 (finding the warrant invalid when the affiant made a summary of 
their own statement but the magistrate did not summarize the statement 
and could not recall the conversation); see also State v. Smith, 87 Wn. 
App. 254, 257−59, 941 P.2d 691 (1997) (discussing the types of evi-
dence that may be used to reconstruct a telephonic affidavit). In State v. 
Garcia, the court found the lack of a recording did not invalidate the 
warrant when the magistrate testified that the affidavit he was presented 
with matched his recollection of the conversation. 140 Wn. App. 609, 
619−20, 166 P.3d 848 (2007). For a discussion of various objections to 
this procedure, see 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.3(c), at 
650−54 (5th ed. 2012). 
3.3(d) Administrative Warrants 
Administrative warrants are subject to Fourth Amendment protec-
tion, but may be issued on less than probable cause when authorized by a 
statute. City of Seattle v. McCready (McCready III), 131 Wn.2d 266, 931 
P.2d 156 (1997); see Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 
1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967) (holding that administrative searches to 
enforce local codes must be supported by “reasonable legislative or ad-
ministrative standards”). Additionally, involvement in a heavily regulat-
ed industry can give authority to issue warrants. Marshall v. Barlow’s, 
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978). 
Although a court may issue a warrant on less than probable cause 
pursuant to an authorizing statute, if there is no authorizing statute, then 
the magistrate does not have authority to issue warrants for civil infrac-
tions, even with probable cause. City of Seattle v. McCready (McCready 
II), 124 Wn.2d 300, 309, 877 P.2d 686 (1994). See generally infra § 6.4 
(administrative searches). When a magistrate issues a warrant without 
authority, it is no more valid than a warrant signed by a private citizen. 
Bosteder v. City of Renton, 155 Wn.2d 18, 117 P.3d 316 (2005) (finding 
that under article I, section 7, magistrate had no authority to issue search 
warrants for civil infractions without statutory authorization); see also 
State v. Lansden, 144 Wn.2d 654, 663, 30 P.3d 483 (2001) (observing 
that courts of limited jurisdiction have no inherent authority to issue ad-
ministrative search warrants). Notably, a statute giving a right of entry is 
not sufficient authorization to issue warrants. McCready II, 124 Wn.2d at 
309, 877 P.2d 686. But if, under city ordinance, willful or knowing viola-
tion of the city code is a misdemeanor, the court may issue a warrant for 
a civil violation. Exendine v. City of Sammamish, 127 Wn. App. 574, 582, 
113 P.3d 494 (2005). 
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3.4 PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF PLACE TO BE SEARCHED 
Both article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution and 
the Fourth Amendment require a particular description of the places to be 
searched and the items to be seized. The purposes of this requirement are 
the “prevention of general searches, prevention of the seizure of objects 
on the mistaken assumption that they fall within the issuing magistrate’s 
authorization, and prevention of the issuance of warrants on loose, vague, 
or doubtful bases of fact.” State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 545, 834 
P.2d 611 (1992). The requirement also serves to leave nothing to the dis-
cretion of the officers executing the warrant. See id.; State v. Rivera, 76 
Wn. App. 519, 522, 888 P.2d 740 (1995); see also Marron v. United 
States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S. Ct. 74, 72 L. Ed. 231 (1927). 
3.4(a) General Considerations 
The description of the place to be searched must be sufficiently de-
tailed such that “the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable 
effort ascertain and identify the place intended.” State v. Fisher, 96 
Wn.2d 962, 967, 639 P.2d 743 (1982) (internal quotations omitted) (cit-
ing State v. Rood, 18 Wn. App. 740, 743−44, 573 P.2d 1325 (1977)). 
This need not be a brick and mortar location; in State v. Jackson, the 
court found that the “place” to be searched in attaching a GPS to a car 
was the travel pattern of the vehicle. 150 Wn.2d 251, 268, 76 P.3d 217 
(2003). However, if there is a possibility that a mistaken search could 
occur, the warrant is not sufficiently particular. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d at 967, 
639 P.2d 743; see also State v. Bohan, 72 Wn. App. 335, 339−40, 864 
P.2d 26 (1993) (inquiring into possibility that incorrect location might be 
searched). 
When a warrant contains errors, the burden is on the party challeng-
ing the warrant to show that errors could have resulted in a search of the 
wrong premises. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d at 967, 639 P.2d 743; see also State v. 
Smith, 39 Wn. App. 642, 649, 694 P.2d 660 (1984) (upholding search 
where incorrect town was identified in warrant because defendant made 
no showing that a similar address existed that could have been mistaken-
ly searched). The test is not whether an officer could hypothetically or 
theoretically search the wrong premises, but whether, under the circum-
stances presented, an officer could reasonably determine the correct 
premises to be searched. Bohan, 72 Wn. App. at 339, 864 P.2d 26. Cleri-
cal or ministerial errors will invalidate a warrant only if prejudice is 
shown. State v. Wible, 113 Wn. App. 18, 25, 51 P.3d 830 (2002); see 
State v. Busig, 119 Wn. App. 381, 388, 81 P.3d 143 (2003) (finding a 
warrant that did not match the pleading paper for the affidavit to be val-
id). 
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In urban areas, places are usually identified by a street address. The 
address is unnecessary, however, if other facts make it clear that a partic-
ular place is intended. State v. Trasvina, 16 Wn. App. 519, 522−23, 557 
P.2d 368 (1976) (finding sufficient a warrant describing premises as two-
story, white-frame house located directly behind particular address); see 
also State v. Chisholm, 7 Wn. App. 279, 283, 499 P.2d 81 (1972) (hold-
ing that a warrant that failed to specify street location was sufficiently 
clear when officers could identify premises with reasonable certainty and 
when reason for failure to specify street was included in affidavit for 
warrant). Rural areas may be identified by a legal description of the 
property. See State v. Cockrell, 102 Wn.2d 561, 570, 689 P.2d 32 (1984). 
In the execution of the search, carelessness on the part of the offic-
ers executing the warrant will not render the warrant insufficient regard-
ing the place to be searched. It is only required that the officers executing 
a warrant could have confined their search to the areas delineated in the 
warrant with a “reasonable effort.” See id. (warrant identified place to be 
searched but did not list an address; officers attempted to serve warrant 
on persons outside the described area); see also Fisher, 96 Wn.2d at 967, 
639 P.2d 743 (finding that with a “reasonable effort” the officers could 
have confined themselves to the place listed in the warrant). 
3.4(b) Inadequacy and Severability 
If a warrant fails to sufficiently describe the place to be searched, 
the warrant is invalid even if the magistrate made a probable cause de-
termination. Three types of information may be considered in determin-
ing a warrant’s adequacy: (1) physical descriptions of the premises con-
tained in the warrant or in the attached affidavit; (2) information based 
on the officer’s personal knowledge of the location or its occupants; and 
(3) the officer’s personal observations at the time of execution. State v. 
Fisher, 96 Wn.2d 962, 967, 639 P.2d 743 (1982) (citing State v. Rood, 18 
Wn. App. 740, 743−44, 573 P.2d 1325 (1977)). See generally 2 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5(a)−(e) (5th ed. 2012). The initial de-
termination of whether a description is adequate is made with reference 
only to the warrant itself, including any attached documents. See State v. 
Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 691−93, 696, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997). A descrip-
tion may appear adequate on its face, but upon execution be found to be 
ambiguous or erroneous. Id. 
If a warrant is inadequate with respect to one location, the adequate 
portion may still be valid if the inadequacy can be severed from the war-
rant. For example, if a warrant separately and distinctly describes two 
targets and it is determined afterward that probable cause existed for is-
suance of the warrant for one target only, the warrant may be treated as 
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severable and upheld as to the one target. State v. Cockrell, 102 Wn.2d 
561, 571, 689 P.2d 32 (1984) (finding portions of the warrant that identi-
fied outbuildings severable from the rest of the warrant that was for the 
residence); see also 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.5(c), at 743−49. 
3.4(c) Particular Searches and Exceptions 
Generally, unless there is probable cause to search all living units of 
a multiple-occupancy building, the description must single out a particu-
lar subunit. State v. Alexander, 41 Wn. App. 152, 704 P.2d 618 (1985). 
See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5(b) (5th ed. 
2012). But if the building looks like a single occupancy structure from 
the outside and the officers have no reason to know that it is a multiple-
unit structure, the warrant is not defective for failing to specify a subunit. 
State v. Chisholm, 7 Wn. App. 279, 282, 499 P.2d 81 (1972). The Ninth 
Circuit has recognized that a warrant may authorize a search of an entire 
street address if the premises are occupied in common rather than indi-
vidually or if a multiunit building is used as a single entity. United States 
v. Gillman, 684 F.2d 616, 618 (9th Cir. 1982); see also 2 LaFave, supra, 
§ 4.5(b), at 734−43. Additionally, the “community living unit” rule will 
generally apply when several people occupy the entire premises in com-
mon, but have separate bedrooms. Under the community living unit rule, 
a single warrant describing the entire premises is valid and justifies a 
search of the entire premises. Alexander, 41 Wn. App. at 156, 704 P.2d 
618 (adopting the community living unit rule in Washington). 
A warrant authorizing the search of an apartment may also include 
the search of a padlocked locker located in a storage room next to the 
defendant’s apartment. State v. Llamas-Villa, 67 Wn. App. 448, 453, 836 
P.2d 239 (1992) (concluding that because the storage locker did not con-
stitute a separate building and was not intentionally excluded from the 
warrant, the officers did not exceed the scope of the warrant when they 
searched the locker). In State v. Boyer, the court upheld a search of a 
storage room belonging to a different apartment because “the fact that 
the outside door was labeled apartment B implied to the casual visitor 
that the hallway and its doorways were all part of apartment B.” 124 Wn. 
App. 593, 604, 102 P.3d 833 (2004). 
However, this exception does not extend to outbuildings. The offic-
ers’ search of “outbuildings” exceeded the scope of a search warrant that 
authorized the search of a residence and the attached carport, but did not 
authorize the search of “outbuildings,” which included a barn and a gar-
age. State v. Kelley, 52 Wn. App. 581, 586, 762 P.2d 20 (1988). Further, 
probable cause to search a house does not provide probable cause to 
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search outbuildings when the outbuildings are under the control of other 
persons. State v. Gebaroff, 87 Wn. App. 11, 16−17, 939 P.2d 706 (1997). 
A warrant issued to search a defendant’s premises may include the 
defendant’s automobile if it is located on the premises. State v. Claflin, 
38 Wn. App. 847, 853, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984) (a search warrant authoriz-
ing search of defendant’s house and premises includes search of his car 
located on the premises). However, a warrant to search a house does not 
include a search of a vehicle that is not within the curtilage—the area 
contiguous to the occupant’s home. State v. Graham, 78 Wn. App. 44, 
51−52, 896 P.2d 704 (1995). For a more detailed description, see infra, § 
3.9. 
3.4(d) Particular Searches: Persons 
Search warrants may be issued for persons, as well as for places, if 
there is probable cause to believe that a specific individual has evidence 
on his or her person. CrR 2.3(c); State v. Rollie M, 41 Wn. App. 55, 
58−59, 701 P.2d 1123 (1985). When a search warrant is issued for a per-
son, the general rule requiring particularity still applies. State v. Martinez, 
51 Wn. App. 397, 399−400, 753 P.2d 1011 (1988) (holding that a war-
rant is sufficient if it provides a detailed description of the person to be 
searched, including the person’s place of residence); Rollie M, 41 Wn. 
App. at 58−59, 701 P.2d 1123 (finding insufficient a warrant that author-
ized search of a person found in general vicinity of a specified place); see 
also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5(e), at 755−63 (5th ed. 
2012). 
For a discussion of when a premises search warrant authorizes the 
search of persons not named in the warrant, see infra § 3.8(b). Generally, 
when a premises search warrant is executed, police may conduct a war-
rantless search of a person only if they have individualized probable 
cause to search that person. See State v. Rivera, 76 Wn. App. 519, 524, 
888 P.2d 740 (1995); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338, 
62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979). Nonetheless, a warrant authorizing the search of 
“all persons present” at a location to be searched might be upheld in 
Washington if the warrant establishes a nexus between all persons pre-
sent, the place, and the criminal activity. State v. Carter, 79 Wn. App. 
154, 161, 901 P.2d 335 (1995) (assuming without deciding that such 
warrants may pass muster). 
3.5 PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF THINGS TO BE SEIZED 
As with the location to be searched, article I, section 7 requires that 
the courts “never authorize general, exploratory searches.” York v. Wah-
kiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 315, 178 P.3d 995 (2008). 
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Instead, article I, section 7 requires that “warrants describe with particu-
larity the things to be seized.” State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 28, 846 P.2d 
1365 (1993). The requirement “eliminates the danger of unlimited discre-
tion in the executing officer’s determination of what to seize.” State v. 
Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 814, 167 P.3d 1156 (2007) (citing State v. 
Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 546, 834 P.2d 611 (1992)). Courts look to the 
purposes of the “particular description” requirement to determine wheth-
er the description is valid. These purposes include (1) preventing general 
exploratory searches; (2) protecting against “seizure of objects on the 
mistaken assumption that they fall within” the warrant; and (3) ensuring 
that probable cause is present. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 545, 834 P.2d 611; 
see also Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S. Ct. 74, 72 L. 
Ed. 231 (1927). 
In the Ninth Circuit, three factors are relevant to the existence of 
sufficient particularity: (1) whether probable cause exists for all classes 
of items in the warrant; (2) whether the warrant sets out objective stand-
ards that allow the executing officer to decide what may be seized and 
what may not; and (3) whether the government was able to describe the 
things to be seized with any greater particularity. United States v. Mann, 
389 F.3d 869, 878 (9th Cir. 2004). For a discussion of searches requiring 
heightened protection, see infra 3.13. 
Because the facts in each case differ greatly, the fact patterns of 
prior cases generally are not referenced when determining whether a 
warrant is sufficiently particular. See State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 149, 
97 P.2d 582 (1999) (citing State v. Helmka, 86 Wn.2d 91, 93, 542 P.2d 
115 (1975)). Instead, the degree of specificity required depends on the 
circumstances and the type of items involved. State v. Jackson, 150 
Wn.2d 251, 268, 76 P.3d 217 (2003). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 4.6 (a)−(f) (5th ed. 2012). 
The officers may also seize objects pursuant to a warrant that estab-
lishes the defendant’s dominion and control over the premises. State v. 
Weaver, 38 Wn. App. 17, 22, 683 P.2d 1136 (1984); see Ewing v. City of 
Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2009) (warrant for articles establishing 
identity of persons in control of premises not overbroad). In State v. 
Weaver, the court held that although a cardboard box bearing defendant’s 
name would not generally be considered “paper,” police could seize the 
box because the obvious purpose of the warrant was seizure not only of 
controlled substances, but also of evidence enabling the state to demon-
strate defendant’s dominion and control over the premises. 38 Wn. App. 
at 22, 683 P.2d 1136. 
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3.5(a) General Rules 
While there is no bright-line rule, a few general principles can be 
gleaned from case law that indicate when a warrant is sufficiently defi-
nite to allow the executing officer to identify the property with reasona-
ble certainty. 
First, more ambiguity is tolerated when the police have acquired the 
most complete description that could reasonably be expected. See State v. 
Clark, 143 Wn.2d 731, 754, 24 P.3d 1006 (2001) (finding warrant for 
“trace evidence” valid when it would be impossible to know what type of 
trace evidence could be present beforehand). Thus, a description need not 
be detailed, and the warrant is valid if it is “as specific as the circum-
stances and the nature of the activity, or crime, under investigation per-
mits.” State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 692, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997). 
However, a warrant is overbroad if the affidavit is much more specific 
and the warrant fails to reflect the affidavit’s specificity. State v. Higgins, 
136 Wn. App. 87, 92, 147 P.3d 649 (2006) (finding warrant overbroad 
when it allowed search for “Assault 2nd DV” when the affidavit listed 
Glock pistol, spent casings, and entry and exit points). 
The use of a generic term or general description in a warrant is not 
a per se violation if a more specific description is impossible and if prob-
able cause is shown. See State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 547, 834 P.2d 
611 (1992). “When the nature of the underlying offense precludes a de-
scriptive itemization, generic classifications such as lists are acceptable.” 
State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 28, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993); see also Stenson, 
132 Wn.2d at 692, 940 P.2d 1239. However, in such instances, “the 
search warrant must [also] be circumscribed by reference to the crime 
under investigation.” Riley, 121 Wn.2d at 29, 846 P.2d 1365. In State v. 
Reid, the “phrase ‘any other evidence of homicide’ specifically limited 
the warrant to the crime under investigation [and] specific items listed, 
such as a shotgun and shotgun shells provided guidelines for the officers 
conducting the search.” 38 Wn. App. 203, 212, 687 P.2d 861 (1984). The 
warrant must also be definite enough to allow the searching officer to 
identify the objects sought with reasonable certainty. State v. Nordlund, 
113 Wn. App. 171, 180, 53 P.3d 520 (2002) (citing Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 
at 691−92, 940 P.2d 1239). 
Second, greater care and particularity are required when property 
sought is inherently innocuous as opposed to property that is inherently 
illegal. State v. Wible, 113 Wn. App. 18, 28, 51 P.3d 830 (2002) (citing 
State v. Chambers, 88 Wn. App. 640, 644, 945 P.2d 1172 (1997)). Thus, 
a less precise description is adequate for controlled substances. See 
Chambers, 88 Wn. App. at 647−48, 945 P.2d 1172 (finding that a search 
for “any and all controlled substances” is sufficient in a search for mari-
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juana under the circumstances); State v. Olson, 32 Wn. App. 555, 
557−58, 648 P.2d 476 (1982) (same). 
Third, failure to provide all available descriptive facts is not fatal 
when the omitted facts could not have assisted the officer in a more cir-
cumscribed search. See Chambers, 88 Wn. App at 647−48, 945 P.2d 
1172 (holding that a warrant authorizing search for “all controlled sub-
stances” when the affidavit recited probable cause for a marijuana grow 
operation did not fail to be particular). In State v. Christiansen, the court 
held that “[t]he fact the warrant could have been more precise in terms of 
identifying marijuana as the focus of the search does not affect its validi-
ty, since reasonable particularity is all that is required.” 40 Wn. App. 249, 
254, 698 P.2d 1059 (1985). 
Lastly, an error is not fatal if the officer was able to determine what 
was intended from the other facts provided in the warrant. State v. Dod-
son, 110 Wn. App. 112, 121, 39 P.3d 324 (2002) (holding that police 
officer merely corrected clerical error in changing warrant to specify a 
search for methamphetamine instead of marijuana where court had de-
termined probable cause to search for methamphetamine); see also Wible, 
113 Wn. App. at 25−26, 51 P.3d 830 (warrant only invalid for clerical 
errors upon a showing of prejudice). 
3.5(b) Severability 
As with the place to be searched, discussed in section 3.4(b) above, 
when one part of the warrant is insufficiently particular regarding the 
items to be seized, the portion sometimes may be severed. However, the 
severability doctrine must not be applied when doing so would render the 
particularity standards meaningless. State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 
556−57, 834 P.2d 611 (1992) (holding that a warrant authorizing a gen-
eral search of materials protected by the First Amendment was imper-
missibly broad and invalid in its entirety). 
A court may examine five factors when determining whether inva-
lid portions of a warrant may be severed from valid portions: (1) whether 
the warrant lawfully authorized entry into the premises; (2) whether the 
warrant includes at least one particularly described item for which there 
is probable cause; (3) whether the portion of the warrant that is valid is 
significant when compared to the warrant as a whole; (4) whether the 
searching officers found and seized any disputed items while executing 
the valid part of the warrant; and (5) whether the officers conducted a 
general search in flagrant disregard of the warrant’s scope. State v. Mad-
dox, 116 Wn. App. 796, 807−09, 67 P.3d 1135 (2003), aff’d, 152 Wn.2d 
499 (2004). 
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3.7 “KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE” REQUIREMENT 
Absent exigent circumstances, officers executing a valid warrant 
must identify themselves as police officers and announce their purpose 
prior to entering private premises. RCW 10.31.040 (“To make an arrest 
in criminal actions, the officer may break open any outer or inner door, 
or windows of a dwelling house or other building, or any other enclosure, 
if, after notice of his office and purpose, he be refused admittance.”); see 
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37−40, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 
(1963) (announcing the rule but leaving the states to administer the 
standard of reasonableness). Importantly, this rule applies to both outer 
and inner doors. RCW 10.31.040. It also applies to the execution of both 
arrest and search warrants. State v. Richard, 87 Wn. App. 285, 289, 941 
P.2d 710 (1997); State v. Shelly, 58 Wn. App. 908, 910, 795 P.2d 187 
(1990). 
The purposes of the knock and announce rule are (1) to reduce the 
potential for violence; (2) to prevent the physical destruction of property; 
and (3) to protect privacy. State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 411, 47 
P.3d 127 (2002) (citing State v. Myers, 102 Wn.2d 548, 554, 689 P.2d 38 
(1984) (overruled on other grounds)). “[C]ompliance with the knock and 
announce rule is required unless exigent circumstances exist or compli-
ance would be futile. Id. at 411−12, 47 P.3d 127; State v. Richards, 136 
Wn.2d 361, 374, 962 P.2d 118 (1998) (holding that the “knock and wait” 
rule gives way when police officers have a reasonable belief that strict 
compliance would be futile). In some situations, when there is substantial 
compliance with the statute, the entry is valid. State v. Reid, 38 Wn. App. 
203, 210, 687 P.2d 861 (1984) (finding substantial compliance when the 
police loudly announced themselves after opening a door that they 
thought was an outer hallway). 
The U.S. Supreme Court, like the Washington State Supreme Court, 
has held that a “no-knock” entry is permissible where the police have a 
reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under 
the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or would in-
hibit the effective investigation of the crime by allowing the destruction 
of evidence. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 
137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997). 
3.7(a) Types of Entry Requiring Notice 
The phrase “break open” in Washington’s knock and announce 
statute refers to all nonconsensual entries, not simply to those involving 
forcible breaking. See State v. Richards, 136 Wn.2d 361, 373, 962 P.2d 
118 (1998) (citing State v. Coyle, 95 Wn.2d 1, 5−6, 621 P.2d 1265 
(1980)). A consensual entry, however, is not “breaking open,” and so the 
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officers have no duty to announce themselves in this situation. See State 
v. Williamson, 42 Wn. App. 208, 211, 710 P.2d 205 (1985). But the cir-
cumstances must reasonably indicate that the occupant has actually con-
sented to the officer’s entry. See State v. Sturgeon, 46 Wn. App. 181, 183, 
730 P.2d 93 (1986) (holding that the knock and announce statute was 
violated when the police knocked, the defendant shouted “yeah,” and the 
police entered the apartment). If officers are attempting to gain entry to 
the residence without a warrant through a “knock and talk” procedure, 
and the officer attempts to gain consent for a search, the officer must an-
nounce his office and inform the suspect that he or she has the right to 
refuse entry. State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 960 P.2d 927 (1998) 
(holding that entry into suspect’s home was unlawful when the officers 
did not have a warrant and failed to inform the defendant of her right to 
refuse entry); see also State v. Schultz, 170 Wn.2d 746, 248 P.3d 484 
(2011). 
Even if the police are able to freely enter the residence, they must 
still announce themselves. The most common example is entry through 
an unlocked or open door. In State v. Miller, the court found the entry 
unlawful when the officer entered through an open door and did not an-
nounce his presence. 7 Wn. App. 414, 416, 499 P.2d 241 (1972) (dis-
cussing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38−41, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 
2d 726, (1963)); see also Coyle, 95 Wn.2d at 6, 621 P.2d 1265 (holding 
that officer entering dwelling must give notice of his office and purpose 
even though door to apartment was partially open). Notice is also re-
quired for entry by use of a pass key. See Ker, 374 U.S. at 38−41, 83 S. 
Ct. 1623. 
However, an officer’s failure to knock and announce himself before 
entering a fenced backyard through an unlocked gate does not violate 
RCW 10.31.040 when the officer can observe that the backyard is unoc-
cupied. State v. Schimpf, 82 Wn. App. 61, 65, 914 P.2d 1206 (1996). 
This is because “a knock and announcement at the gate in these circum-
stances would serve none of the purposes of the rule and statute.” Id. No 
one was present in the backyard, so there was little risk of violence; the 
unlocked gate allowed the deputy to enter without any property damage; 
and the low fence meant that the deputy could already see into the back-
yard, suggesting there were no significant privacy interests involved. Id. 
3.7(b) Entry Obtained by Deception 
The Washington State Supreme Court has held that consent ob-
tained by deception may still be effective consent. State v. Myers, 102 
Wn.2d 548, 552−53, 689 P.2d 38 (1984), modified on other grounds, 
State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 19−21, 921 P.2d 1035 (1996). Moreover, 
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such an entry is approved because the interests underlying the statute are 
well served by a consensual entry. The occupant’s right to privacy is still 
protected because the occupant may not deny entry to police who possess 
a valid search warrant, there is no damage to property as the entry was 
consensual, and the possibility for violence is lower with consent. State v. 
Richards, 136 Wn.2d 361, 373, 962 P.2d 118 (1998). Thus, an officer 
who deceives a suspect into allowing him or her to enter need not an-
nounce his office and purpose because—as the suspect has given con-
sent—no “breaking” occurs within the terms of the statute. State v. Wil-
liamson, 42 Wn. App. 208, 211, 710 P.2d 205 (1985). 
In State v. Myers, the police were aware that the doors and windows 
to the defendant’s house were covered by iron bars and that the defend-
ant kept a handgun. 102 Wn.2d at 549, 689 P.2d 38. The police prepared 
a fictitious warrant for the defendant’s arrest for a traffic offense. Id. at 
550, 689 P.2d 38. Upon being permitted to enter his house to execute the 
arrest warrant, the police executed the search warrant. Id. The court held 
that even though the officers failed to announce their purpose to search, 
the occupant of the house had granted “valid permission” for them to 
enter. Id. at 554, 689 P.2d 38; see also State v. Coyle, 95 Wn.2d 1, 5, 621 
P.2d 1265 (1980). In State v. Huckaby, the court found the knock and 
announce statute inapplicable when undercover officers gained entry into 
the suspect’s home with the suspect’s consent and for the apparent pur-
pose of conducting a drug transaction. 15 Wn. App. 280, 290, 549 P.2d 
35 (1976). See generally William D. Bremer, Annotation, What Consti-
tutes Compliance with Knock-and-Announce Rule in Search of Private 
Premises—State Cases, 85 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2001). 
3.7(c) Identification and Waiting Period 
The police must wait only a reasonable period of time after they 
announce their presence before entering the residence if no one answers 
their knock. State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 411, 47 P.3d 127 (2002); 
see 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(c), at 854−62 (5th ed. 
2012). However, the waiting period is over once “the door of the premis-
es is open, attended by an occupant, and the police have announced their 
identity and purpose while face-to-face with the occupant.” State v. 
Alldredge, 73 Wn. App. 171, 177, 868 P.2d 183 (1994). The announce-
ment of office and purpose may be made to the person answering the 
door even when that person is not in possession of the premises. See 
State v. Sainz, 23 Wn. App. 532, 537 n.3, 596 P.2d 1090 (1979). 
Whether the officer waited a reasonable amount of time is a ques-
tion of law and is determined with regard to the particular circumstances 
of the case. State v. Richards, 136 Wn.2d 361, 374, 962 P.2d 118 (1998); 
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State v. Johnson, 94 Wn. App. 882, 890, 974 P.2d 855 (1999). If it is 
clear that the inhabitants are aware of the police presence, the police may 
enter immediately. See Richards, 136 Wn.2d at 374, 962 P.2d 118 (hold-
ing that officers did not violate the knock and wait rule when they en-
tered the apartment immediately after announcing their identity because 
they were visible through sliding screen door); State v. Woodall, 32 Wn. 
App. 407, 411, 647 P.2d 1051 (1982) (holding three to four second wait 
reasonable when someone inside the clubhouse had seen the officers long 
before they reached the door and announced their presence). 
So long as the police wait a reasonable amount of time after an-
nouncing their presence, they need not wait for an affirmative denial. 
United States v. Bustamante–Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 10–11 (9th Cir. 1973); 
Richards, 136 Wn.2d at 374, 962 P.2d 118. Denial of admittance may be 
implied from the occupant’s lack of response. See State v. Schmidt, 48 
Wn. App. 639, 644–45, 740 P.2d 351 (1987). 
Because the length of a “reasonable” wait depends on the situation, 
courts have held that short waiting periods are appropriate if the suspect 
may be armed or the evidence is easily disposable. In State v. Berlin, the 
court held that the defendant’s possession of weapons and his history of 
violence did “bear upon the reasonableness of the length of time that the 
police waited after announcing themselves.” 46 Wn. App. 587, 593−94, 
731 P.2d 548 (1987). In State v. Schmidt, the court found that a three-
second wait was reasonable when there was the possibility that the occu-
pants had been alerted to police presence by barking dogs, the suspect 
had a history of gun possession, and the place to be searched was a very 
small shed, meaning the knock could have been quickly answered. 48 
Wn. App. at 646, 740 P.2d 351. 
3.7(d) Exceptions: Useless Gesture and Exigent Circumstances 
Police are excused from compliance with the knock and announce 
rule when it would be a useless gesture or when the police face exigent 
circumstances. Although Washington courts have not addressed this situ-
ation, law enforcement officers may be excused from the knock and an-
nounce requirement when covert entry of the premises is the only way to 
effectively execute the warrant. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 
247−48, 99 S. Ct. 1682, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1979). 
Under the “useless gesture” exception, compliance with the knock 
and announce rule is excused if the officers are “virtually certain” that 
the occupants are aware of their presence and purpose on the premises. 
State v. Coyle, 95 Wn.2d 1, 11, 621 P.2d 1265 (1980); State v. Shelly, 58 
Wn. App. 908, 911, 795 P.2d 187 (1990). See generally 2 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(f), at 879–81 (5th ed. 2012). This is 
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because once the defendant has opened the door and the police officers 
have identified themselves and their purpose, waiting for a grant or deni-
al of entrance by the defendant is a useless gesture. See Shelly, 58 Wn. 
App. at 911, 795 P.2d 187. The useless gesture exception has also been 
applied to justify a police officer’s forcible entry when the officer identi-
fied himself but was unable to state his purpose before the suspect tried 
to close the door. State v. Neff, 10 Wn. App. 713, 717, 519 P.2d 1328 
(1974).  
Officers may enter immediately and with force when exigent cir-
cumstances are present. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37−41, 83 S. Ct. 
1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963); State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 412, 
47 P.3d 127 (2002); State v. Young, 76 Wn.2d 212, 216, 455 P.2d 595 
(1969). This occurs most commonly when the evidence can be disposed 
of easily, the defendant may escape, or the defendant poses a threat to 
public safety. 
Washington has rejected the blanket rule, favored by some courts, 
that permits an unannounced entry when the warrant is for easily dis-
posed of items, such as drugs. State v. Jeter, 30 Wn. App. 360, 362, 634 
P.2d 312 (1981). In Washington, the police must possess specific infor-
mation indicating that the items are in imminent danger of destruction or 
removal. See Young, 76 Wn.2d at 215−16, 455 P.2d 595 (holding that 
belief of exigent circumstances cannot be based on suspicion or ambigu-
ous acts); State v. Dugger, 12 Wn. App. 74, 81, 528 P.2d 274 (1974) (de-
struction of evidence exigency not established because prior to their en-
try police had heard nothing to suggest such destruction was in progress). 
See generally 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.8(d). Likewise, evidence that sug-
gests that the suspect may escape constitutes an exigency. Cardenas, 146 
Wn.2d at 400, 47 P.3d 127. 
A police officer’s reasonable belief that announcing his or her of-
fice and purpose would jeopardize police or public safety is another type 
of exigent circumstance. See id. at 412, 47 P.3d 127; State v. Reid, 38 
Wn. App. 203, 210, 687 P.2d 861 (1984). A mere good faith concern for 
safety, however, is not sufficient. Jeter, 30 Wn. App. at 363, 634 P.2d 
312 (finding no exigent circumstances existed when officer had prior 
knowledge of defendant’s possession of gun but not of any propensity 
for defendant to use it to resist arrest). Police must know from prior in-
formation or from direct observation that the suspect both keeps weapons 
and has a propensity to use them. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d at 400, 47 P.3d 
127 (holding that the police were justified in entering with the 
knowledge that the defendants had firearms and had used them against 
the robbery victims); State v. Allyn, 40 Wn. App. 27, 31, 696 P.2d 45 
(1985) (exigent circumstances found when the police knew from under-
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cover agent that the defendant had several firearms in his dwelling and a 
strong propensity to use them). 
3.8 SEARCH AND DETENTION OF PERSONS ON THE PREMISES BEING 
SEARCHED 
3.8(a) Detention of Persons on Premises Being Searched 
A valid search warrant carries with it the authority to detain the oc-
cupants of the premises while the search is being conducted. Michigan v. 
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981); 
State v. Flores-Moreno, 72 Wn. App. 733, 739, 866 P.2d 648 (1994). 
However, this authority is narrower than either a detention supported by 
probable cause or a Terry stop. State v. King, 89 Wn. App. 612, 618–19, 
949 P.2d 856 (1998) (citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 702–03, 705, 101 S. 
Ct. 2587). To detain a person not listed in a search warrant, the police 
must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has commit-
ted or is about to commit a crime or that she is a threat to safety. State v. 
Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 135, 101 P.3d 80 (2004) (citing State v. 
Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486, 497, 987 P.2d 73 (1999)). 
The police may ascertain whether any individual arriving on the 
scene might interfere with the search and may determine what business, 
if any, the individual has at the premises. State v. Galloway, 14 Wn. App. 
200, 202, 540 P.2d 444 (1975). Such a limited stop, however, is not a 
license to detain and frisk all persons approaching within 100 feet of the 
location of the search. State v. Melin, 27 Wn. App. 589, 592, 618 P.2d 
1324 (1980). 
3.8(b) Search of Persons on Premises Being Searched 
Generally, a premises search warrant justifies a search of personal 
effects of the owner found therein [that] “are plausible repositories for 
the objects named in the warrant.” State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 643, 870 
P.2d 313 (1994). Officers have only the power to detain other persons 
who are present; they may not conduct personal searches of the persons 
other than the occupant. State v. Worth, 37 Wn. App. 889, 892, 683 P.2d 
622 (1984); see also State v. Galbert, 70 Wn. App. 721, 727, 855 P.2d 
310 (1993) (rejecting “mere presence” of contraband as a justification to 
search persons who are merely located at the search scene). Additionally, 
protection extends to “readily recognizable personal effects . . . which an 
individual has under his control and seeks to preserve as private.” State v. 
Lohr, 164 Wn. App. 414, 423, 263 P.3d 1287 (2011) (internal quotations 
omitted) (citing Worth, 37 Wn. App. at 893, 683 P.2d 622); see also 2 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.9(b)−(c), at 894−902 (5th ed. 
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2012). Thus, if the police can identify the item as belonging to a person 
other than the occupant, they may not search it. See Worth, 37 Wn. App. 
at 893, 683 P.2d 622; see also State v. Jackson, 107 Wn. App. 646, 649, 
27 P.3d 689 (2001) (holding that police properly searched a jacket where 
there was confusion over whether it was owned by the lawfully arrested 
driver or the non-arrested passenger). 
In State v. Worth, the court rejected a distinction between personal 
effects worn on or held by the person and those effects nearby the person 
at the time of the search: “A narrow focus on whether a person is holding 
or wearing a personal item would tend to undercut the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment and leave vulnerable readily recognizable effects, 
such as [a] purse, which an individual has under [her] control and seeks 
to preserve as private.” 37 Wn. App. at 893, 683 P.2d 622. However, the 
Washington State Supreme Court has held that one has no privacy inter-
est in items left at another’s house. See State v. Reynolds, 144 Wn.2d 282, 
287, 27 P.3d 200 (2001). 
However, in limited instances, the police may conduct a search of a 
person on the premises but not named in the warrant. State v. Broadnax, 
98 Wn.2d 289, 301, 654 P.2d 96 (1982). For searches conducted incident 
to arrest, see infra § 5.1. If the search is not incident to a lawful arrest, 
then police may only detain or search an individual other than the occu-
pant if there is “presence plus.” Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d at 301, 654 P.2d 96. 
First, a person not named in the warrant but present on the premises 
may be searched if the police “have reasonable cause to believe [that the 
person] has the articles for which the search is instituted upon his person.” 
State v. Halverson, 21 Wn. App. 35, 38, 584 P.2d 408 (1978) (citations 
omitted). “Reasonable cause” requires that the person engage in some 
type of suspicious activity. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d at 301, 654 P.2d 96. 
Thus, in the execution of a search warrant for narcotics, police were jus-
tified in searching a person’s fists when, at the time of the officer’s entry, 
the person was observed kneeling in front of a weighing scale and then 
rising with his fists clenched. Halverson, 21 Wn. App. at 36−37, 584 
P.2d 408. Police were not justified in searching a purse, however, when 
the owner of the purse gave no evidence of suspicious behavior. Lohr, 
164 Wn. App. at 423, 263 P.3d 1287. 
Second, police may conduct a limited search for weapons to protect 
themselves during the execution of the warrant. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 
U.S. 85, 93, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979); Broadnax, 98 
Wn.2d at 301, 654 P.2d 96; State v. Allen, 93 Wn.2d 170, 172, 606 P.2d 
1235 (1980). The police must, however, have a reasonable suspicion that 
the person searched is armed. State v. Lennon, 94 Wn. App. 573, 580−81, 
976 P.2d 121 (1999) (objective, reasonable belief that the suspect is 
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armed and dangerous may not be based on a generalized suspicion that 
people present during narcotic searches are often armed). Moreover, the 
search must be limited to ascertaining whether the individual is armed. 
Allen, 93 Wn.2d at 172, 606 P.2d 1235 (holding that an officer conduct-
ing a pat-down may not examine the contents of a wallet found on the 
individual “after satisfying himself that the ‘bulge’ [wallet] was not a 
weapon”). For a more detailed discussion, see infra, § 4.5. 
3.9 PERMISSIBLE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF SEARCH 
Assuming that a search warrant describes the area and items with 
the requisite particularity, the remaining question is the permissible 
scope and intensity of the search. The nature of the items to be seized 
governs the permissible degree of intensity for the search. State v. Lair, 
95 Wn.2d 706, 717, 630 P.2d 427 (1981) (holding that a search for mari-
juana may be very intense). And “[a]ny express or implied limitations or 
qualifications may reduce the scope of consent in duration, area, or in-
tensity.” State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 133, 101 P.3d 80 (2004). 
Once the purpose of the warrant has been carried out, the authority to 
search ends. See State v. Legas, 20 Wn. App. 535, 541, 581 P.2d 172 
(1978) (holding that a warrant permitting a search in a bedroom for pa-
pers linking defendant to the premises did not justify a search of a small 
box after such papers had been discovered). 
Generally, a premises search warrant “justifies a search of personal 
effects of the owner found therein [that] are plausible repositories for the 
objects specified in the warrant.” State v. Worth, 37 Wn. App. 889, 892, 
683 P.2d 622 (1984) (citing State v. White, 13 Wn. App. 949, 538 P.2d 
860 (1975)); see also State v. Anderson, 41 Wn. App. 85, 96, 702 P.2d 
481 (1985) (holding that a warrant to search for clothing used in a rob-
bery extended to the entire residence where clothing might be found, in-
cluding the inside of a garbage-can-sized commercial vacuum cleaner). 
Similarly, a valid search warrant supported by probable cause may be 
sufficient to obtain a blood test; the court need not issue a separate order 
calling for a blood test. State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wn.2d 525, 532, 852 
P.2d 1064 (1993) (finding that the initial warrant provided probable 
cause to issue warrant for blood draw when van and defendant matched 
description provided by rape victims and the defendant was seen cruising 
the neighborhood). 
In a search for documents, courts have recognized that officers 
searching for documents must, out of necessity, examine documents not 
specifically listed in the warrant. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 
482 n.11, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976); State v. Stenson, 132 
Wn.2d 668, 695, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997) (finding that officers did not ex-
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ceed the scope of the search warrant when they examined and seized 
documents not specifically listed in the warrant). In the course of such a 
search, officers may also seize evidence found that is not specifically 
described in the warrant if “it will aid in a particular apprehension or 
conviction, or [if it] has a sufficient nexus with the crime under investi-
gation.” Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 695, 940 P.2d 1239. 
3.9(a) Area 
Police “must execute a search warrant strictly within the bounds set 
by the warrant.” State v. Cheatam, 112 Wn. App. 778, 783, 51 P.3d 138 
(2002), aff’d, 150 Wn.2d 626 (2003) (citing State v. Kelley, 52 Wn. App. 
581, 585, 762 P.2d 20 (1988)). But a search of the premises and out-
buildings extends to the curtilage of the house as well. State v. Rivera, 76 
Wn. App. 519, 525, 888 P.2d 740 (1995) (citing State v. Claflin, 38 Wn. 
App. 847, 853, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984)). Police may enter areas not explic-
itly named in the warrant when such entry is necessary to execute the 
warrant. See, e.g., Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257, 99 S. Ct. 
1682, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1979) (holding that a warrant explicitly authoriz-
ing planting of hidden microphone implicitly authorized covert entry on-
to premises). Additionally, officers may search for items thrown outside 
of the premises if knowledge of police presence at the premises provoked 
that action. State v. Dearinger, 73 Wn.2d 563, 567, 439 P.2d 971 (1968) 
(finding that officers acted within ambit of warrant in seizing a sack and 
its contents thrown by occupant into the adjoining yard during the 
search). 
As discussed further in section 3.4(c), above, a warrant that author-
izes the search of a house with no mention of outbuildings does not in-
clude a search of outbuildings not under defendant’s control. State v. 
Kelley, 52 Wn. App. 581, 586, 762 P.2d 20 (1988) (suppressing evidence 
located in a barn and garage that were not specified in the warrant); see 
also State v. Gebaroff, 87 Wn. App. 11, 16, 939 P.2d 706 (1997) (hold-
ing that warrant application describing drug buy at a mobile home did 
not give rise to probable cause to search travel trailer located on same 
property but not under suspect’s control). Generally, where it is reasona-
ble for an officer to believe that a storage area is appurtenant to the area 
covered by a valid search warrant, the officers may search the storage 
area. See State v. Boyer, 124 Wn. App. 593, 602, 102 P.3d 833 (2004). 
It has been suggested that police may also enter adjacent areas if 
they reasonably fear for their safety. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 4.10(a), at 942−45 (5th ed. 2012). However, in Washington, 
the protective sweep has not been extended to search warrants because 
no court has yet considered this question. Boyer, 124 Wn. App. at 602, 
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102 P.3d 833. In City of Walla Walla v. $401,333.44, the court stated that 
the police entered a house without a search warrant and conducted a 
“protective sweep” of the residence. 150 Wn. App. 360, 363, 208 P.3d 
574 (2009). 
3.9(b) Personal Effects 
Personal effects found on the premises and belonging to the occu-
pant may be searched if the effects can reasonably be expected to contain 
the described items. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 643, 870 
P.2d 313 (1994); State v. Worth, 37 Wn. App. 889, 892, 683 P.2d 622 
(1984). Ordinarily, however, the police may not search effects that they 
know belong to other persons. See Worth, 37 Wn. App. at 893, 683 P.2d 
622; see also supra § 3.9(b). Even when a warrant authorizes a search of 
the entire premises, it does not justify the search of another person resid-
ing on the premises who was not mentioned in the affidavit, nor does it 
justify a search of a purse belonging to another person if she was holding 
the purse or in proximity to it. Worth, 37 Wn. App. at 893, 683 P.2d 622. 
An individual has no privacy interest in abandoned personal property, 
see State v. Reynolds, 144 Wn.2d 282, 287, 27 P.3d 200 (2001), but the 
court has held that even if the defendant has disclaimed ownership of the 
personal item, if the defendant has a privacy interest in the item, the of-
ficers must have a search warrant to search or seize it. State v. Evans, 
159 Wn.2d 402, 150 P.3d 105 (2007). 
Additionally, if officers have a warrant to search a person, they may 
conduct a strip search of the defendant to procure evidence if such search 
is conducted in a reasonable manner and place as prescribed by statute. 
State v. Colin, 61 Wn. App. 111, 114−15, 809 P.2d 228 (1991). In Colin, 
the court utilized RCW 10.79.080 and RCW 10.79.100 by analogy in 
determining standards of reasonableness. Id. In State v. Hampton, the 
court held that the strip search pursuant to a search warrant was reasona-
ble because it was conducted in a reasonably private place, a police van 
with tinted windows, without unnecessary touching, and by persons of 
the defendant’s gender. 114 Wn. App. 486, 494−95, 60 P.3d 95 (2002). 
3.9(c) Vehicles 
Officers with authority to search a residence for illegal drugs also 
have authority to search vehicles that are under the control of the defend-
ant and located on the premises to be searched. State v. Claflin, 38 Wn. 
App. 847, 853, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984). But a trailer that is used as a resi-
dence is treated as a residential outbuilding rather than as a vehicle. State 
v. Gebaroff, 87 Wn. App. 11, 16, 939 P.2d 706 (1997) (holding that be-
cause the trial court found that Gebaroff treated the trailer as his resi-
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dence, the reviewing court treated it like a residential outbuilding). And 
police have no authority to search vehicles that are not within the curti-
lage of the home. See, e.g., State v. Graham, 78 Wn. App. 44, 51−52, 
896 P.2d 704 (1995) (holding that a truck parked next to, and slightly in, 
a public street is not within the curtilage of the house where there was no 
fence or other barrier between the occupant’s yard and the street). 
In State v. Pourtes, the court held that the street and the shoulder of 
the roadway were not within the curtilage of a residence. 49 Wn. App. 
579, 581, 744 P.2d 644 (1987). Likewise, in State v. Niedergang, the 
court held that a vehicle is not within the curtilage of a house when it is 
parked in a space that lawfully could be used by anyone coming to the 
adjoining house on legitimate business. 43 Wn. App. 656, 662, 719 P.2d 
576 (1986). 
3.10 SEIZURE OF UNNAMED ITEMS: REQUIREMENTS IN GENERAL 
Items not listed in the search warrant may be seized when the sei-
zure falls within one of the general exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
See, e.g., State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 70, 917 P.2d 563 (1996) 
(search incident to arrest). See generally infra Chapter 5. Most common-
ly, officers see an incriminating object that was not listed in the warrant 
during a search. Under the plain view and open view exceptions, this 
evidence may sometimes be seized. State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 392, 
909 P.2d 280 (1996) (open view); State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 332, 346, 
815 P.2d 761 (1991) (plain view). In addition, items may be seized in 
order to show dominion and control of the premises even if those items 
are not listed in the search warrant. State v. Weaver, 38 Wn. App. 17, 22, 
683 P.2d 1136 (1984). 
3.11 DELIVERING WARRANT AND INVENTORY: REQUIREMENTS FOR 
EXECUTION OF WARRANTS 
Statutes or court rules may impose requirements on the execution of 
warrants beyond those mandated by the U.S. Constitution. Washington 
court rules provide that the officer shall give a copy of the warrant to the 
person who controls the premises being searched. CrR 2.3(d). If no one 
is present, the officer must post a copy of the warrant. Id. In addition, an 
inventory of articles taken must be made in the presence of at least one 
person other than the searching officer. Id. This requirement is designed 
to prevent error in the inventory and is satisfied by the presence of an-
other police officer. State v. Temple, 170 Wn. App. 156, 161, 285 P.3d 
149 (2012) (citing State v. Wraspir, 20 Wn. App. 626, 628, 581 P.2d 182 
(1978)). 
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Washington follows the majority rule that defects relating to the de-
livery of a search warrant are ministerial and do not compel invalidation 
of the warrant absent a showing of prejudice. Temple, 170 Wn. App. at 
161, 285 P.3d 149. In State v. Aase, the court held that a several minute 
delay in the provision of the warrant to the defendant did not require 
suppression under either the federal or the state constitution. 121 Wn. 
App. 558, 567, 89 P.3d 721 (2004). Even a warrant that by error was un-
signed did not invalidate the search without a showing of prejudice. State 
v. Parker, 28 Wn. App. 425, 426, 626 P.2d 508 (1981). 
3.12 CHALLENGING THE CONTENT OF AN AFFIDAVIT 
A defendant is generally entitled to examine an affidavit in order to 
challenge whether there was probable cause to issue the warrant. Most 
commonly, issues arise with disclosure of the informant’s identity and 
misrepresentations or omissions in the affidavit. 
3.12(a) Informant’s Identity 
The court may excise portions of the affidavit that identify a confi-
dential or unnamed informant to protect the State’s interest in maintain-
ing the confidentiality of such informants. See State v. Moen, 150 Wn.2d 
221, 230, 76 P.3d 721 (2003); see CrR 4.7(f)(2) (“Disclosure of an in-
formant’s identity shall not be required where the informant’s identity is 
a prosecution secret and a failure to disclose will not infringe upon the 
constitutional rights of the defendant.”). 
When the informant is undisclosed, the defendant lacks access to 
the very information he or she needs to challenge the veracity of an affi-
davit. State v. Casal, 103 Wn.2d 812, 818, 699 P.2d 1234 (1985). Courts 
have held that when the “informant provided information relating to 
probable cause only, rather than the defendant’s guilt or innocence, dis-
closure of the identity of an informant is not required.” State v. Atchley, 
142 Wn. App. 147, 156, 173 P.3d 323 (2007); see also Casal, 103 Wn.2d 
at 815−16, 699 P.2d 1234 (citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 
61, 77 S. Ct. 623, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1957)). However, “fundamental fair-
ness” may require the disclosure of an informant’s identity to assess the 
affiant’s credibility or accuracy. State v. White, 50 Wn. App. 858, 865, 
751 P.2d 1202 (1988). In such cases, the court must balance the risks of 
disclosure against the risk that nondisclosure may conceal police perjury. 
State v. Wolken, 103 Wn.2d 823, 829, 700 P.2d 319 (1985). The discre-
tionary nature of the rule recognizes the possibility that search warrant 
affidavits may contain some false allegations. In re Rosier, 105 Wn.2d 
606, 615, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986). 
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A defendant under these circumstances is entitled to an in camera 
hearing on whether to disclose the informant’s identity if the defendant 
“casts a reasonable doubt on the veracity of material representations 
made by the affiant.” White, 50 Wn. App. at 865, 751 P.2d 1202 (quoting 
Casal, 103 Wn.2d at 820, 699 P.2d 1234). This hearing is available on 
only a “minimal showing of inconsistency.” Id. Even so, “a Casal hear-
ing is required only whe[n] a search warrant affidavit contains no other 
independent basis for establishing probable cause.” Id. at 865 n.4, 751 
P.2d 1202. If the informant verifies the affiant’s story and the judge is 
convinced that probable cause existed, the informant’s identity is not to 
be disclosed. Id. at 822, 751 P.2d 1202. But if the judge finds a substan-
tial showing of falsehood, an open evidentiary hearing is required. Id. 
3.12(b) Misrepresentations and Omissions in an Affidavit 
A defendant may challenge the validity of a warrant based on a 
misrepresentation of fact in the supporting affidavit. Franks v. Delaware, 
438 U.S. 154, 155−56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978); State v. 
Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 158 P.3d 595 (2007). The Franks test also 
applies to allegations of material omissions. State v. Cord, 103 Wn.2d 
361, 367, 693 P.2d 81 (1985). 
Under article I, section 7, the defendant must first make a substan-
tial showing that a false statement in the affidavit (1) was made either 
knowingly and intentionally or in reckless disregard for the truth, and (2) 
was necessary or material to the finding of probable cause. State v. Gar-
rison, 118 Wn.2d 870, 872, 827 P.2d 1388 (1992) (per curiam); see also 
Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 478−79, 158 P.3d 595. An omission or mis-
representation that was made in a negligent or grossly negligent manner 
will not give rise to a Franks hearing; the omission or misrepresentation 
must be made recklessly. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 478−79, 158 P.3d 
595; State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 908, 632 P.2d 44 (1981) (quoting 
Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S. Ct. 2674). The showing must be based on 
specific facts and offers of proof rather than on conclusory assertions. 
Garrison, 118 Wn.2d at 872, 827 P.2d 1388. 
If the defendant fails to meet these formidable preconditions, the 
inquiry ends. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 479−81, 158 P.3d 595; State v. 
Jackson, 111 Wn. App. 660, 677, 46 P.3d 257 (2002). But if the defend-
ant is successful in proving the truth of his allegations and the false 
statements or omitted material is relevant to the establishment of proba-
ble cause, the affidavit must be examined with the false statements delet-
ed and the omissions inserted. State v. Atchley, 142 Wn. App. 147, 158, 
173 P.3d 323 (2007). If the modified affidavit is insufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause, the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary 
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hearing under the Fourth Amendment. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171−72, 98 S. 
Ct. 2674; Garrison, 118 Wn.2d at 873, 827 P.2d 1388. As with the ex-
clusionary rule, close cases should be assessed in favor of the defendant 
when the misstatements are removed from the affidavit. United States v. 
Kelley, 482 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007). 
3.13 SPECIAL SITUATIONS 
Three situations appearing frequently in searches require additional 
limitations. These are searches and seizures of materials protected by the 
First Amendment, intrusions into the body, and warrants directed at non-
suspects. 
3.13(a) First Amendment Materials 
 “Where a search warrant authorizing a search for materials pro-
tected by the First Amendment is concerned, the degree of particularity 
demanded is greater than in the case where the materials sought are not 
protected by the First Amendment.” State v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 815, 
167 P.3d 1156 (2007). The particularity requirement is afforded its most 
exacting enforcement for these materials, including warrants for books, 
pictures, films, or recordings. State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 547, 834 
P.2d 611 (1992); see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564, 98 S. 
Ct. 1970, 56 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1978). Computers themselves are not subject 
to heightened protection just because they frequently store material pro-
tected by the First Amendment. United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882 
(9th Cir. 2008). These warrants must “follow the Fourth Amendment’s 
particularity requirement with ‘scrupulous exactitude.’” Reep, 161 
Wn.2d at 815, 167 P.3d 1156 (internal citations omitted). When the First 
Amendment is involved, nothing should be “left to the discretion of the 
officer executing the warrant.” Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485, 85 
S. Ct. 506, 13 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1965). 
If the objects to be seized are books or films, and are being seized 
because of their content, the requirement of particularity is especially 
important.” Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 548, 834 P.2d 611; see also 2 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.6(e) (5th ed. 2012). The seizure of 
protected materials happens most frequently with regards to allegedly 
obscene material. 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.6(e), at 811–12 (for allegedly ob-
scene material, “a description of these materials by title or similar identi-
fying characteristic, or by a specific statement as to the type of contents 
which would render the materials presumptively obscene” is required). In 
State v. Perrone, the court held that a warrant for “child pornography” 
was insufficiently particular because pornography implicates “obscenity,” 
a term that is presumptively protected by the First Amendment. 119 
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Wn.2d at 547, 834 P.2d 611. In State v. Reep, the court held that “the 
fictitious crime of ‘child sex’ is even broader and more ambiguous than 
the term ‘child . . . pornography.’” 161 Wn.2d at 815, 167 P.3d 1156 
(striking down warrant for “child sex”). However, in the Ninth Circuit, a 
warrant for “computers, compact disks, floppy disks, hard drives, 
memory cards, printers, and other portable digital devices, DVDs, and 
video tapes” was not too broad, as the computer-related equipment was 
described in the narrowest terms reasonably likely to contain the images. 
States v. Brobst, 558 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2009). 
However, the scrupulous exactitude standard has not been extended 
to all searches and seizures involving the First Amendment. State v. Wal-
ter, 66 Wn. App. 862, 869, 833 P.2d 440 (1992) (per curiam) (citing New 
York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 875, 106 S. Ct. 1610, 89 L. Ed. 2d 
871 (1986)) (determining that greater scrutiny was not required merely 
because photographs were involved). Additionally, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has upheld a search warrant that listed specific documents pertain-
ing to a particular crime but then added the catchall phrase “together with 
other fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence of crime.” Andresen v. Mary-
land, 427 U.S. 463, 479, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976). In An-
dresen, the search was constitutional because the catchall phrase was to 
be read as authorizing a search for only evidence relating to the defined 
crime. Id. at 480−82, 96 S. Ct. 2737. In U.S. v. Heredia, the Ninth Circuit 
found a warrant for “any and all” records related to a certain organization 
too broad because the organization had not been shown to be pervasively 
criminal. 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2007). 
3.13(b) Intrusions into the Body 
Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 of the 
Washington State Constitution, a forced intrusion into the body is a 
search. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616, 109 S. Ct. 
1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989); State v. Garcia-Salgado, 170 Wn.2d 
176, 184, 240 P.3d 153 (2010). This includes, among other things, DNA 
sampling, tests of a defendant’s blood for alcohol content, breathalyzer 
tests, cavity searches, and strip searches. Importantly, if the defendant 
voluntarily discards bodily fluids, no warrant is necessary. State v. Athan, 
160 Wn.2d 354, 367, 158 P.3d 27 (2007) (finding no privacy interest in 
saliva on envelope mailed to the defendant by a police officer posing as 
an attorney). A trial court may also order samples to be taken from the 
defendant’s body; however, the court’s power to do so is subject to con-
stitutional limitations. CrR 4.7(b)(2)(vi); see Garcia-Salgado, 170 Wn.2d 
at 185−86, 240 P.3d 153. Thus, intrusion into the body is covered by the 
warrant requirement. 
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For an intrusion into the body, the regular requirements under arti-
cle I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment apply. State v. Kalakosky, 121 
Wn.2d 525, 532, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993) (holding that valid search warrant 
based on probable cause is constitutionally sufficient to obtain blood 
sample from suspect). However, in addition, three more showings must 
be made. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770–72, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 
16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (finding that the “interests in human dignity and 
privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects” require a heightened 
standard); Garcia-Salgado, 170 Wn.2d at 184−85, 240 P.3d 153. In order 
for the search to be lawful, (1) there must be a “clear indication” that the 
desired evidence will be found if the search is performed, (2) the method 
of searching must be reasonable, and (3) the search must be performed in 
a reasonable manner. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770−72, 86 S. Ct. 1826. 
However, if the alcohol content of the defendant’s blood is an ele-
ment of the crime, the police may take a blood sample without a warrant 
if the test used to measure blood alcohol content is reasonable and per-
formed in a reasonable manner. State v. Curran, 116 Wn.2d 174, 185, 
804 P.2d 558 (1991), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Berlin, 133 
Wn.2d 541, 947 P.2d 700 (1997). Thus, for example, taking a blood 
sample from a defendant charged with negligent homicide is valid when 
the police have probable cause to believe that evidence of intoxication 
will be found and that the test used to measure blood alcohol content is 
reasonable and performed in a reasonable manner. State v. Judge, 100 
Wn.2d 706, 712, 675 P.2d 219 (1984) (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 
770–71, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (finding that it was impracticable to seek a war-
rant for a blood draw because the defendant’s body was constantly elim-
inating the evidence of alcohol in his blood)). But see Missouri v. 
McNeely, No. 11–1425, slip op. (U.S. Apr. 17, 2013) (dissipation of 
blood alcohol not sufficient per se to conduct warrantless draw).  
Washington has also upheld mandatory blood testing in cases of pu-
tative fathers, see State v. Meacham, 93 Wn.2d 735, 739, 612 P.2d 795 
(1980), and has upheld mandatory HIV and DNA testing of convicted 
sexual offenders. Kalakosky, 121 Wn.2d at 536, 852 P.2d 1064 (holding 
that mandatory HIV testing of sexual offenders presents a minimal 
Fourth Amendment intrusion for which the State’s reasons are compel-
ling); State v. Olivas, 122 Wn.2d 73, 93, 856 P.2d 1076 (1993) (holding 
that a statute requiring mandatory DNA testing of convicted sexual of-
fenders in order to establish DNA databank is constitutionally permissi-
ble). It is also permissible to take DNA samples from convicted felons. 
State v. Surge, 160 Wn.2d 65, 156 P.3d 208 (2007) (upholding RCW 
43.43.754 and finding that mandatory DNA testing of felons without a 
warrant is constitutional). In addition, once the police have the DNA 
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sample in their possession, they may compare it to unrelated cases with-
out a warrant. State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 826–27, 147 P.3d 1201 
(2006). 
More intrusive procedures may be permitted in special environ-
ments. In prisons and jails, strip searches and cavity searches may be 
done without a warrant. State v. Harris, 66 Wn. App. 636, 642, 833 P.2d 
402 (1992) (finding exigent circumstances justified strip search of juve-
nile before placement in holding cell when police had prior experience 
with gang members taping razor blades to their skin); Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 U.S. 520, 560, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979) (finding full 
body cavity searches of prison inmates following contact visits not un-
reasonable). Similar intrusive procedures may be allowed at borders. See 
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537, 105 S. Ct. 
3304, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1985) (holding that suspect fitting the profile for 
a drug smuggler may be subjected to rectal cavity search when search 
warrant was based on profile and suspect’s unwillingness to eat, drink, or 
defecate during 16 hour confinement). See generally infra §§ 6.2 (pris-
ons), 6.3 (borders). 
The U.S. Supreme Court is currently hearing a challenge to a state 
law that allows DNA sampling for persons arrested for, but not convicted 
of, a crime. King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 42 A.3d 549 (2012), cert. grant-
ed, 133 S. Ct. 594, 184 L. Ed. 2d 390 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012). 
3.13(c) Warrants Directed at Nonsuspects 
In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
also applies to non-suspects. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 
559−60, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 56 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1978). Critics have argued 
that a search warrant of a third party is per se unreasonable and that a 
subpoena duces tecum can adequately protect law enforcement interests. 
See Note, The Reasonableness of Warranted Searches of Nonsuspect 
Third Parties, 44 Alb. L. Rev. 212, 232–35 (1979) (criticizing Zurcher 
for failing to adopt a less drastic alternative or less intrusive practice test 
in Fourth Amendment cases). In response to Zurcher, Congress enacted 
the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 (PPA), which prohibits the govern-
ment from searching or seizing any work product material “possessed by 
a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the pub-
lic a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public com-
munication” without first issuing a subpoena duces tecum. 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000aa–2000aa-12 (1994). 
These protections have not been extended outside the media, and 
Washington has not yet addressed the issue. See generally 2 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure §§ 4.2(c), 4.1(f)−(i) (5th ed. 2012). Most 
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commonly, disputes occur with the searching of non-suspect attorneys’ 
offices. O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (find-
ing that the protections of client confidentiality, attorney-client privilege, 
attorney work product, and a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to 
counsel cannot keep enforcement officers from rummaging through doc-
uments in search of items to be seized when such officers possess a war-
rant to search an attorney’s office). Colorado, one of the only states to do 
so, has struck down a third party search under its heightened First 
Amendment provision. Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 
1044, 1056, 30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1656 (Colo. 2002), as modified on 
denial of reh’g (Apr. 29, 2002). 
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CHAPTER 4 
Seizure of the Person: Arrests and Stop-and-Frisks 
This chapter covers principles that are unique to seizure of the per-
son. Related issues include probable cause discussed in chapter 2, knock 
and announce discussed in section 3.7, and searches incident to arrest 
discussed in section 5.1. This chapter first discusses the basics of arrests, 
both with and without warrants, for felony charges and misdemeanor 
charges. Second, this chapter discusses the specifics of arrests, such as 
force, custodial arrests for minor offenses, judicial review, and booking 
charges. Lastly, this chapter covers Terry stops, including the reasonable 
suspicion standard, frisks, investigative questioning, and the dimensions 
of a reasonable stop. 
4.0 SEIZURE: AN INTRODUCTION 
The Washington constitution has generally been interpreted as 
providing greater protections for individual privacy interests than the 
Fourth Amendment provides. State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 
631, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009). Under article I, section 7, a seizure occurs 
when a reasonable person under the totality of the circumstances would 
not feel free either to leave or to decline an officer’s requests due to the 
officer’s use of force or display of authority. State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 
689, 695, 92 P.3d 202 (2004); State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 574, 62 
P.3d 489 (2003). Unlike the Fourth Amendment, Washington’s “standard 
is ‘a purely objective one, looking to the actions of the law enforcement 
officer.’” State v. Harrington, 167 Wn.2d 656, 663, 222 P.3d 92 (2009); 
see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626−29, 111 S. Ct. 1547 
(1991) (requiring submission to the show of force in order to constitute a 
seizure). Specifically, a determination of whether a reasonable person 
would feel free to leave is based on the officer’s conduct. See O’Neill, 
148 Wn.2d at 574, 62 P.3d 489; see also Harrington, 167 Wn.2d at 663, 
222 P.3d 92. The relevant question is whether, under the circumstances, 
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police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he 
or she was not free to leave. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d at 574, 62 P.3d 489; 
State v. Avila-Avina, 99 Wn. App. 9, 14, 991 P.2d 720 (2000), abrogated 
on other grounds by Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 220 P.3d 1226. 
Coercive conduct that constitutes a seizure is established by a series 
of acts, rather than a single act. See State v. Soto-Garcia, 68 Wn. App. 20, 
25, 841 P.2d 1271 (1992). The state supreme court has embraced a non-
exclusive list of factors that likely result in a seizure: “‘the threatening 
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some 
physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or 
tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might 
be compelled.’” State v. Young, 135 Wn.2d 498, 512, 957 P.2d 681 
(1998) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554–55, 100 
S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980)). 
If the officers merely ask the defendant a few questions or ask for 
identification, they have initiated a social contact, not a seizure. See Har-
rington, 167 Wn.2d at 664–65, 222 P.3d 92 (finding a social contact 
when only one officer was present, the defendant had use of the sidewalk, 
and the police officer was on foot); State v. Hansen, 99 Wn. App. 575, 
576, 994 P.2d 855 (2000) (per curiam) (holding that handing defendant’s 
identification from one officer to another for the purpose of identification 
does not amount to a seizure); see supra Chapter 1. 
A seizure was found when the defendant voluntarily entered a po-
lice car that could not be opened from inside. Avila-Avina, 99 Wn. App. 
at 14, 991 P.2d 720. In situations where there is more than one police 
officer or the officers use a threatening tone, the court has found seizures 
as well. See Harrington, 167 Wn.2d at 660, 222 P.3d 92 (arrival of se-
cond police officer and request to pat down instigated a seizure); State v. 
Gleason, 70 Wn. App. 13, 17, 851 P.2d 731 (1993) (seizure found when 
two officers were present, and one officer yelled “[c]an I talk to you a 
minute?” to the suspect, approached him, and requested identification). 
4.1 ARREST 
A defendant is placed under arrest when “a duly authorized officer 
of the law manifests an intent to take a person into custody and actually 
seizes or detains such person.” State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 387, 219 
P.3d 651 (2009). The moment of arrest occurs when the officer manifests 
this intent, not when the officer actually restrains the defendant. Id. 
(holding that a defendant was under arrest at the point when officer told 
him he was under arrest even though the defendant ran). 
The relevant inquiry to determine whether a person has been arrest-
ed is “whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position at the time 
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would have thought so.” State v. Rivard, 131 Wn.2d 63, 75, 929 P.2d 413 
(1997). The subjective intent of the arresting officer is irrelevant. State v. 
Radka, 120 Wn. App. 43, 50, 83 P.3d 1038 (2004). In State v. Rivard, the 
court found that no arrest occurred because the defendant was not physi-
cally apprehended, restrained, handcuffed, or placed in a police vehicle. 
131 Wn.2d at 75, 929 P.2d 413. In State v. Radka, the court found no 
arrest even though the defendant was told he was under arrest and placed 
in a patrol car because he was neither frisked nor handcuffed, and he was 
allowed to make calls on his cell phone. 120 Wn. App. at 50, 83 P.3d 
1038. 
Although a seizure restrains an individual’s freedom of movement, 
not all seizures amount to arrests. See State v. Lyons, 85 Wn. App. 267, 
270, 932 P.2d 188 (1997) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 
1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968) (finding investigative detention was not 
transformed into an arrest when the investigating officer physically re-
strained a suspect and stated that he was under arrest)). For instance, a 
seizure, but not necessarily an arrest, has taken place when a police of-
ficer asks an individual to step out of his or her car during a stop. See 
State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 581−82, 62 P.3d 489 (2003). 
It is not a defense in a criminal prosecution that a defendant was il-
legally arrested. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444, 7 S. Ct. 225, 30 L. Ed. 
421 (1886); State v. Waters, 93 Wn. App. 969, 976, 971 P.2d 538 (1999). 
However, the legality of the arrest affects the legality of any search or 
confession that takes place after the arrest, as well as the admissibility of 
evidence derived from the arrest. See generally infra Chapter 7. 
4.2 ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS 
Arrests are not subject to the same strict warrant requirements as 
searches; therefore, officers have more leeway to arrest without a warrant 
than they do to search without a warrant. First, this section will delineate 
the general rules for warrantless arrests in public places and in the home. 
Then, this section will examine the standards for warrantless arrests for 
felony offenses and warrantless arrests for misdemeanors. 
4.2(a) Public Arrests 
An officer may make a warrantless felony arrest in a public place 
even though the officer had time to obtain a warrant. State v. Solberg, 
122 Wn.2d 688, 696, 861 P.2d 460 (1993) (citing United States v. Wat-
son, 423 U.S. 411, 422−24, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976)). 
Nonetheless, such arrests must be supported by probable cause. Id.; 3 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(b), at 15−21 (5th ed. 
2012). “‘Probable cause exists when the arresting officer is aware of 
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facts or circumstances . . . sufficient to cause a reasonable officer to be-
lieve a crime has been committed.’” State v. Moore, 161 Wn.2d 880, 887, 
169 P.3d 469 (2007) (emphasis removed) (citing State v. Gaddy, 152 
Wn.2d 64, 70, 93 P.3d 872 (2004)); see Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 
366, 371, 124 S. Ct. 795, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769 (2003). Additionally, the 
probable cause must be specific to the individual arrested; thus, if an of-
ficer smells marijuana emanating from a vehicle and two individuals are 
present, the officer may not arrest both if he cannot discern where the 
odor is coming from. State v. Grande, 164 Wn.2d 135, 146, 187 P.3d 248 
(2008). 
Probable cause, however, is not subject to calculation by formula or 
by mathematical certainty. See State v. Morgan, 78 Wn. App. 208, 212, 
896 P.2d 731 (1995); see also supra Chapter 2. Therefore, a defendant is 
entitled to a prompt judicial determination of probable cause following a 
warrantless arrest. Westerman v. Cary, 125 Wn.2d 277, 295, 892 P.2d 
1067 (1994); see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 
L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975) (“Once the suspect is in custody . . . the reasons that 
justify dispensing with the magistrate’s neutral judgment evaporate.”); 
see also infra § 4.5(c). 
4.2(b) Home Arrests 
Although officers may make a warrantless arrest in a public area, 
they may not make a warrantless arrest after a nonconsensual entry into a 
suspect’s home. State v. Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 907, 912, 259 P.3d 172 
(2011) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589−90, 100 S. Ct. 
1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980)). If the officers have a warrant, they may 
enter the home if they reasonably believe the defendant resides therein. 
State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 395−96, 166 P.3d 698 (2007); see infra 
§ 4.3 (discussing Hatchie). The defendant’s home includes trailers even 
when the “trailer home [is] so small that [the defendant] could open the 
front door while lying in his bed.” United States v. Quaempts, 411 F.3d 
1046, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005). Washington courts have not extended the 
protections provided by Payton beyond the home. See State v. White, 129 
Wn.2d 105, 109, 915 P.2d 1099 (1996). 
In Washington, the arrest of a suspect who is standing in the door-
way of his or her home is treated the same as an arrest in the home. See 
State v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d 688, 697, 861 P.2d 460 (1993) (citing State 
v. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89 (1985)). As such, the lo-
cation of the suspect, not the location of the officer, is material to the 
issue of whether an arrest occurs in the home. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d at 
429, 693 P.2d 89; see Solberg, 122 Wn.2d at 697, 861 P.2d 460 (officer 
prohibited from arresting suspect standing in the doorway of home with-
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out warrant). And if the officers force the suspect out of his home, the 
arrest is considered as taking place inside the home. United States v. Al-
Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1985). However, an arrest of a suspect 
who is on a front porch, as opposed to in the doorway, is considered a 
public arrest. See Solberg, 122 Wn.2d at 700, 861 P.2d 460 (“[T]he pro-
tections afforded in Payton clearly do not apply outside the physical 
boundaries of the home as the theoretical basis of the Payton decision is 
that an arrest within a home violates the sanctity of the home whereas 
outside the boundaries of the home, no such violation is present.”). 
In interpreting the Washington constitution, state courts have not 
adopted the bright-line rule applied under the Fourth Amendment that an 
officer may, in all circumstances, accompany an arrestee into the ar-
restee’s home after the arrest. See State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 
820−21, 676 P.2d 419 (1984); see also State v. Kull, 155 Wn.2d 80, 86, 
118 P.3d 307 (2005). Under article I, section 7, when a person is arrested 
for a minor violation, the arresting officer may not follow the arrestee 
into his or her home unless the officer can reasonably conclude that the 
officer’s safety is endangered, evidence might be destroyed, or escape is 
a strong possibility. Kull, 155 Wn.2d at 88−89, 118 P.3d 307 (finding 
that the officer could not follow the defendant into her house because he 
did not fear for his safety and had no other justification). If the officer 
knows of specific, articulable facts that indicate a threat to the officer’s 
safety, the officer may follow the defendant inside. State v. Wood, 45 Wn. 
App. 299, 308−09, 725 P.2d 435 (1986) (finding that sufficient reason 
existed to accompany the arrestee into residence for security purposes 
when officer was executing an arrest warrant for a felony parole viola-
tion). An officer may also enter a home without a warrant under exigent 
circumstances or in response to a medical emergency. Eserjose, 171 
Wn.2d at 912, 259 P.3d 172; State v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 386, 5 P.3d 
668 (2000); see infra §§ 5.12−5.14 (exigent circumstances). 
A warrantless search based on the emergency exception is valid on-
ly if “(1) the officer subjectively believed that someone likely needed 
assistance for health or safety reasons; (2) a reasonable person in the 
same situation would similarly believe that there was a need for assis-
tance; and (3) there was a reasonable basis to associate the need for assis-
tance with the place searched.” Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d at 386, 5 P.3d 668; 
State v. Gibson, 104 Wn. App. 792, 796−97, 17 P.3d 635 (2001) (up-
holding arrest of defendant under emergency exception when officers 
entered house to secure the safety of the children before arresting de-
fendant). 
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4.2(c) Felony Arrest 
Under the common law standard and the Fourth Amendment, the 
authority to arrest without a warrant applies to felonies. United States v. 
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 422−23, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976); 
Kellogg v. State, 94 Wn.2d 851, 854, 621 P.2d 133 (1980). The officer 
may arrest for a felony committed outside of his presence if “he has rea-
sonable grounds to believe that (1) the offense committed is a felony, and 
(2) the person apprehended committed the felony.” RCW 10.31.100; see 
also Watson, 423 U.S. at 422−23, 96 S. Ct. 820. In deciding whether an 
officer had a reasonable belief that a felony was committed, the court 
must consider all of the information known to the officer at the time of 
the arrest, as well as the officer’s expertise. State v. Rose, 175 Wn.2d 10, 
22, 282 P.3d 1087 (2012) (holding that plain view of pipe with residue, 
coupled with the detective’s training, provided cause to make a warrant-
less arrest). 
4.2(d) Misdemeanor Arrest 
To make a warrantless misdemeanor arrest, an officer must have 
probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor is being committed in his 
presence. RCW 10.31.100; State v. Green, 150 Wn.2d 740, 742, 82 P.3d 
239 (2004) (per curiam). For more detail on custodial arrests for misde-
meanor offenses, see infra § 4.4(d). Under common law, an officer can 
make a warrantless arrest of a person who breaches the peace. See 
Kalmas v. Wagner, 133 Wn.2d 210, 218, 943 P.2d 1369 (1997); 3 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(b), at 17 (5th ed. 2012). But an 
officer’s authority to make such an arrest under the common law is not 
restricted to offenses involving a breach of the peace. Atwater v. City of 
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 327, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 
(2001). If the misdemeanor is committed in the presence of the officer, 
the officer may arrest without a warrant. Green, 150 Wn.2d at 742, 82 
P.3d 239. 
The common law presence rule is not constitutionally mandated, 
and consequently, Washington allows an officer to make a warrantless 
misdemeanor arrest in a few instances even where the offense is not 
committed in the officer’s presence. RCW 10.31.100; see United States v. 
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418–21, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976). 
An officer may make a warrantless misdemeanor arrest if the offense (1) 
involves criminal trespass, physical harm, or the threat of physical harm 
to persons or property; (2) is for possession of marijuana, or possession 
or consumption of alcohol by a minor; (3) is for violation of a restraining 
order; (4) is witnessed by another officer; or (5) is for one of a number of 
specified traffic offenses. RCW 10.31.100. Also, when a suspect is ar-
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rested for a misdemeanor not committed in the officer’s presence, the 
arrest is not illegal if the arresting officer has knowledge of a felony for 
which the suspect could have been arrested. See State v. Stebbins, 47 Wn. 
App. 482, 485, 735 P.2d 1353 (1987). 
The “in the presence” requirement of RCW 10.31.100 is satisfied 
whenever the officer directly perceives facts permitting a reasonable in-
ference that a misdemeanor is being committed. See Tacoma v. Harris, 
73 Wn.2d 123, 126, 436 P.2d 770 (1968). See generally 3 LaFave, supra 
§ 5.1(c) (discussing what constitutes “in the presence”). Questions arise 
regarding whether the officer must view all the elements of a crime and 
what types of information may be used to fill in “gaps.” See Tacoma, 73 
Wn.2d at 126, 436 P.2d 770. However, the arresting officer must be the 
one who observed the misdemeanor. State v. Ortega, 297 P.3d 57 (Wash. 
2013). The Washington State Supreme Court has held that the fellow-
officer rule does not extend to the context of misdemeanors; thus, infor-
mation known to one officer will not be imputed to other members of the 
team. Id. 
Originally, the misdemeanor offense of possessing or consuming 
alcohol by a person under 21 years of age, RCW 66.44.270, was not con-
sidered committed in an officer’s presence if the officer did not witness 
the person’s ingestion of the alcohol. State v. Allen, 63 Wn. App. 623, 
625, 821 P.2d 533 (1991). However, the Washington legislature realized 
that such a requirement was problematic. Thus, in 1987, the legislature 
amended RCW 66.44.270 to allow an officer to arrest a person under the 
age of 21 for possessing or consuming alcohol if the officer had probable 
cause to believe that the person had alcohol or other drugs in his or her 
system. See RCW 10.31.100(1); State v. Preston, 66 Wn. App. 494, 
497−98, 832 P.2d 513 (1992) (citing State v. Hornaday, 105 Wn.2d 120, 
129, 713 P.2d 71 (1986)). 
4.3 ARRESTS WITH WARRANTS 
Unlike arrests without warrants, an officer with a valid warrant may 
enter the home without permission to make the arrest. See State v. 
Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 395–97, 166 P.3d 698 (2007) (holding that a 
misdemeanor warrant allowed the officers to enter the residence). But the 
court has “recognized that the presence of an officer, which is initially 
lawful, can be rendered unlawful by his movement.” State v. Chrisman, 
100 Wn.2d 814, 820, 676 P.2d 419 (1984). The valid arrest warrant gives 
police “only the limited ability to enter the residence, find the suspect, 
arrest him, and leave.” Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d at 400, 166 P.3d 698. 
In general, the principles governing the procurement and execution 
of search warrants also apply to arrest warrants. See supra Chapter 3. 
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Thus, an invalid warrant will not support an arrest. State v. Nall, 117 Wn. 
App. 647, 651, 72 P.3d 200 (2003) (holding that an invalid Oregon war-
rant will not support arrest in Washington); see Whiteley v. Warden, 401 
U.S. 560, 568−69, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971); 3 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(h), at 87−88 (5th ed. 2012). Even if 
the arrest is based on a mistaken “hot sheet” and the arresting officer acts 
in goodwill, the arrest is unlawful. State v. Mance, 82 Wn. App. 539, 542, 
918 P.2d 527 (1996). 
With a valid warrant, an arrest is lawful if the officer has reasonably 
articulable grounds to believe that the suspect is the intended arrestee 
named in the warrant. State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d 449, 453−54, 688 P.2d 
146 (1984). If doubt arises as to identity, the officer is expected to im-
mediately take reasonable steps to confirm or deny that the warrant ap-
plies to the person being held. Id. at 454, 688 P.2d 146. The initial arrest, 
however, must be based on more than the individual’s similarity to the 
general physical description set forth in the warrant. See id. (applying 
Sanders v. United States, 339 A.2d 373, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1975), and find-
ing the seizure unlawful because the defendant only fit the general de-
scription and the officer failed to take steps to verify the specific infor-
mation). 
Under statutory law in Washington, a person arrested under the au-
thority of a warrant must first be read the warrant, but the rules surround-
ing the execution of an arrest warrant are ministerial, and substantial 
compliance with RCW 10.31.030 is all that is required for a valid arrest. 
State v. Simmons, 35 Wn. App. 421, 423, 667 P.2d 133 (1983). After ar-
rest, if the person wishes to deposit bail, he or she must be taken without 
delay before a judge. RCW 10.31.030; State v. Caldera, 84 Wn. App. 
527, 528, 929 P.2d 482 (1997) (per curiam) (finding illegal a search of 
two defendants when the search occurred prior to being read the warrant 
or being taken before a judge to deposit bail). However, the plain lan-
guage of RCW 10.31.030 does not require the officer to take the defend-
ant to the nearest detention station. State v. Ross, 106 Wn. App. 876, 881, 
26 P.3d 298 (2001). 
4.4 ARRESTS: MISCELLANEOUS REQUIREMENTS 
Even with a warrant, the officer may not make an arrest in any 
manner that he or she chooses. There are further limitations on the use of 
deadly force, booking charges, judicial review, and custodial arrest for 
minor offenses. This section introduces these various rules in more detail. 
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4.4(a) Use of Force 
Under traditional common law, an officer was permitted to use rea-
sonable force to make an arrest, and the officer could use deadly force if 
such force reasonably appeared necessary to prevent a suspect’s escape 
from a felony arrest. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 13−15, 105 S. 
Ct. 1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985). If the defendant does not pose a threat to 
the officer, the officer is restricted in the force he can use. Bryan v. Mac-
Pherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826−31 (9th Cir. 2010) (taser following stop for 
failure to wear seat belt was excessive when arrestee did not pose imme-
diate threat to officer and officer did not warn arrestee taser would be 
used). Deadly force is restricted even further and is appropriate only 
when “the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a 
significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or oth-
ers.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 3, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (holding that police were not 
permitted to shoot an unarmed, fleeing burglary suspect). 
In Washington, the amount of force an officer may use is governed 
by statute to the extent that the statute is consistent with Garner. See 
RCW 10.31.050 (“If after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, 
he or she either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all necessary 
means to effect the arrest.”); RCW 9A.16.040 (listing specific situations 
in which officer is justified in using deadly force). The legislature specif-
ically limited the use of deadly force under RCW 9A.16.040(1)(c) to in-
stances in which the officer has “probable cause to believe that the sus-
pect, if not apprehended, poses a threat of serious physical harm to the 
officer or . . . others.” RCW 9A.16.040(2). The use of deadly force by a 
public officer is justified “[w]hen necessar[y] . . . to overcome actual re-
sistance to the execution of the legal process . . . or in the discharge of a 
legal duty.” RCW 9A.16.040(1)(b). 
In construing RCW 9A.16.040’s predecessor, the Supreme Court of 
Washington held that deadly force may be used even when a felony has 
not in fact occurred if the officer reasonably believes that a felony has 
been committed. See Reese v. Seattle, 81 Wn.2d 374, 379−80, 503 P.2d 
64 (1972). In Reese, the court stated that “great caution must be exer-
cised by an officer in the use of deadly force and it must be resorted to by 
an officer only when all other reasonable efforts to apprehend a person 
fleeing from a Lawful arrest for a felony have failed.” Id. at 382−83, 81 
Wn.2d 374. 
4.4(b) Significance of Booking and Crime Charged 
Courts differ about whether a suspect being booked for one offense 
may be formally charged with another offense. Conflicting considera-
tions underlie the decisions. On the one hand, if the booking and formal 
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charges do not need to be similar, police can use an arrest as a pretext for 
detaining a suspect for questioning about an unrelated crime for which 
the police lack probable cause. On the other hand, at the time police first 
establish probable cause for one crime, they may not possess sufficient 
information to establish probable cause for another. See generally 3 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(e) (5th ed. 2012). 
In Washington, the formal charge may differ from the booking 
charge. See State v. Teuber, 19 Wn. App. 651, 655−56, 577 P.2d 147 
(1978). The booking charge has no significance after a formal charge has 
been lodged, and booking “for investigation” is permissible provided that 
probable cause for an arrest on any charge is present. See State v. 
Thompson, 58 Wn.2d 598, 606−07, 364 P.2d 527 (1961). 
4.4(c) Judicial Review 
A person arrested without a warrant is entitled to a post-arrest prob-
able cause determination. Westerman v. Cary, 125 Wn.2d 277, 295, 892 
P.2d 1067 (1994); see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S. Ct. 854, 
43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975) (“Once the suspect is in custody . . . the reasons 
that justify dispensing with the magistrate’s neutral judgment evapo-
rate.”). A neutral and detached magistrate must make the probable cause 
determination, but the hearing may be ex parte. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 
119–23, 95 S. Ct. 854. Courts have not resolved the issue of whether a 
violation of the Gerstein rule requires suppression of evidence seized 
after the arrest. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(g), 
at 62−64 (5th ed. 2012). 
4.4(d) Custodial Arrests for Minor Offenses 
 “If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has 
committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, 
without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Atwater v. 
City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354−55, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d 
549 (2001) (upholding the arrest of an individual for failing to secure 
herself and her children with safety belts). The Washington Court of Ap-
peals has noted Atwater’s bright-line rule but stated that because of the 
state’s additional protection of privacy rights, Washington courts must 
draw the line differently than the U.S. Supreme Court. State v. Pulfrey, 
120 Wn. App. 270, 283, 86 P.3d 790 (2004), aff’d, State v. Pulfrey, 154 
Wn.2d 517, 528, 111 P.3d 1162 (2005) (affirming but not deciding the 
constitutional issue). 
Under RCW 46.64.015, custodial arrests for minor traffic violations 
are limited to situations involving specific statutory violations, a defend-
ant’s refusal to sign a promise to appear, and nonresident arrestees. RCW 
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46.64.015; see State v. Radka, 120 Wn. App. 43, 48, 83 P.3d 1038 
(2004); see also State v. Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 689, 835 P.2d 1019 
(1992). “[A]s a matter of public policy . . . custodial arrest for minor traf-
fic violations is unjustified, unwarranted, and impermissible if the de-
fendant signs [a] promise to appear” in court. State v. Hehman, 90 Wn.2d 
45, 47, 578 P.2d 527 (1978); see 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Sei-
zure § 5.2(g), at 162−164 n.149 (5th ed. 2012). In Hehman, the Supreme 
Court of Washington held that an officer was prohibited from making a 
custodial arrest for a minor traffic violation unless the officer had “other 
reasonable grounds [for the arrest] apart from the minor traffic violation 
itself.” 90 Wn.2d at 50, 578 P.2d 527. 
Custodial arrests are permissible, however, for non-minor traffic of-
fenses such as reckless driving and driving with a suspended license. 
Pulfrey, 154 Wn.2d at 528, 111 P.3d 1162; State v. Carner, 28 Wn. App. 
439, 444, 624 P.2d 204 (1981) (finding arrest proper when minor tried to 
evade police on his motorcycle). Also, the officer may make a custodial 
arrest when the circumstances surrounding the arrest dictate transferring 
the violator to another location for completion of the arrest process. See 
State v. LaTourette, 49 Wn. App. 119, 125, 741 P.2d 1033 (1987) (find-
ing that the officers’ decision to move arrestee to another location to 
complete arrest for reckless driving was proper when a hostile crowd 
gathered in parking lot). 
When civil proceedings are involved, custodial arrests may be im-
proper. The Supreme Court of Washington has held a statute unconstitu-
tional that authorized the custodial arrest of any person against whom a 
paternity complaint is filed. See State v. Klinker, 85 Wn.2d 509, 524, 537 
P.2d 268 (1975). Thus, in the absence of a contrary showing, the usual 
summons and complaint procedure for civil cases is deemed adequate for 
securing the defendant’s presence at trial. See id. at 522. 
4.5 INTRODUCTION TO TERRY STOPS 
In some situations, police may make investigatory stops that fall 
short of arrests and are based on proof less than probable cause. See Ter-
ry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); State 
v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 197−98, 275 P.3d 289 (2012). Although these 
brief detentions, known as “Terry stops,” fall within the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment, the public interests in crime detection and the rela-
tive non-intrusiveness of the stop permit a lower standard of proof. See 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20−27, 88 S. Ct. 1868. Thus, the investigatory stop is 
tested against the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription of unreason-
able searches and seizures rather than the Amendment’s probable cause 
requirement. See id. at 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868. 
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For a seizure to be permissible, an officer must have a reasonable 
suspicion that the person stopped is engaged in criminal conduct. State v. 
Doughty, 170 Wn.2d 57, 62−63, 239 P.3d 573 (2010). The question is 
“whether the officer had ‘specific and articulable facts, which, taken to-
gether with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] 
intrusion.’” State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 5, 726 P.2d 445 (1986) 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868); see also Doughty, 170 
Wn.2d at 62−63, 239 P.3d 573. Under article I, section 7 of the Washing-
ton constitution, reasonable suspicion requires consideration of the totali-
ty of the circumstances, including the officer’s subjective belief. See 
State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 358−59, 979 P.2d 833 (1999). See gen-
erally supra § 2.9(b). For a discussion of the use of the reasonable suspi-
cion standard in special environments, see infra §§ 6.1 (schools) and 6.3 
(borders). See also 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §§ 9.3(b) 
(routine traffic stops), 9.7 (roadblocks), 9.8 (other brief detentions) (5th 
ed. 2012). 
Once an officer possesses a reasonable suspicion, he or she may 
forcibly stop the suspect, but the stop must be a more limited intrusion 
than an arrest. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209, 99 S. Ct. 
2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979). The stop must be reasonably limited in 
scope to “whatever reasonable suspicions legally justified the stop in the 
first place.” See State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 293−94, 290 P.3d 983 
(2012) (citing Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 350, 979 P.2d 833). Article I, sec-
tion 7, provides more protection than the Fourth Amendment in that the 
investigative stop may not be a pretext for a search in any situation. Lad-
son, 138 Wn.2d at 358−59, 979 P.2d 833. See generally Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996). 
During a Terry stop, the officer may ask a moderate number of 
questions regarding identity and the purpose of the stop without render-
ing the suspect “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda. State v. Herit-
age, 152 Wn.2d 210, 219, 95 P.3d 345 (2004). Once an intrusion is sub-
stantial enough to constitute an arrest, probable cause is necessary. See 
State v. Rose, 175 Wn.2d 10, 18−19, 282 P.3d 1087 (2012); see also in-
fra § 6.3. However, reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop 
may ripen into probable cause for arrest. State v. McIntosh, 42 Wn. App. 
579, 583−84, 712 P.2d 323 (1986) (holding that a suspect’s inability to 
give rational account of appearance and presence in a high burglary area 
late at night, absence of identification, and presence of what appeared to 
be burglar’s tools gave rise to probable cause to arrest). If the “suspect’s 
freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest,’” 
then a Miranda warning must be given. State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22, 
37, 93 P.3d 133 (2004); State v. Harris, 106 Wn.2d 784, 789−90, 725 
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P.2d 975 (1986) (adopting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 
S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984)). 
4.6 NATURE OF THE OFFENSE 
“It is generally recognized that crime prevention and crime detec-
tion are legitimate purposes for investigative stops or detentions.” State v. 
Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 5−6, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). Thus, Terry stops 
have been upheld for offenses ranging from aggravated robbery, United 
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985), 
to possession of narcotics, Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S. Ct. 
1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972). In Washington, a non-traffic, civil infrac-
tion is insufficient to justify a Terry stop. State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 
166, 175, 43 P.3d 513 (2002) (declining to extend Terry to general, non-
traffic civil infractions); State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 897, 168 P.3d 
1265 (2007) (declining to extend Terry to parking infractions). Normal 
traffic infractions, however, are sufficient to support a Terry stop. State v. 
Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 198, 275 P.3d 289 (2012) (failure to illuminate 
headlights). 
For arguments that Terry stops should be limited to investigations 
of serious offenses, see Adams, 407 U.S. at 151−53, 92 S. Ct. 1921 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 9.2(c) (5th ed. 2012). 
4.7 SATISFYING THE REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD 
To satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, the officer’s belief 
must be based on objective facts. State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747, 64 
P.3d 594 (2003); State v. Seitz, 86 Wn. App. 865, 869−70, 941 P.2d 5 
(1997). The facts must be specific and articulable; thus, an “inarticulate 
hunch[]” is insufficient. State v. Doughty, 170 Wn.2d 57, 63, 239 P.3d 
573 (2010) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 
2d 889 (1968)). Courts consider the experience of the officer when de-
termining if there was reasonable suspicion. See Acrey, 148 Wn.2d at 
747, 64 P.3d 594. Consequently, an experienced officer may be able to 
detect something suspicious where a layperson would not. See State v. 
Glover, 116 Wn.2d 509, 514, 806 P.2d 760 (1991) (concluding that of-
ficers’ familiarity with the neighborhood allowed them to lawfully detain 
man they did not recognize who claimed to live in an apartment). Gener-
ally, the level of suspicion required for an investigative stop of a pedes-
trian is the same as that required for a vehicle. See State v. Kennedy, 107 
Wn.2d 1, 6, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). 
This section will examine the reasonable suspicion standard in 
greater depth. Issues include individualized suspicion, information from 
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informants as the basis for the reasonable suspicion, and the standard as 
it is applied to different offenses. For a discussion of stops not requiring 
individualized suspicion, see infra §§ 6.3 (stops at or near borders) and 
5.18 (vehicle spot checks). 
4.7(a) Individualized Suspicion 
For an officer to make an investigative Terry stop, the officer must 
have an individualized suspicion that the particular defendant is engag-
ing in unlawful conduct. State v. Kennedy, 38 Wn. App. 41, 45−46, 684 
P.2d 1326 (1984); see State v. Penfield, 106 Wn. App. 157, 162−63, 22 
P.3d 293 (2001) (finding that officer who stopped vehicle without any 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity on the part of the male driver 
could not lawfully ask male driver to identify himself when basis for stop 
was license suspension of female who was the vehicle’s registered own-
er). 
Generally, individualized suspicion is required. “[I]n the absence of 
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, the search is a general search. 
[W]e never authorize general, exploratory searches . . . .” York v. Wah-
kiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 315, 178 P.3d 995 (2008) 
(alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, under article 
I, section 7, sobriety checkpoints are unconstitutional if lacking individu-
alized suspicion. Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 460, 755 P.2d 775 
(1988). 
There are, however, several exceptions. For example, a school offi-
cial may detain and search a student with only reasonable suspicion and 
not individualized suspicion. York, 163 Wn.2d at 308–09, 178 P.3d 995. 
Border checkpoints may also constitute such a circumstance. See infra § 
6.3. When individualized suspicion is lacking, officer discretion must be 
limited. State v. Marchand, 104 Wn.2d 434, 441, 706 P.2d 225 (1985) 
(finding spot checks of licenses unconstitutional because the discretion 
of the officers was not checked in any way). For example, officers stop-
ping vehicles for driver license and vehicle registration checks may not 
select the vehicles at random. See State v. Thorp, 71 Wn. App. 175, 
181−82, 856 P.2d 1123 (1993) (holding that officers who lack probable 
cause or a reasonable suspicion may not randomly stop moving vehicles 
for questioning). 
4.7(b) Information from Informants 
When Terry stops are based on information provided by informants, 
the information does not have to meet the same criteria required for 
probable cause. State v. Lee, 147 Wn. App. 912, 916−17, 199 P.3d 445 
(2008) (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 
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L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990)). See generally supra § 2.5. However, “[a]n in-
formant’s tip cannot constitutionally provide police with such a suspicion 
unless it possesses sufficient ‘indicia of reliability.’” State v. Sieler, 95 
Wn.2d 43, 47, 621 P.2d 1272 (1980) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 
U.S. 143, 147, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972)). To determine 
whether the informant possesses the requisite “indicia of reliability,” the 
court will consider (1) whether the informant is reliable; (2) whether the 
information was obtained in a reliable fashion; and (3) whether the offic-
ers can corroborate any details of the informant’s tip. State v. Kennedy, 
107 Wn.2d 1, 7, 726 P.2d 445 (1986); Sieler, 95 Wn.2d at 47, 621 P.2d 
1272; State v. Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940, 944, 530 P.2d 243 (1975). 
Generally, citizen-informants that witnessed the crime firsthand are 
reliable. See State v. Vandover, 63 Wn. App. 754, 759, 822 P.2d 784 
(1992). Indeed, citizen-informants are given greater credence than pro-
fessional informants because they act with only an intent to aid the police 
and are thus more reliable. Lee, 147 Wn. App. at 918−19, 199 P.3d 445 
(tip from eyewitness citizen-informant sufficient when corroborated by 
officer’s observations); see State v. Garcia, 125 Wn.2d 239, 242, 883 
P.2d 1369 (1994) (holding that information provided by a citizen does 
not require a showing of the same degree of reliability as an informant 
because a citizen is not a “professional” informant); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 3.4(a), at 265−70 (5th ed. 2012). 
Some surrounding circumstances may decrease the required level of 
reliability. For example, the Supreme Court of Washington has suggested 
that when the tip involves a serious crime or potential danger, less relia-
bility is required for a stop than is required in other circumstances. Sieler, 
95 Wn.2d at 50, 621 P.2d 1272; Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d at 944−45, 530 P.2d 
243; see 4 LaFave, supra § 9.5(i), at 806−11. However, the informant 
must still be reliable, either by the circumstances of the tip or by police 
corroboration. Vandover, 63 Wn. App. at 760, 822 P.2d 784. 
Police may also make a Terry stop based on information provided 
by other divisions or agencies. See State v. Mance, 82 Wn. App. 539, 542, 
918 P.2d 527 (1996); see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 
230−31, 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985). The collective 
knowledge of law enforcement agencies that gives rise to a dispatch will 
be imputed to the officers who act on it. State v. O’Cain, 108 Wn. App. 
542, 544−45, 31 P.3d 733 (2001). However, if the issuing agency lacked 
the authority to make a Terry stop on the information, so did the officer. 
State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 71, 93 P.3d 872 (2004). Further, the 
length and intrusiveness of the detention may not exceed that which 
would have been effected by the police agency providing the information. 
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State v. Dorsey, 40 Wn. App. 459, 470, 698 P.2d 1109 (1985) (citing 
Hensley, 469 U.S. at 233, 105 S. Ct. 675). 
4.7(c) Situations that Satisfy or Fail to Satisfy the Reasonable Suspicion 
Standard 
The mere fact that a suspect is in a high-crime area will not justify a 
Terry stop. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 
357 (1979); State v. Seitz, 86 Wn. App. 865, 867−70, 941 P.2d 5 (1997) 
(holding that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop when they saw 
occupants of a car speaking to a man on the sidewalk but did not observe 
drugs, money, or anything else change hands); State v. Soto-Garcia, 68 
Wn. App. 20, 25, 841 P.2d 1271 (1992) (stating that merely walking in 
the street in a known drug area late at night does not suggest that some-
one has committed a crime), abrogated by State v. Thorn, 129 Wn.2d 
347, 917 P.2d 108 (1996). Similarly, officers may not stop an individual 
merely because the individual is in proximity to others who are suspected 
of criminal activity. State v. Thompson, 93 Wn.2d 838, 841, 613 P.2d 
525 (1980). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
4.9(d) (5th ed. 2012); see also supra § 4.7(b). 
A person who simply acts suspiciously is not the proper subject of a 
stop in the absence of other circumstances implicating a crime. State v. 
Walker, 66 Wn. App. 622, 629, 834 P.2d 41 (1992) (finding that an of-
ficer investigating a report of suspicious behavior in a neighborhood in-
appropriately stopped a man who appeared startled when he saw the of-
ficer and turned onto another street to avoid him); State v. Henry, 80 Wn. 
App. 544, 552, 910 P.2d 1290 (1995) (nervousness is not sufficient for a 
Terry stop). In addition, being “out of place” in a particular location be-
cause of race is not suspicious. State v. Barber, 118 Wn.2d 335, 346, 823 
P.2d 1068 (1992) (holding that a person of a specific race being “out of 
place” in a particular geographic area can never amount to a reasonable 
suspicion). 
Taken together, the suspect’s actions, whether they are furtive ges-
tures or flight, may satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard. State v. 
Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711, 725−26, 927 P.2d 227 (1996); State v. Little, 
116 Wn.2d 488, 496, 806 P.2d 749 (1991) (flight from the police may be 
considered). Crouching down or dropping an object upon seeing the of-
ficer may also give rise to reasonable suspicion. State v. Jones, 117 Wn. 
App. 721, 728, 72 P.3d 1110 (2003) (holding that suspect in an area 
known for narcotics crouching down with item consistent with the ap-
pearance of crack cocaine was reasonably suspicious when the suspect 
quickly began to leave the area upon noticing the presence of the officer). 
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However, it is not sufficient if the officer does not see what the suspect is 
hiding. State v. Gatewood, 163 Wn.2d 534, 540, 182 P.3d 426 (2008). 
Where the officers are either very familiar with the location or are 
familiar with the narcotics involved, reasonable suspicion may be found. 
State v. Garcia, 125 Wn.2d 239, 242, 883 P.2d 1369 (1994) (per curiam) 
(finding that information given to police, combined with an officer’s ex-
perience in narcotics and knowledge of location as high-crime area, justi-
fied investigative restraint). Likewise, in State v. Little, the court found 
sufficient suspicion to conduct a Terry stop where officers were general-
ly familiar with residents of a complex and did not recognize the suspects, 
and the defendant subsequently fled from the officers. 116 Wn.2d at 
497−98, 806 P.2d 749. 
4.8 DIMENSIONS OF A PERMISSIBLE STOP 
A valid Terry stop “must be temporary, lasting no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop,” and “the investigative 
methods employed must be the least intrusive means reasonably availa-
ble to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.” 
State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 738, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984) (discussing 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 
(1983)); see also State v. Smith, 115 Wn.2d 775, 784−85, 801 P.2d 975 
(1990). To determine whether the stop was valid, the court examines (1) 
the purpose of the stop; (2) the amount of physical intrusion upon the 
suspect’s liberty; and (3) the length of time the suspect is detained. State 
v. Wheeler, 108 Wn.2d 230, 235, 737 P.2d 1005 (1987). This section ex-
amines duration, investigative techniques, transporting the suspect, and 
seizure of persons in proximity to the suspect. 
4.8(a) Duration 
The U.S. Supreme Court has declined to set an absolute limit on the 
permissible duration of a Terry stop in terms of minutes or hours. The 
duration of a stop is evaluated by asking “whether the police diligently 
pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel 
their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the 
[suspect].” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 
84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985); see also Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 
1080−82 (9th Cir. 2011) (45-minute detention permissible). If the “inves-
tigation should have taken no more than a few minutes,” and the officers 
unnecessarily delayed it, the stop is unlawful. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Re-
form, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff Dept., 533 F.3d 780, 795 (9th Cir. 
2008) (the fact that officers needed a supervisor to clarify the law for 
them was not a sufficient basis to extend the stop). 
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“‘[A]n officer may briefly stop an individual based upon reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity if necessary to maintain the status quo 
while obtaining more information.’” State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 
172, 43 P.3d 513 (2002) (quoting State v. Miller, 91 Wn. App. 181, 184, 
955 P.2d 810 (1998)). In Washington, the court has found a 45-minute 
wait permissible when it was caused by the defendant’s refusal to pro-
vide identification. State v. Cunningham, 116 Wn. App. 219, 228−29, 65 
P.3d 325 (2003). Similarly, officers may temporarily detain a suspect 
pending results of a police radio check. State v. Perea, 85 Wn. App. 339, 
342, 932 P.2d 1258 (1997). This also includes detaining a suspect in a 
room for approximately 20 minutes while the robbery victim was 
brought to the room for identification. State v. Moon, 45 Wn. App. 692, 
695, 726 P.2d 1263 (1986), abrogated on other grounds by State v. 
Cheatam, 150 Wn.2d 626, 81 P.3d 830 (2003). 
4.8(b) Investigative Techniques 
During a Terry stop, the police may request both identification from 
the suspect and a description of the suspect’s purpose in the area. State v. 
Little, 116 Wn.2d 488, 495, 806 P.2d 749 (1991) (citing State v. White, 
97 Wn.2d 92, 105, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982)); see also Brown v. Texas, 443 
U.S. 47, 51, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979). “An officer making 
a Terry stop may ask a moderate number of questions to determine the 
identity of the suspect and to confirm or dispel the officer’s suspi-
cions . . . .” State v. Heritage, 152 Wn.2d 210, 219, 95 P.3d 345 (2004). 
However, the officers must use the least intrusive means reasonably 
available. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 
84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985); State v. Johnston, 38 Wn. App. 793, 798−99, 
690 P.2d 591 (1984) (ordering three juveniles out of the house at gun-
point was not the least intrusive means possible to confirm suspicion of 
burglary). The officer may expand the stop and use greater force such as 
frisking, secluding, gun drawing, or cuffing if the officer perceives a rea-
sonable threat to his or her safety. State v. Mitchell, 80 Wn. App. 143, 
145−46, 906 P.2d 1013 (1995); see infra § 4.10. 
Police may not subject the suspect to custodial interrogation during 
a Terry stop. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 211, 99 S. Ct. 
2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979); Heritage, 152 Wn.2d at 219, 95 P.3d 345. 
The police also may not transport the suspect to the police station for the 
purposes of interrogation or fingerprinting, although it may be permissi-
ble to fingerprint the suspect in the field. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 
816−18, 105 S. Ct. 1643, 84 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1985). 
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4.8(c) Transporting the Suspect 
“Transportation to the police station is usually impermissible be-
cause it is not reasonably related to the investigation.” State v. Gardner, 
28 Wn. App. 721, 727−28, 626 P.2d 56 (1981); see also Dunaway v. 
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212–13, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 
(1979). Thus, if probable cause to arrest has not ripened, such transporta-
tion is illegal. State v. Gonzales, 46 Wn. App. 388, 396, 731 P.2d 1101 
(1986) (handcuffing and transporting a suspect to a police station before 
probable cause to arrest arises constitutes an illegal arrest under the 
Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7). 
However, if the transportation is reasonably related to the investiga-
tive purpose of the initial detention, it may be permissible. See State v. 
Wheeler, 108 Wn.2d 230, 237, 737 P.2d 1005 (1987) (transporting the 
suspect a short distance for identification purposes); Gardner, 28 Wn. 
App. at 728, 626 P.2d 56 (finding it lawful to transport the suspect a 
short distance to the crime scene). An unrelated emergency occurring 
nearby or other exceptional circumstances may also warrant transporta-
tion. See State v. Sweet, 44 Wn. App. 226, 232−33, 721 P.2d 560 (1986) 
(radio call summoning the investigating officers to an apparently unrelat-
ed crime scene a block away allowed the officers to transport the suspect 
with them after the suspect told them he was a lookout). 
4.8(d) Detention of Persons in Proximity to Suspect 
The Supreme Court of Washington has held that the mere fact of an 
individual’s proximity to one independently suspected of criminal activi-
ty is insufficient to justify a Terry stop. State v. Horrace, 144 Wn.2d 386, 
398, 28 P.3d 753 (2001) (citing State v. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d 289, 295, 
654 P.2d 96 (1982), abrogated on other grounds by Minnesota v. Dicker-
son, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993)). See gen-
erally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2(b) (5th ed. 2012). 
This includes asking the passenger for identification. State v. Rankin, 151 
Wn.2d 689, 697, 92 P.3d 202 (2004) (citing State v. Larson, 93 Wn.2d 
638, 642, 611 P.2d 771 (1980)). 
Instead, the passenger or individual must give some indication of 
suspicious activity. Horrace, 144 Wn.2d at 394, 28 P.3d 753 (holding 
reasonable suspicion existed to frisk passenger because the driver was 
making furtive gestures as if handing the passenger something even 
though the passenger did not move). In State v. Chelly, the court found 
that the fact the passenger was not wearing a safety belt provided the of-
ficer with the authority to detain him for a reasonable period of time in 
order to identify him. 94 Wn. App. 254, 260, 970 P.2d 376 (1999). 
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4.8(e) Pretextual Traffic Stops 
Pretextual traffic infraction stops made for the purpose of conduct-
ing warrantless investigations of matters unrelated to a person’s driving 
violate article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution. State v. Ladson, 
138 Wn.2d 343, 353, 979 P.2d 833 (1999). In this respect, Washington’s 
constitution provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment be-
cause the U.S. Supreme Court has held that pretextual traffic stops do not 
violate the Fourth Amendment. Compare Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 
260, 266, 94 S. Ct. 488, 38 L. Ed. 2d 456 (1973) (holding search incident 
to arrest valid even though it followed an admittedly pretextual traffic 
stop), with State v. Hehman, 90 Wn.2d 45, 50, 578 P.2d 527 (1978) (de-
clining to limit protection that provided under federal law). For further 
discussion of the Fourth Amendment requirements concerning pretextual 
stops and a critique of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on the matter, 
see generally Lewis R. Katz, “Lonesome Road”: Driving Without the 
Fourth Amendment, 36 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1413 (2013).  
 Under article I, section 7, “‘the reasonable articulable suspicion 
that a traffic infraction has occurred which justifies an exception to the 
[search] warrant requirement for an ordinary traffic stop does not justify 
a stop for criminal investigation.’” State v. Myers, 117 Wn. App. 93, 98, 
69 P.3d 367 (citing Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 349, 979 P.2d 833). “A stop 
for a traffic infraction can be extended only when an officer has articula-
ble facts from which the officer could reasonably suspect criminal activi-
ty.” State v. Lemus, 103 Wn. App. 94, 101, 11 P.3d 326 (2000) (internal 
quotations omitted). If the initial traffic stop is unlawful, “‘the subse-
quent search and fruits of that search are inadmissible.’” State v. 
Gatewood, 163 Wn.2d 534, 542, 182 P.3d 426 (2008) (citing State v. 
Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 4, 726 P.2d 445 (1986)). See generally infra 
Chapter 7 (exclusionary rule). 
When determining if a particular traffic stop is pretextual, the court 
should consider the totality of the circumstances, including both the sub-
jective intent of the officer and the objective reasonableness of the of-
ficer’s behavior. State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 199, 275 P.3d 289 
(2012); State v. Hoang, 101 Wn. App. 732, 742−43, 6 P.3d 602 (2000). 
In State v. Snapp, the court found a stop was not pretextual because the 
officer could not see how many occupants were inside the vehicle, the 
officer testified that he routinely pulled people over who did not have 
their headlights illuminated, and the car began moving in the opposite 
direction when his police car came into view. 174 Wn.2d at 199−201, 
275 P.3d 289. In contrast, in State v. Ladson, the court held that the stop 
was pretextual because the officer admitted the reason for the stop was 
rumored drug use by one of the occupants. See 138 Wn.2d at 359−60, 
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979 P.2d 833. Likewise, in State v. DeSantiago, the court found a stop 
pretextual because the officer believed the suspect had just bought or 
sold drugs and he deliberately followed the suspect for ten blocks look-
ing for a reason to pull him over. 97 Wn. App. 446, 448, 983 P.2d 1173 
(1999). 
4.9 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON COMPELLED RESPONSES TO 
INVESTIGATORY QUESTIONS 
Even when a police officer possesses a reasonable suspicion and 
makes a valid Terry stop, the officer may not compel the suspect to an-
swer. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6, 89 S. Ct. 1394, 22 L. 
Ed. 2d 676 (1969); State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 105−06, 640 P.2d 1061 
(1982). Furthermore, a suspect’s refusal to answer an investigating of-
ficer’s questions cannot provide the basis for an arrest. White, 97 Wn.2d 
at 106, 640 P.2d 1061. 
To remedy this limitation, Washington has enacted a stop-
and-identify statute to facilitate police investigations of ongoing or im-
minent crimes. RCW 9A.76.020; State v. Lalonde, 35 Wn. App. 54, 57, 
665 P.2d 421 (1983), review denied, 100 Wn.2d 1014 (1983) (finding the 
statute constitutional as amended). However, refusing to identify oneself, 
when viewed in isolation, is still insufficient to support a charge of ob-
structing a law enforcement officer. State v. Steen, 164 Wn. App. 789, 
265 P.3d 901 (2011), review denied as amended, 173 Wn.2d 1024 (2012). 
4.10 GROUNDS FOR INITIATING A FRISK DURING A TERRY STOP 
An officer conducting a valid Terry stop may conduct a limited 
search for weapons in order to protect himself or herself or persons near-
by from physical harm. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 
L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 250, 207 P.3d 
1266 (2009) (citing State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 895, 168 P.3d 1265 
(2007)). After the officer has made a valid stop supported by reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity, a frisk may then be undertaken if the of-
ficer reasonably believes that the “suspect is armed and ‘presently’ dan-
gerous.” State v. Xiong, 164 Wn.2d 506, 513−14, 191 P.3d 1278 (2008) 
(officers did not have right to frisk the defendant because he cooperated 
with police, made no attempt to flee, and could not reach his pockets). 
“Reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and presently dangerous 
means, some basis from which the court can determine that the detention 
was not arbitrary or harassing.” State v. Setterstrom, 163 Wn.2d 621, 626, 
183 P.3d 1075 (2008) (emphasis removed) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (finding no reasonable belief when the suspect was under the 
influence, lied about his name, and was nervous and fidgety). Once the 
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officer dispels his belief that the suspect is armed, the frisk must end. 
Garvin, 166 Wn.2d at 254−55, 207 P.3d 1266 (officer exceeded the 
scope of the search when he continued to squeeze the defendant’s pocket 
after concluding there was no weapon). 
Washington requires the following for a valid frisk: (1) the initial 
stop is legitimate; (2) there is a reasonable safety concern justifying a 
protective frisk for weapons; and (3) the scope of the frisk is limited to 
protective purposes. State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172, 43 P.3d 513 
(2002). The fact that a detention occurs in a high-crime area is not in it-
self sufficient to justify a search. See State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d 449, 
452−53, 688 P.2d 146 (1984) (holding that the inquiry must focus on the 
defendant and his actions, not the area where he was found). Thus, police 
may not frisk when they cannot articulate a reason for believing that a 
suspect is dangerous other than that the suspect was seen leaving in his 
car from the scene of a possible burglary. State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 
733, 740−41, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984). The most common situation is 
where the suspect makes a furtive gesture or appears to be concealing 
something. State v. Chang, 147 Wn. App. 490, 496, 195 P.3d 1008 
(2008) (holding the search of the passenger compartment of the car was 
valid when the suspect appeared to be concealing something when police 
approached). 
For certain crimes in which the offender is likely to be armed, the 
right to conduct a protective search is much more accepted, but for other 
crimes, such as possession of marijuana, additional circumstances must 
be present. See United States v. Flatter, 456 F.3d 1154, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 
2006) (absent other circumstances, a frisk was not proper for a postal 
employee suspected of mail theft because it “is not a crime that is fre-
quently associated with weapons”); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 9.6(a), at 852−62 (5th ed. 2012). Consequently, in State v. 
Guzman-Cuellar, an officer was justified in initiating a frisk where the 
suspect matched the description of a murder suspect. 47 Wn. App. 326, 
332, 734 P.2d 966 (1987). Likewise, in State v. Harvey, a frisk was justi-
fied when the crime under investigation was burglary because it is well 
known that burglars often carry weapons. 41 Wn. App. 870, 875, 707 
P.2d 146 (1985). 
The time of day can also contribute to the reasonableness of a pro-
tective search. State v. Horrace, 144 Wn.2d 386, 398–99, 28 P.3d 753 
(2001) (considering “early morning darkness” as a factor justifying a 
protective search). Not only does “[t]he darkness ma[k]e it more difficult 
for [the officer] to get a clear view into the car,” but “an individual who 
has been stopped may be more willing to commit violence against a po-
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lice officer at a time when few people are likely to be present to witness 
it.” State v. Collins, 121 Wn.2d 168, 174–75, 847 P.2d 919 (1993). 
Under certain circumstances, officers may seize evidence pursuant 
to a Terry stop even in the absence of grounds for believing that the sus-
pect is armed and dangerous. For example, a police officer may seize 
property from a suspect if the suspect’s actions give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that evidence of a crime is in danger of being destroyed. State v. 
Pressley, 64 Wn. App. 591, 598, 825 P.2d 749 (1992) (holding officer’s 
actions in asking the suspect to remove her hand from her pocket after 
seeing a bag in her palm was proper given his experience with disposal 
of narcotics and her furtive gesture); see also State v. Dorsey, 40 Wn. 
App. 459, 472, 698 P.2d 1109 (1985). However, some courts have ex-
pressly rejected this rationale for a search. State v. Rodriguez–Torres, 77 
Wn. App. 687, 693, 893 P.2d 650 (1995) (rejecting Pressley and stating 
that a Terry frisk may be conducted only based on protective purposes). 
4.10(a) Scope of a Permissible Frisk 
A frisk must be justified in its inception and scope. State v. Hudson, 
124 Wn.2d 107, 112, 874 P.2d 160 (1994). The scope of a valid frisk is 
strictly limited to protective purposes. State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 
250, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009); see also State v. Alcantara, 79 Wn. App. 362, 
366, 901 P.2d 1087 (1995) (holding that a search exceeded the scope of a 
Terry stop because the officer gave no indication that the search was 
based on concerns for the officer’s safety). Thus, the officer may only 
conduct a search of the suspect’s outer clothing for weapons that might 
be used to harm the officer or others nearby. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
29−30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); Hudson, 124 Wn.2d at 
112, 874 P.2d 160. However, a frisk need not conform to the convention-
al pat down. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d at 112, 874 P.2d 160 (if pat down is 
inconclusive, the officer may reach into the clothing); see also Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147−49, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972) 
(finding an officer was justified in reaching through a window and re-
moving a revolver from the suspect’s waistband when officer knew that 
the suspect carried a gun in his waistband and he refused to step out of 
the car); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.5(b), at 477−79 
(5th ed. 2012). 
When in the course of a frisk an officer feels what may be a weapon, 
the officer may only take such action as is necessary to examine the ob-
ject. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d at 113, 874 P.2d 160 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 
30, 88 S. Ct. 1868). See generally 4 LaFave, supra § 9.6(c). Once police 
ascertain that no weapon is involved, their authority to conduct even a 
limited search ends. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d at 254, 207 P.3d 1266 (continu-
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ing squeeze of pocket after the officer determined no weapon was pre-
sent was not permissible under the “plain feel” doctrine); Hudson, 124 
Wn.2d at 113, 874 P.2d 160. 
4.10(b) Frisks of Persons in Proximity to Suspect 
Police may not frisk persons merely because they are present on the 
premises of a place being lawfully searched. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 
U.S. 85, 94, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979); see also supra § 
3.8(a). Thus, a passenger frisk is justified “only [when] the officer is able 
to point to specific, articulable facts giving rise to an objectively reason-
able belief that the passenger [may] be armed and dangerous.” State v. 
Horrace, 144 Wn.2d 386, 399−400, 28 P.3d 753 (2001); State v. Parker, 
139 Wn.2d 486, 489, 987 P.2d 73 (1999) (officers may not search purse 
of passenger); see also State v. Larson, 93 Wn.2d 638, 641−42, 611 P.2d 
771 (1980). One commentator suggests that the appropriate inquiry is 
whether the officer is under a reasonable apprehension of danger—a de-
termination that depends on the nature of the crime, the time and place of 
the arrest, and the number of officers and suspects, and on whether the 
companion has made any threatening movements. See 4 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.6(a), at 871−73 (5th ed. 2012). 
4.10(c) Protective Measures Other Than Frisks 
An officer may take self-protective measures other than a frisk. For 
instance, a police officer may order a driver who has been validly 
stopped to get out of his or her car, regardless of whether the driver is 
suspected of being armed or dangerous or whether the offense under in-
vestigation is serious. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S. 
Ct. 330, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977) (noting that intrusion is de minimis 
while risks confronting an officer are substantial); State v. Kennedy, 107 
Wn.2d 1, 12, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). The Supreme Court of Washington, 
however, has declined to extend Mimms to passengers of the vehicle un-
der article I, section 7, unless the officer has an objective reason based on 
safety concerns. State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 220, 970 P.2d 722 
(1999) (declining to follow Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S. Ct. 
882, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997)), abrogated in part on other grounds by 
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132 
(2007); see 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.6(a), at 885 
n.192 (5th ed. 2012). 
If the officer is merely controlling the scene and not detaining the 
passenger for investigatory reasons, he must meet the standard set out in 
Mendez. Namely, he must be “able to articulate an objective rationale 
predicated specifically on safety concerns . . . for ordering a passenger to 
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stay in the vehicle or to exit the vehicle.” Mendez, 137 Wn.2d at 220, 970 
P.2d 722. However, if the purpose of the officer’s interaction with the 
passenger is investigatory, then the interaction must meet the standard set 
out in Terry, and the officer must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity. State v. Horrace, 144 Wn.2d 386, 393, 28 P.3d 753 (2001). 
4.10(d) Search of Area: Measures Beyond Frisks 
Officers may extend a Terry search for weapons to the passenger 
compartment of a detained person’s vehicle “‘if there is a reasonable 
suspicion that the suspect is dangerous and may gain access to a weapon 
in the vehicle.’” State v. Glossbrener, 146 Wn.2d 670, 680–81, 49 P.3d 
128 (2002) (quoting State v. Terrazas, 71 Wn. App. 873, 879, 863 P.2d 
75 (1993)) (officer did not have concern for safety when he allowed sus-
pect to sit in the car while he checked for warrants and search was an 
afterthought); see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049−50, 103 S. 
Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983). The search must be confined to the 
area within the suspect’s immediate control. State v. Kennedy, 107 
Wn.2d 1, 12, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). However, that includes immediate 
control once the suspect has returned to the vehicle. Thus, the officer 
may still search the compartment if both occupants of the vehicle are 
outside the car and do not have access to the passenger compartment so 
long as the officer intends to return them to the car following the stop. 
State v. Chang, 147 Wn. App. 490, 496, 195 P.3d 1008 (2008). 
In State v. Kennedy, the court upheld a search where the officer ob-
served the suspect leaning forward as if to place something under his seat 
while the officer was stopping the suspect’s vehicle for investigation of a 
possible drug buy. 107 Wn.2d at 12, 726 P.2d 445. Likewise, in State v. 
McIntosh, the search of the passenger compartment was lawful when the 
driver of a vehicle was armed with a knife and a weapon-like object was 
visibly protruding from under the passenger seat. 42 Wn. App. 579, 
582−84, 712 P.2d 323 (1986). 
A police officer may also search a container carried by a suspect 
who is detained for questioning if the officer reasonably believes that the 
suspect possesses a weapon. State v. Miller, 91 Wn. App. 181, 185−86, 
955 P.2d 810 (1998) (officer could search a tin found with defendant that 
was capable of holding a gun after officer found knife on the defendant); 
State v. Franklin, 41 Wn. App. 409, 415, 704 P.2d 666 (1985) (finding 
search of backpack proper when the defendant told the officer it con-
tained a firearm). For a discussion of whether an officer may search 
items carried by a suspect, see generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 9.5(f) (5th ed. 2012). 
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CHAPTER 5 
Warrantless Searches and Seizures:  
Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless justified by a 
limited set of carefully drawn exceptions. State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 
177, 187–88, 275 P.3d 289 (2012); State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 
171, 43 P.3d 513 (2002). Article I, section 7 of the Washington State 
Constitution not only “prohibits . . . unreasonable searches, but also pro-
vides no quarter for ones which, in the context of the Fourth Amend-
ment, would be deemed reasonable searches and thus constitutional.” 
State v. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761, 772, 224 P.3d 751 (2009). This creates 
an “almost absolute bar to warrantless arrests, searches, and seizures.” 
State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 690, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983). 
The State bears the burden of proving that a warrantless search or 
seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 746, 64 P.3d 594 (2003). Even when a 
search or seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement, the search or seizure may be invalid if it infringes upon other 
rights. See generally State v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 167 P.3d 1156 
(2007) (holding that search warrants for documents protected under the 
First Amendment must have a higher standard of particularity). 
The following sections examine the various exceptions to the war-
rant requirement, including searches incident to a lawful arrest, the plain 
view and open view doctrines, consent, exigent circumstances, Terry 
stops, and inventory searches. 
5.1 SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST 
Generally, police may conduct a warrantless search incident to a 
lawful arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762−63, 89 S. Ct. 
2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969). Under article I, section 7, a custodial ar-
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rest provides the necessary “authority of law” to search, so long as the 
arrest is lawful. State v. Grande, 164 Wn.2d 135, 139, 187 P.3d 248 
(2008); State v. Moore, 161 Wn.2d 880, 885, 169 P.3d 469 (2007). The 
rationale behind this rule is to ensure officer safety and to prevent the 
concealment or destruction of evidence. State v. MacDicken, 171 Wn. 
App. 169, 174–75, 286 P.3d 413 (2012). The search, however, may only 
extend to the area within the arrestee’s “immediate control”—the area in 
which an arrestee may be able to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence. 
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762−63, 89 S. Ct. 2034. Thus, “searching any room 
other than that in which an arrest occurs” or “searching through all the 
desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself” is not 
justified absent a search warrant. Id. 
This exception to the warrant requirement applies, however, only 
when (1) there was a lawful arrest and (2) the search incident to the arrest 
was “restricted in time and place in relation to the arrestee and the ar-
rest,” as opposed to being “a wide-ranging exploratory, rummaging, ran-
sacking” search. State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 127, 135, 559 P.2d 970 (1977). 
For a discussion of automobile searches incident to arrest, see infra § 
5.1(c). 
As the following sections demonstrate, while Washington’s search 
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement is similar to the 
federal exception, it is subject to a different analysis under the Wash-
ington constitution. 
5.1(a) Lawful Arrest 
Chapter 4 discusses the criteria for a lawful arrest. If the arrest is 
invalid, then the search incident to the arrest is invalid as well. State v. 
Moore, 161 Wn.2d 880, 885, 169 P.3d 469 (2007); State v. Hehman, 90 
Wn.2d 45, 50, 578 P.2d 527 (1978); State v. Terrazas, 71 Wn. App. 873, 
878, 863 P.2d 75 (1993). If an arrest is lawful, then a search incident to 
that arrest may be permissible. State v. Pulfrey, 154 Wn.2d 517, 523, 111 
P.3d 1162 (2005). 
In Washington, however, even when an arrest is valid, a search is 
not properly “incident” to the arrest if the arrest is merely a pretext for 
conducting a search to obtain evidence of a different offense. State v. 
Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 353, 979 P.2d 833 (1999) (declining to interpret 
article I, section 7 according to federal law, under which pretextual traf-
fic stops did not violate the Fourth Amendment). Furthermore, additional 
searches of the same individual that are made in retaliation for the de-
fendant’s previous criminal behavior are unreasonable. State v. Carner, 
28 Wn. App. 439, 445, 624 P.2d 204 (1981). For discussion of the need 
for the search to be contemporaneous with the arrest, see infra § 5.3. 
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The search incident to arrest exception requires a custodial arrest. 
See Hehman, 90 Wn.2d at 50, 578 P.2d 527; State v. Radka, 120 Wn. 
App. 43, 50, 83 P.3d 1038 (2004) (search of vehicle not valid as inci-
dental to arrest because driver’s detention at a traffic stop was noncusto-
dial); see also State v. McKenna, 91 Wn. App. 554, 564, 958 P.2d 1017 
(1998) (search was unreasonable because noncustodial arrest had already 
ended at time of search). Under article I, section 7, a custodial arrest pro-
vides the “authority of law” for the search. State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 
564, 585, 62 P.3d 489 (2003). In Washington, a custodial arrest for mi-
nor traffic violations is generally not permitted. See RCW 46.64.015; 
State v. Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 689−90, 835 P.2d 1019 (1992). Rather, 
officers are required to cite and release motorists stopped for minor traf-
fic offenses if the motorist gives a signed promise to appear in court. See 
RCW 46.64.015; Reding, 119 Wn.2d at 689–90, 835 P.2d 1019. Moreo-
ver, officers explicitly lack authority to arrest after witnessing only a mi-
nor traffic infraction. RCW 46.63.020. Thus, a search is generally unlaw-
ful if it is incident to a stop for a minor traffic violation. See Terrazas, 71 
Wn. App. at 875, 863 P.2d 75. 
Police officers are authorized to make a custodial arrest for a traffic 
violation if (1) the violation is one of the “nonminor” traffic violations 
specifically designated in RCW 10.31.100 or (2) the motorist is a nonres-
ident arrestee. See RCW 46.64.015(1)–(2). Absent either of these condi-
tions, police need other reasonable grounds to arrest and conduct a valid 
search incident to arrest if a motorist is stopped for a “minor” traffic vio-
lation. See Reding, 119 Wn.2d at 691–92, 835 P.2d 1019 (upholding cus-
todial arrest for the nonminor offense of reckless driving); Terrazas, 71 
Wn. App. at 875–78, 863 P.2d 75 (an officer may arrest a defendant for 
driving without a valid driver’s license only if facts suggest the defend-
ant will not appear in court if cited and released). 
Property seized incident to a lawful arrest may be used to prosecute 
the arrested person for a crime other than the one for which the person 
was initially arrested so long as the initial arrest was not merely a pretext 
to conduct a search for evidence of some other offense. State v. Smith, 
119 Wn.2d 675, 681, 835 P.2d 1025 (1992); State v. Cormier, 100 Wn. 
App. 457, 463, 997 P.2d 950 (2000) (evidence from a search of the de-
fendant was admissible after the defendant’s lawful arrest for assaulting 
an officer, even though the defendant assaulted the officer after being 
illegally stopped). In Smith, after the police lawfully arrested the defend-
ant for consuming liquor in public, the court held that the drug parapher-
nalia found in the defendant’s fanny pack during the search was admissi-
ble. Smith, 119 Wn.2d at 684, 835 P.2d 1025; see also State v. Gammon, 
61 Wn. App. 858, 863, 812 P.2d 885 (1991); State v. LaTourette, 49 Wn. 
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App. 119, 127–29, 741 P.2d 1033 (1987); State v. White, 44 Wn. App. 
276, 278, 722 P.2d 118 (1986). 
5.1(b) “Immediate Control” 
There is no hard and fast rule for determining whether the area 
searched or the object seized was within the “immediate control” of the 
defendant under the Fourth Amendment. The court has considered vari-
ous factors, including: (1) whether the arrestee was physically restrained; 
(2) the position of the officer in relation to the defendant and the place 
searched; (3) the difficulty of gaining access into the container or enclo-
sure searched; and (4) the number of officers present as compared with 
the number of arrestees or other persons. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 6.3(c), at 462−75 (5th ed. 2012); see also id. § 
7.1(b), at 676–79. For the purposes of a search incident to an arrest, an 
object or container is considered within the control of an arrestee if the 
object was within the arrestee’s reach immediately prior to arrest or at 
the moment of arrest. State v. Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675, 681, 835 P.2d 1025 
(1992) (upholding search of a fanny pack that was within one or two 
steps of the defendant at the time of the arrest); see also United States v. 
Turner, 926 F.2d 883, 888 (9th Cir. 1991) (plastic baggies under ar-
restee’s pillow were within immediate control of arrestee who was on the 
bed when he was arrested); United States v. Andersson, 813 F.2d 1450, 
1455 (9th Cir. 1987) (closed suitcase on the bed next to arrestee was 
searchable incident to arrest). 
Article I, section 7 places greater restraints on a search incident to 
arrest in someone’s home. Entry into rooms beyond the immediate con-
trol of the suspect requires that police have a reasonable fear for their 
safety or a belief that the arrestee is about to destroy evidence or escape. 
State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 815, 821, 676 P.2d 419 (1984); see 
also State v. Boyer, 124 Wn. App. 593, 602, 102 P.3d 833 (2004) (pro-
tective sweep of basement rooms that belonged to an upstairs apartment 
not justified when search was done incident to execution of a search war-
rant for a basement apartment); 3 LaFave, supra §§ 6.3(c), at 468, 
6.4(a)−(c), at 476−510, 7.1(b), at 693. 
Conversely, under the Fourth Amendment, and in certain limited 
situations, some courts have permitted police to extend a search incident 
to an arrest in the home into an area that is beyond the arrestee’s imme-
diate control. If the police permit an arrestee to move into other rooms to 
gather clothing, for example, the police may accompany the arrestee and 
search the rooms and any areas, such as closets or bureau drawers, where 
the arrestee has been. See id. § 6.4(a), at 477−80. Federal courts have 
also permitted police to search premises to determine whether accom-
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plices who could aid the arrestee are present, see id. § 6.4(b), at 484, and 
to conduct a protective sweep of the premises when the officers fear that 
third parties may offer resistance, id. § 6.4(c), at 488–90. See also Mary-
land v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333–36, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 
(1990). 
Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may search an arrestee in 
custody even when the officer does not believe that the arrestee is armed 
or in possession of evidence of the crime for which the suspect was ar-
rested. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. 
Ed. 2d 427 (1973). The lawful arrest establishes the authority to search 
the arrestee; the arresting officer need not have a subjective fear that an 
arrestee is armed or will destroy evidence. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 
U.S. 260, 263–64, 94 S. Ct. 488, 38 L. Ed. 2d 456 (1973). The rule ap-
plies even when the custodial arrest follows a stop for a minor traffic vio-
lation, unless such an arrest would be illegal. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235, 
94 S. Ct. 467; see State v. Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 691−92, 835 P.2d 
1019 (1992). However, if a police officer merely cites a driver for speed-
ing without making an arrest, a search is impermissible. Knowles v. Io-
wa, 525 U.S. 113, 118−19, 119 S. Ct. 484, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1998). 
Under article 1, section 7, an arrestee’s diminished expectation of 
privacy permits an officer to search an arrestee’s clothing, including 
small containers found on the arrestee. See, e.g., Smith, 119 Wn.2d at 
681−82, 835 P.2d 1025 (upholding search of fanny pack following law-
ful arrest); State v. Gammon, 61 Wn. App. 858, 864, 812 P.2d 885 (1991) 
(upholding search of prescription pill bottle found on defendant follow-
ing lawful arrest); State v. White, 44 Wn. App. 276, 278, 722 P.2d 118 
(1986) (upholding police examination of cosmetic case found in ar-
restee’s coat pocket). In addition, an arrestee does not have to be in actu-
al physical possession of a container at the time of the search so long as 
the container is within the arrestee’s reach. Smith, 119 Wn.2d at 681, 835 
P.2d 1025. Further, evidence seized pursuant to the search of an ar-
restee’s person does not need to relate to the crime for which the defend-
ant was arrested, nor must the grounds for the initial search encompass 
the evidence seized. See id. (allowing admission of drug paraphernalia 
found in a fanny pack during a search subsequent to a lawful arrest for 
consuming liquor in public); see also Gammon, 61 Wn. App. at 863, 812 
P.2d 885; State v. LaTourette, 49 Wn. App. 119, 127−28, 741 P.2d 1033 
(1987); White, 44 Wn. App. at 278, 722 P.2d 118. A greater expectation 
of privacy is extended, however, to possessions that are not closely relat-
ed to the person’s clothing, such as “purses, briefcases[,] or luggage,” 
and some additional reason must be present to justify the search of those 
items. White, 44 Wn. App. at 279, 722 P.2d 118; see also State v. Kealey, 
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80 Wn. App. 162, 170, 907 P.2d 319 (1995) (stating that “a purse is inev-
itably associated with an expectation of privacy”). For a discussion of the 
search of purses in conjunction with automobile searches, see infra § 
5.3(b). 
An intrusion into a suspect’s body, such as a draw of blood sam-
ples, is a search and seizure under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth 
Amendment. State v. Dunivin, 65 Wn. App. 501, 507, 828 P.2d 1150 
(1992). It may be justified under the exigent circumstances exception 
rather than the search incident to arrest exception. Schmerber v. Califor-
nia, 384 U.S. 757, 770−71, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966); see 
3 LaFave, supra § 5.3(c), at 215. See generally infra § 5.13(b) and supra 
§ 3.13(b). For example, in Washington, bodily intrusions are authorized 
by statute in order to allow police to take blood samples of motorists ar-
rested for certain serious traffic violations. See RCW 46.20.308(3). If the 
suspect is attempting to swallow apparent contraband, less intrusive 
physical measures, such as a choke-hold, are permissible. See State v. 
Taplin, 36 Wn. App. 664, 666−67, 676 P.2d 504 (1984); State v. Wil-
liams, 16 Wn. App. 868, 871−72, 560 P.2d 1160 (1977). Officers at-
tempting to prevent a suspect from swallowing evidence may not, how-
ever, prevent the suspect from breathing or obstruct the suspect’s blood 
supply to the head, although they may pinch his mouth shut. Williams, 16 
Wn. App. at 872, 560 P.2d 1160. For a brief discussion of post-detention 
body searches, see infra § 6.2(c). 
5.1(c) Vehicles and Containers 
Under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, police 
may not search the passenger compartment of an automobile as a search 
incident to the arrest of the occupant except in certain circumstances. 
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 
(2009); State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 197, 275 P.3d 289 (2012). Wash-
ington’s application of the search incident to arrest exception in the con-
text of vehicles is much narrower than the Fourth Amendment applica-
tion. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d at 197, 275 P.3d 289 (declining to adopt federal 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment for article I, section 7). In Wash-
ington, an officer may search the vehicle only when there are (1) con-
cerns for officer safety or (2) concerns for destruction of the evidence. 
Id.; State v. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761, 772, 224 P.3d 751 (2009); State v. 
Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 397, 219 P.3d 651 (2009). Once the defendant is 
in custody, fears for officer safety or destruction of the evidence evapo-
rate. Patton, 167 Wn.2d at 397, 219 P.3d 651. Thus, once the defendant 
is handcuffed, removed from the vehicle, or placed in a police vehicle, 
there can be no vehicle search. Id. Under the Fourth Amendment, an of-
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ficer may also search if the officer believes that evidence relevant to the 
crime of arrest will be found in the vehicle. Gant, 556 U.S. at 351, 129 S. 
Ct. 1710. For a more detailed explanation of vehicle searches, see infra § 
5.15. 
5.2 PRE-ARREST SEARCH 
If a warrantless search is closely related in time and place to a law-
ful arrest, the search may be considered incidental to the arrest and valid 
as long as probable cause to arrest exists at the time of the search, even if 
the search occurs before the arrest. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 
111, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1980); State v. Harrel, 83 Wn. 
App. 393, 400, 923 P.2d 698 (1996). If probable cause does not exist at 
the time of the search, a search that provides probable cause is not con-
sidered a valid search incidental to the arrest. Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 
541, 543, 110 S. Ct. 1288, 108 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1990) (warrantless search 
of the defendant’s paper bag could not be justified as a search incidental 
to the arrest when the bag contained drug paraphernalia and the search 
was followed by the arrest of the defendant for drug abuse). See general-
ly 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.5(a) (5th ed. 2012). 
Under limited circumstances, pre-arrest searches are permitted even 
when the arrest does not closely follow the search. See generally 3 
LaFave, supra § 5.4(b). A search may be considered incidental to the 
arrest of a suspect in the following circumstances: (1) the police have 
probable cause; (2) the police believe the suspect is in the process of de-
stroying highly evanescent evidence; and (3) the evidence can be pre-
served by a limited search. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296, 93 S. Ct. 
2000, 36 L. Ed. 2d 900 (1973). See generally 3 LaFave, supra § 5.4(b). 
Pre-arrest searches are Terry searches, see supra § 2.9(b), and should be 
subject to the same standard applied and discussed in sections 4.5 
through 4.9. 
5.3 POST-DETENTION SEARCHES: SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST AND 
INVENTORY SEARCHES 
5.3(a) Post-Detention Searches Incident to Arrest 
The search incident to arrest exception can apply to a search at both 
the place of detention as well as the place of arrest. See generally 3 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.3(a) (5th ed. 2012). However, 
a significant delay between the arrest and the search may render the 
search unreasonable if the search is no longer contemporaneous with the 
arrest. State v. Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675, 683, 835 P.2d 1025 (1992) (delay 
of 17 minutes between arrest and search of a fanny pack was not unrea-
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sonable under the circumstances). Whether a delay is sufficient to render 
a search unreasonable under the search incident to arrest exception de-
pends on the facts of the individual case. Id. at 683 n.4, 835 P.2d 1025; 
see State v. Boursaw, 94 Wn. App. 629, 635, 976 P.2d 130 (1999) (a 10 
minute delay between arrest and arrival of dog to complete search by 
sniffing behind vehicle’s ashtray was reasonable). Likewise, any post-
arrest search is unlawful if probable cause to arrest dissipates by the time 
the suspect is taken into custody. State v. Hehman, 90 Wn.2d 45, 50, 578 
P.2d 527 (1978); State v. Lemus, 103 Wn. App. 94, 105, 11 P.3d 326 
(2000) (search of vehicle was invalid because no probable cause existed 
to arrest driver prior to police performing a positive field test for cocaine 
powder found from vehicle search). 
Under article I, section 7, when an arrestee is searched upon book-
ing, officers may later conduct a warrantless “second look” into the ar-
restee’s belongings. State v. Cheatam, 150 Wn.2d 626, 642, 81 P.3d 830 
(2003); see also United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 805, 94 S. Ct. 
1234, 39 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1974) (a search of the defendant’s clothing long 
after the defendant had been searched and placed in a jail cell was a per-
missible search incident to an arrest). An arrestee no longer has a reason-
able expectation of privacy in his personal items once state officials have 
viewed them during a valid inventory search. Cheatam, 150 Wn.2d at 
642, 81 P.3d 830. The same is true for a pretrial detainee transferred to a 
hospital for a competency evaluation. State v. Puapuaga, 164 Wn.2d 
515, 523, 192 P.3d 360 (2008). Additionally, the police do not need a 
warrant when comparing an individual’s DNA profile already in the 
State’s possession with evidence from a new crime scene. State v. Greg-
ory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 828, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006). 
A difficult question arises when police detain a suspect only be-
cause the police have failed to comply with laws allowing release. See 
generally 3 LaFave, supra § 5.3(d). A search conducted after police have 
decided to release a suspect is improper when there is no probability that 
the suspect possesses relevant evidence or weapons. State v. Carner, 28 
Wn. App. 439, 445, 624 P.2d 204 (1981). Similarly, a search based on 
consent from someone who was illegally detained is invalid. State v. Avi-
la-Avina, 99 Wn. App. 9, 14−15, 991 P.2d 720 (2000); State v. O’Day, 
91 Wn. App. 244, 253, 955 P.2d 860 (1998). 
5.3(b) Post-Detention Inventory Search 
Under article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, police offi-
cers may search containers or packages as part of an inventory of the ar-
restee’s possessions prior to storing the items for safekeeping. Illinois v. 
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643−48, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 77 L. Ed. 2d 65 
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(1983); State v. Smith, 76 Wn. App. 9, 16, 882 P.2d 190 (1994). Howev-
er, an inventory search that is “a ruse for a general rummaging in order to 
discover incriminating evidence” is unreasonable. Florida v. Wells, 495 
U.S. 1, 4, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 109 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990); State v. Mireles, 73 
Wn. App. 605, 871 P.2d 162 (1994). 
Consistent with the greater protection provided under article I, sec-
tion 7, inventory searches in Washington must be conducted “in good 
faith for the purposes of (1) finding, listing, and securing from loss dur-
ing detention property belonging to a detained person; (2) protecting po-
lice from liability due to dishonest claims of theft; and (3) protecting 
temporary storage bailees against false charges.” Smith, 76 Wn. App. at 
16, 882 P.2d 190. Thus, it is reasonable for police, as part of routine pro-
cedure before incarcerating an arrestee, to search any container or article 
in the arrestee’s possession according to inventory procedures. Id. at 
15−16, 882 P.2d 190 (upholding the search of defendant’s purse upon 
arrival to jail). But see State v. Smith, 56 Wn. App. 145, 150−52, 783 
P.2d 95 (1989) (holding that a booking search of an arrestee’s purse was 
unlawful because she was not given timely opportunity to post bail, and 
police were not concerned that she was carrying weapons). Officers may 
also conduct an inventory search of a validly impounded automobile and 
its containers. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374−75, 107 S. Ct. 
738, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987); State v. McFadden, 63 Wn. App. 441, 448, 
820 P.2d 53 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Adel, 136 
Wn.2d 629, 640, 965 P.2d 1072 (1998); see also infra § 5.19. 
Inventory searches, however, are not unlimited in scope, and “must 
be restricted to effectuating the purposes that justify their exception to 
the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Dugas, 109 Wn. App. 592, 597–98, 36 
P.3d 577 (2001) (holding that while police could inventory arrestee’s 
jacket, they could not search the closed container within the jacket when 
there was no indication of dangerous contents or illegal drugs). See gen-
erally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.5(b) (5th ed. 2012). 
5.4 SEARCHES CONDUCTED IN GOOD FAITH AND WITHOUT PURPOSE OF 
FINDING EVIDENCE: COMMUNITY CARETAKING AND MEDICAL 
EMERGENCY 
The police also do not need a warrant to assist persons who are se-
riously injured or threatened with such injury. Brigham City, Utah v. 
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006); 
State v. Guevara, 172 Wn. App. 184, 288 P.3d 1167 (2012). This “com-
munity caretaking” exception is “totally divorced from the detection, 
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a 
criminal statute,” Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S. Ct. 
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2523, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973), and is distinct from the “exigent circum-
stances” exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Leupp, 96 Wn. 
App. 324, 330, 980 P.2d 765 (1999). Both exceptions involve instances 
in which the police must act immediately, but for distinctly different pur-
poses. State v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 387 n. 39, 5 P.3d 668 (2000). Un-
like the exigent circumstances exception, “community caretaking” arises 
from a police officer’s responsibility to come to the aid of persons in 
danger. Id. Additionally, if officers undertake a search as part of their 
“community caretaking” function, any evidence discovered may be ad-
missible. See State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 802−03, 92 P.3d 228 
(2004) (community caretaking function does not include simply retriev-
ing a guest’s jacket from defendant’s home). 
Whether a search or seizure made for such “noncriminal 
noninvestigatory purposes is reasonable depends on a balancing of the 
individual’s interest in freedom from police interference against the pub-
lic’s interest in having the police perform this ‘community caretaking 
function.’” Kalmas v. Wagner, 133 Wn.2d 210, 216−17, 943 P.2d 1369 
(1997). Thus, even when police lack probable cause to believe a crime 
has been committed, they may conduct a warrantless search of the prem-
ises when the premises contains any of the following: (1) persons in im-
minent danger of death or harm; (2) objects likely to burn, explode, or 
otherwise cause harm; or (3) information that will disclose the location 
of a threatened victim or the existence of such a threat. State v. Downey, 
53 Wn. App. 543, 545, 768 P.2d 502 (1989); see also State v. Menz, 75 
Wn. App. 351, 353−56, 880 P.2d 48 (1994) (police entry was justified in 
response to a domestic violence call). 
The emergency, or “community caretaking” exception, however, 
must be motivated by a need to render assistance, and cannot be used as 
simply a “pretext for conducting an evidentiary search.” State v. 
Schlieker, 115 Wn. App. 264, 270, 62 P.3d 520 (2003) (held search inva-
lid when officers failed to inquire about the defendants’ safety, and pro-
ceeded to search for drugs). See generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 5.5(d) (5th ed. 2012). Consequently, the officer must be 
able to articulate specific facts and reasonable inferences drawn there-
from that justify the warrantless entry. State v. Davis, 86 Wn. App. 414, 
420, 937 P.2d 1110 (1997) (entry was proper when, after check-out time, 
the motel occupant did not respond to repeated telephone calls and 
knocks at the door). Finally, however, no court has yet fully articulated 
the precise contours of this exception, including whether and to what 
extent it applies to a search of a home. See Feis v. King County Sheriff’s 
Dep’t., 165 Wn. App. 525, 545−47, 267 P.3d 1022 (2011). 
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5.4(a) Minors 
The community caretaking exception may apply when officers are 
attempting to protect children. State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 64 P.3d 
594 (2003). When determining whether police have exceeded their scope 
of authority in trying to protect children under community caretaking, 
courts consider various circumstances, including whether a minor is 
found late at night, unaccompanied by a parent. See State v. Kinzy, 141 
Wn.2d 373, 5 P.3d 668 (2000). In Kinzy, police physically detained a 16 
year-old girl after seeing her walking in downtown Seattle at 10 p.m. on 
a weeknight with an adult male known to be involved with narcotics. Id. 
at 378, 5 P.3d 668. The court held that under the community caretaking 
exception, police could approach Kinzy and ask if she needed help, but 
without articulable suspicion that she had committed a criminal offense, 
police could not physically detain her. Id. at 395, 5 P.3d 668. In contrast, 
in State v. Acrey, the court upheld the detention of 12 year-old Acrey, 
whom the officers found while responding to a 911 call on a weeknight, 
after midnight, in an isolated area with no adult supervision. Acrey, 148 
Wn.2d at 742−43, 64 P.3d 594. Police contacted Acrey’s mother, who 
asked police to give the boy a ride home. Id. at 743, 64 P.3d 594. Before 
transporting the boy in the police car, police conducted a pat-down frisk 
for safety purposes and found drugs. Id. The court affirmed the appellate 
court’s holding that the police acted reasonably in this instance because 
there was a heightened concern that the boys may be engaging in conduct 
that could bring harm to themselves or others. Id. at 751, 64 P.3d 594. 
The court found persuasive the young age of the defendant, the late hour, 
and his presence in an isolated area without adults. Id. at 752, 64 P.3d 
594. Most importantly, the officers had initially made a Terry stop of the 
defendant to investigate a possible crime. Id. 
5.4(b) Rendering Aid to Victims 
Courts of appeal have recognized that police may make a warrant-
less entry into a residence in response to a report of ongoing domestic 
violence. State v. Menz, 75 Wn. App. 351, 353−56, 880 P.2d 48 (1994). 
“Police officers responding to a domestic violence report have a duty to 
ensure the present and continued safety and wellbeing of the occupants” 
of a residence. State v. Raines, 55 Wn. App. 459, 465, 778 P.2d 538 
(1989). In deciding whether police entry was lawful, the court can con-
sider the specific instance and likelihood of domestic violence as it re-
lates to the requirements of the emergency-aid exception. State v. 
Schultz, 170 Wn.2d 746, 750, 248 P.3d 484 (2011) (a report of a couple 
yelling, the presence of “loud voices,” and an agitated woman answering 
the door was not enough to uphold a warrantless entry). 
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When the medical emergency is a homicide, officers may enter to 
aid the victim and make a quick check to see if the perpetrator or other 
victims are present. See Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 14, 120 S. 
Ct. 7, 145 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1999) (noting that, while officers may enter a 
murder scene to aid victims or to see if the perpetrator is present, there is 
no general “murder scene” warrant exception). Thus, the police may 
seize any evidence observed in plain view during the course of legitimate 
police emergency activities. State v. Stevenson, 55 Wn. App. 725, 729–
30, 780 P.2d 873 (1989); see infra § 5.5. Any such search must be brief; 
a general exploratory search lasting several hours is not permissible. 
Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 21, 105 S. Ct. 409, 83 L. Ed. 2d 
246 (1984). 
In the course of rendering aid, police may conduct a warrantless 
search of a victim’s personal effects so long as the search is motivated by 
a need to render assistance. State v. Loewen, 97 Wn.2d 562, 568, 647 
P.2d 489 (1982) (the search of the defendant’s tote bag for identification 
was improper when the defendant regained consciousness prior to the 
search). The scope of the search must remain limited to whatever is rea-
sonable to conduct the community caretaking function, and the necessity 
must exist at the time of the search. Id. at 568, 647 P.2d 489; State v. 
Schroeder, 109 Wn. App. 30, 45, 32 P.3d 1022 (2001) (searching coat 
pocket for identification of suicide victim was beyond scope of commu-
nity caretaking function because the deceased no longer needed emer-
gency medical attention, and the object of the search was not in plain 
view); State v. Dempsey, 88 Wn. App. 918, 922, 947 P.2d 265 (1997), 
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Neeley, 113 Wn. App. 100, 52 
P.3d 539 (2002). 
5.4(c) Property Damage 
Similarly, police may make a warrantless entry to protect property, 
and in doing so, may seize evidence in plain view. State v. Bakke, 44 
Wn. App. 830, 839−41, 723 P.2d 534 (1986). Firefighters may enter a 
house to extinguish a fire and immediately thereafter conduct a limited 
warrantless investigation to determine the fire’s cause. Michigan v. Tay-
lor, 436 U.S. 499, 510, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1978). Once a 
fire has been extinguished, however, a warrant is required for arson in-
vestigators to search the premises to investigate a possible criminal cause 
of the fire. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294−95, 104 S. Ct. 641, 
78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984); Taylor, 436 U.S. at 511, 98 S. Ct. 1942. 
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5.4(d) Second Entry 
Police officers may enter a private residence without a warrant 
when officials of another government agency have validly entered the 
residence and discovered contraband. State v. Bell, 108 Wn.2d 193, 201, 
737 P.2d 254 (1987) (marijuana-growing operation discovered in plain 
view by firefighters justified a warrantless entry and seizure by police), 
abrogated on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 
S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990). However, the entry of the initial 
party must of course be valid. State v. Browning, 67 Wn. App. 93, 97, 
834 P.2d 84 (1992) (contraband sighted during building inspector’s entry 
could not be used as the basis for later police entry under warrant be-
cause inspector’s initial entry was unlawful). 
5.5 THE “OPEN VIEW” AND “PLAIN VIEW” DOCTRINES DISTINGUISHED 
Courts have used the “plain view” and “open view” doctrines inter-
changeably to describe a variety of situations, but the two doctrines are 
distinct. See State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 901–02, 632 P.2d 44 
(1981); State v. Barnes, 158 Wn. App. 602, 243 P.3d 165 (2010). “Open 
view” often describes one of two situations: (1) a search in which an of-
ficer observes an item that is exposed to public view in a public place or 
in a location that is not constitutionally protected; or (2) a search in 
which an officer, standing in an unprotected area, observes an object that 
is located inside a constitutionally protected area. Barnes, 158 Wn. App. 
at 612, 243 P.3d 165; State v. Perez, 41 Wn. App. 481, 483, 704 P.2d 
625 (1985); see also State v. O’Herron, 153 N.J. Super. 570, 574, 380 
A.2d 728 (1977) (discussing the “chameleon-like quality of the phrase 
‘plain view’”); 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.2(a), at 
596−97 (5th ed. 2012). The “open view” doctrine is characterized by the 
defendant’s lower expectation of privacy because in both cases the of-
ficer views the contraband from an unprotected place. See supra § 1.3. 
The plain view doctrine, as opposed to the open view doctrine, may justi-
fy the seizure of objects without a warrant. See generally LaFave, supra 
§ 2.2(a). This doctrine usually applies to the discovery and seizure of an 
object after entry into a constitutionally protected area. See generally id. 
5.6 “OPEN VIEW” 
In the first situation, the discovery of an object in a public place or 
in a location that is not constitutionally protected is not a true search be-
cause the defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in objects 
exposed to public view. State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 392, 909 P.2d 280 
(1996). Thus, this situation is referred to as “open view” and not “plain 
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view.” State v. Dykstra, 84 Wn. App. 186, 191 n.4, 926 P.2d 929 (1996); 
see supra § 1.3. 
Likewise in the second instance, an officer viewing contraband in a 
protected area while standing in an unprotected place also constitutes an 
“open view” situation. State v. Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304, 312, 4 P.3d 130 
(2000). This is because a search does not occur when an object, located 
in a protected area, is merely observed from an unprotected point in an 
unprotected area. See id. at 312–13, 4 P.3d 130. However, even if obser-
vations from an unprotected vantage point do not constitute a search, 
privacy rights are implicated when police enter a constitutionally pro-
tected area to seize an object. See State v. Dyreson, 104 Wn. App. 703, 
713−14, 17 P.3d 668 (2001). In other words, “[w]herever the eye may 
go, the body of the policeman may not necessarily follow.” Charles E. 
Moylan, Jr., The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great 
“Search Incident” Geography Battle, 26 Mercer L. Rev. 1047, 1096 
(1975); see also Dykstra, 84 Wn. App. at 192−93, 926 P.2d 929. 
Therefore, although the “open view” doctrine may justify observing 
an object located in a constitutionally protected area, it will not justify 
seizing the object, but may serve as the basis for a search warrant. See 
Dykstra, 84 Wn. App. at 191, 926 P.2d 929; State v. Mierz, 72 Wn. App. 
783, 791, 866 P.2d 65 (1994), aff’d, 127 Wn.2d 460, 901 P.2d 286 
(1995) (view of prohibited coyote pups from legal vantage point outside 
of the defendant’s fence did not justify an officer’s warrantless entry on-
to property); State v. Ferro, 64 Wn. App. 181, 182, 824 P.2d 500 (1992). 
In limited instances, seizure of an object may be permissible under 
the “open view” doctrine if an officer is reasonably certain that a con-
tainer holds contraband based on the container’s appearance. State v. 
Courcy, 48 Wn. App. 326, 330, 739 P.2d 98 (1987) (a paper “bindle” 
containing cocaine was observed by an officer during a lawful investiga-
tive stop). This is because “‘some containers . . . by their very nature 
cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their con-
tents can be inferred from their outward appearance.’” Id. (quoting Ar-
kansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d 
235 (1979)). Consequently, the suspect does not have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy that would prevent opening the container or field-
testing its contents. Courcy, 48 Wn. App. at 330, 739 P.2d 98. 
 
2013] Chapter 5: Warrantless Searches and Seizures 1709 
5.7 CRITERIA FOR FALLING WITHIN THE “PLAIN VIEW” EXCEPTION 
5.7(a) Discovery of Object in Plain View Following  
Entry into a Constitutionally Protected Area: Requirements 
In contrast to “open view,” “plain view” often involves an officer 
lawfully entering a constitutionally protected area and unexpectedly dis-
covering incriminating evidence. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 65 Wn. 
App. 409, 416, 828 P.2d 636 (1992); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443, 466, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971). For a warrantless 
seizure to fall within this “plain view” exception, the following two re-
quirements must be met: (1) the police must have a prior justification for 
the intrusion into the constitutionally protected area, and (2) the police 
must immediately realize that the object they observe is evidence—the 
incriminating character of the evidence must be immediately apparent. 
State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 395, 166 P.3d 698 (2007); see also 
State v. Cotten, 75 Wn. App. 669, 683, 879 P.2d 971 (1994) (shotgun did 
not come within the plain view doctrine when it was not immediately 
apparent to FBI officers that the gun was evidence of a crime). Previous-
ly, courts imposed a third requirement: the discovery of the incriminating 
evidence must be inadvertent. See Cotten, 75 Wn. App. at 683, 879 P.2d 
971. However, neither article I, section 7, nor the Fourth Amendment 
still require inadvertent discovery to justify a seizure under the plain 
view exception. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130, 110 S. Ct. 
2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990); State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107, 114 
n.1, 874 P.2d 160 (1994) (noting the Horton revision to the plain view 
test). 
5.7(a)(1) Prior Justification for Intrusion 
The plain view doctrine applies only when police are lawfully oc-
cupying the position from which they observe the illegal object or ac-
tivity. State v. McKague, 143 Wn. App. 531, 539, 178 P.3d 1035 (2008). 
Thus, if an initial entry into a residence or onto property is illegal, con-
fiscation of evidence will constitute an illegal seizure. Id.; see also State 
v. Kull, 155 Wn.2d 80, 85, 118 P.3d 307 (2005). Similarly, when the ini-
tial stop of a vehicle is unlawful—the police therefore having no right to 
be in a position to observe the vehicle’s interior—the observation of con-
traband within the vehicle constitutes an unlawful search. State v. 
Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940, 942−43, 530 P.2d 243 (1975); see also Washing-
ton v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9, 102 S. Ct. 812, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1982), 
on remand, 100 Wn.2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984). 
Because the plain view exception to the warrant requirement rests 
on the lawfulness of the officer’s presence, plain view cases will have 
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different outcomes under the federal and state constitutions when the two 
constitutions differ as to the underlying lawfulness. For example, when 
the arresting officer follows the arrestee into his or her home, the inspec-
tion of objects within the room may be lawful under the Fourth Amend-
ment, yet unlawful under article I, section 7. Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 9, 
102 S. Ct. 812 (determining that Fourth Amendment permits officer to 
accompany arrestee wherever arrestee goes), on remand, 100 Wn.2d at 
822 (concluding that article I, section 7 prohibits an officer from entering 
misdemeanor arrestee’s home unless officer can demonstrate threat to 
own safety, possibility of destruction of evidence of misdemeanor 
charged, or strong likelihood of escape). Essentially, any application of 
the plain view exception in confluence with article I, section 7 requires 
“a close examination of the facts and not a bright line rule” for determin-
ing when officers exceed their lawful presence. Id. at 820, 102 S. Ct. 
812; see State v. Link, 136 Wn. App. 685, 697, 150 P.3d 610 (2007). 
5.7(a)(2) Immediate Knowledge: Incriminating Character Immediately 
Apparent 
The plain view exception applies only when the police immediately 
recognize the incriminating nature of the object seized. State v. Cotten, 
75 Wn. App. 669, 683, 879 P.2d 971 (1994) (shotgun not valid under the 
plain view doctrine because it was not immediately apparent to the FBI 
officers that the shotgun was evidence of a crime). Although the officer 
need not have absolute knowledge that the object is related to a crime, 
the officer cannot tamper with the evidence in order to come to this be-
lief, and the object must have a nexus to the crime under investigation or 
lead to an arrest. Id. 
It is sufficient that the officer have probable cause to believe that 
the object is evidence of a crime. State v. Sistrunk, 57 Wn. App. 210, 
214, 787 P.2d 937 (1990). For example, in State v. Gonzales, a clear vial 
of capsules and pills, “viewed in context” of other items of drug para-
phernalia, was properly seized. 46 Wn. App. 388, 400−01, 731 P.2d 1101 
(1986). On the other hand, a closed paper bag containing marijuana was 
improperly seized because the marijuana was clearly not visible. Id. at 
400, 731 P.2d 1101; see also Sistrunk, 57 Wn. App. at 214, 787 P.2d 937 
(no probable cause to seize empty beer cans in open view when the con-
dition of cans was consistent with driver’s explanation that they had been 
picked up for recycling). 
If an object is moved or tampered with in any way to determine 
whether it is evidence of a crime, the “immediately apparent” prong of 
the plain view test will fail. State v. King, 89 Wn. App. 612, 622 n.31, 
949 P.3d 856 (1998) (citing State v. Murray, 84 Wn.2d 527, 527 P.2d 
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1303 (1974)). Police officers must connect items to a crime based solely 
on what is exposed to their view; they cannot move the object even a few 
inches. Murray, 84 Wn.2d at 527, 527 P.2d 1303 (holding that the police 
may not move a TV to view the serial number). 
Officers may seize objects only if the objects are connected with the 
crime under investigation or will lead to an arrest. State v. Terrovona, 
105 Wn.2d 632, 648, 716 P.2d 295 (1986) (officers may only seize evi-
dence that is not described in the warrant if “it will aid in a particular 
apprehension or conviction, or if it has a sufficient nexus with the crime 
under investigation”). This nexus may include documents providing the 
motive for a crime or evidence of the crime itself. See State v. Stenson, 
132 Wn.2d 668, 695, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997) (insurance documents were 
“related to the crime” because they could provide a motive for the mur-
der). 
An officer’s knowledge and experience are also relevant to deter-
mining whether an object is legally seized under the plain view doctrine. 
State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 13, 726 P.2d 445 (1986) (“Adams could 
immediately conclude, based on his own prior experience investigating 
narcotics and the information he had about the Smith household and 
about Kennedy, that the bag contained contraband.”). Baggies may be 
considered evidence of a crime if other factors are present, such as the 
baggies’ appearance of having contained illicit substances or presence in 
an area of high drug crime. State v. Neth, 165 W.2d 177, 185 n.3, 196 
P.3d 658 (2008). 
Article I, section 7 provides the same protection as the Fourth 
Amendment in this respect. State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 582, 62 
P.3d 489 (2003). Under the Fourth Amendment, officers must also im-
mediately recognize the illicit nature of the object. See generally 2 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.11(d) (5th ed. 2012). But they 
may not move the object to uncover its illicit nature. Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971); 
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 94 L. Ed. 2d 347 
(1987) (the scope of plain view was exceeded when police lifted stereo 
components to read serial numbers). Officers may also, however, be in-
formed in their determination by their expertise. Andresen v. Maryland, 
427 U.S. 463, 483, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976) (use of spe-
cially trained investigators supported the seizure of business records). 
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5.8 EXTENSIONS OF THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE 
5.8(a) Plain Hearing 
Some circuit courts have recognized a “plain hearing” analog to the 
plain view doctrine based on the premise that defendants have no reason-
able expectation of privacy in conversations that are overheard with un-
aided ears. See United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 1051−52 (5th 
Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068, 1071 (6th 
Cir. 1990) (inadvertently intercepted nontelephonic conversations were 
authorized under “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement). 
Use of hearing enhancement devices may “raise very different and far 
more serious questions” from visual enhancement devices when deter-
mining the reasonable expectation of the privacy of defendants and, con-
sequently, when determining whether a warrant is required. Dow Chem. 
Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238−39, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 90 L. Ed. 
2d 226 (1986). 
In Washington, eavesdropping by means of an electronic device or 
the interception of private telephone, telegraph, radio, or other electronic 
communications is governed by Washington’s Violating Right of Privacy 
Act. RCW 9.73. Tape recordings made by federal agents pursuant to the 
federal wiretap statute are inadmissible in state court when the recordings 
are made in violation of the Washington statute. State v. Williams, 94 
Wn.2d 531, 541, 617 P.2d 1012 (1980). Police testimony about such rec-
orded conversation is also inadmissible. See infra § 7.3(a) (discussing the 
use of illegally obtained evidence at probable cause hearings); see also 
Tara McGraw Swaminatha, The Fourth Amendment Unplugged: Elec-
tronic Evidence Issues & Wireless Defenses, 7 Yale J. L. & Tech. 51 
(2005). 
5.8(b) Plain Smell 
Courts have generally accepted the “plain smell” exception as a 
branch of the plain view doctrine. See generally 1 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 2.2(a), at 596−97 (5th ed. 2012). Thus, police of-
ficers have used odor to justify warrantless entries and seizures so long 
as the officer was lawfully in the location where the odor was detected. 
See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 
842 (2005) (warrantless search of car trunk valid when dog sniff of exte-
rior of car detected drugs inside trunk and when police lawfully pulled 
car over for traffic stop). 
Washington has permitted the warrantless seizure of an object 
based on its odor when the odor established probable cause or when the 
odor was in “open view.” See State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 332, 345, 815 
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P.2d 761 (1991) (odor of marijuana was in “open view”); State v. 
Huckaby, 15 Wn. App. 280, 290−91, 549 P.2d 35 (1976); see also State 
v. Hammone, 24 Wn. App. 596, 599, 603 P.2d 377 (1979) (marijuana 
odor emanating from vehicle). Odor can also support a warrantless entry 
and can serve as probable cause for a search warrant. See State v. Gave, 
77 Wn. App. 333, 336, 890 P.2d 1088 (1995) (odor of marijuana sup-
ported warrant probable cause requirement); State v. Gocken, 71 Wn. 
App. 267, 278, 857 P.2d 1074 (1993) (odor of decaying flesh justified 
warrantless entry at homicide scene). 
5.8(c) Plain Feel 
The court has recognized the “plain feel” or “plain touch” doctrine 
as a corollary of the plain view doctrine. Under the plain touch exception 
to the warrant requirement, police may seize nonthreatening contraband 
detected through the officer’s sense of touch during a legitimate pat 
down search. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375−76, 113 S. Ct. 
2130, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993); State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 251, 
207 P.3d 1266 (2009). The object will be admissible only if its “contour 
or mass makes its identity immediately apparent.” Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 
365−76, 113 S. Ct. 2130; State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107, 115, 874 P.2d 
160 (1994). Any “squeezing, sliding or otherwise manipulating” the ob-
ject extends the search beyond the scope of Terry, thus rendering the 
search constitutionally invalid. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d at 250, 207 P.3d 1266 
(excluding evidence when officer continued to squeeze defendant’s 
pocket after feeling no weapon); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 
337−39, 120 S. Ct. 1462, 146 L. Ed. 2d 365 (2000) (border patrol agent’s 
exploratory manipulation of bus passenger’s opaque bag violated the 
Fourth Amendment). 
5.9 INTRODUCTION TO CONSENSUAL SEARCHES  
A warrantless search is constitutional when valid consent is grant-
ed. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9−10, 102 S. Ct. 812, 818, 70 
L. Ed. 2d 778, 787 (1982), on remand to 100 Wn.2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 
(1984); State v. Cantrell, 124 Wn.2d 183, 187, 875 P.2d 1208 (1994). A 
valid consensual search requires that (1) the consent be “voluntary,” (2) 
the consent be granted by a party having the authority to consent, and (3) 
the search be limited to the scope of the consent granted. State v. Has-
tings, 119 Wn.2d 229, 234, 830 P.2d 658 (1992). See generally 4 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1 (5th ed. 2012). Furthermore, while 
the Fourth Amendment does not require targets of searches to be told 
they have the right to refuse the search, United States v. Drayton, 536 
U.S. 194, 207, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2002), article I, sec-
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tion 7 provides heightened protection against unreasonable searches. 
Thus, “where the State seeks to justify a search on the basis of consent, it 
has the burden of showing that the consent was voluntary, an essential 
element of which is knowledge of the right to refuse consent.” State v. 
Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 116, 960 P.2d 927 (1998) (quoting State v. 
Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353−54, 346 A.2d 66 (1975) (alteration in origi-
nal)). 
The State has the burden of proving that consent to a search was 
voluntary. State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 116, 960 P.2d 927 (1998) 
(citing State v. Smith, 115 Wn.2d 775, 789, 801 P.2d 975 (1990)). The 
level of proof required is “clear and convincing evidence.” Smith, 115 
Wn.2d at 789, 801 P.2d 975. For a discussion of the distinctions between 
voluntary consent and waiver of constitutional rights, see generally 4 
LaFave, supra § 8.1(a), at 10−17. 
5.9(a) Factors Considered in Determining Voluntariness 
The court analyzes the validity or voluntariness of consent to a 
search in a similar manner as the voluntariness of a confession. See 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248−49, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. 
Ed. 2d 854 (1973). However, consent to search is distinguishable from 
testimonial admissions since the former is consistent with innocence. 
State v. Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466, 471, 755 P.2d 797 (1988). In Wash-
ington, the issue “is clearly an interest of local concern . . . due to ‘[t]he 
heightened protection afforded state citizens against unlawful intrusion 
into private dwellings [that] places an onerous burden upon the govern-
ment to show a compelling need to act outside our warrant require-
ment.’” State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 114, 960 P.2d 927 (1998) 
(quoting Washington v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 822, 676 P.2d 419 
(1984) (alteration in original)). 
In Washington, if the police officers conduct a “knock and talk” for 
the purpose of gaining consent, they must “inform the person[s] from 
whom consent is sought that [they] may lawfully refuse to consent to the 
search and that they can revoke, at any time, the consent that they give, 
and can limit the scope of the consent to certain areas of the home.” Fer-
rier, 136 Wn.2d at 118−19, 960 P.2d 927; see supra § 3.7. Failure to do 
so vitiates any consent given afterwards. Id. The Washington Supreme 
Court has declined to extend the Ferrier rule to situations where police 
seek entry to (1) question a resident in the course of investigating a 
crime, State v. Khounvichai, 149 Wn.2d 557, 559, 69 P.3d 862 (2003); 
(2) execute arrest warrants, State v. Thang, 145 Wn.2d 630, 636−37, 41 
P.3d 1159 (2002); and (3) identify residents of the home, State v. Wil-
liams, 142 Wn.2d 17, 27, 11 P.3d 714 (2000). In other words, police 
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need not give a Ferrier warning when the purpose of the visit is some-
thing other than searching for contraband or evidence of a crime. Thus, 
in State v. Tagas, the court concluded that under article I, section 7, the 
validity of defendant’s consent to the search of her purse did not depend 
on the officer advising her of her right to refuse consent to search. 121 
Wn. App. 872, 878, 90 P.3d 1088 (2004). 
A prior voluntary confession or other type of cooperation with the 
police will weigh in favor of a finding that the consent to search was vol-
untary. See State v. Raines, 55 Wn. App. 459, 462, 778 P.2d 538 (1989). 
A prior refusal to consent to a search will suggest that a subsequent con-
sent was not voluntary. See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 8.2(f) (5th ed. 2012). 
A suspect’s behavior may also indicate consent even when verbal 
consent is withheld. See Raines, 55 Wn. App. at 462, 778 P.2d 538 (fail-
ure to expressly object after police requested permission to enter “to look 
around” amounted to implied waiver of right to exclude them); State v. 
Sabbot, 16 Wn. App. 929, 938, 561 P.2d 212 (1977) (although the under-
cover investigator followed the defendant into the defendant’s home after 
the defendant had told him to wait outside, the investigator’s presence in 
house was with the defendant’s tacit acquiescence). 
5.9(b) Police Claim of Authority to Search 
An express or implied claim by the police that they will proceed 
immediately to conduct the search even without the individual’s consent 
is likely to indicate that the subsequent consent was involuntary. See 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 1792, 20 
L. Ed. 2d 797, 803 (1968); State v. Browning, 67 Wn. App. 93, 97−98, 
834 P.2d 84 (1992) (acquiescence to a claim of authority is not equiva-
lent to free and voluntary consent to a search). See generally 4 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(a) (5th ed. 2012). 
A threat to seek a warrant if the person refuses to allow a search 
does not, however, automatically invalidate consent. See State v. Smith, 
115 Wn.2d 775, 790, 801 P.2d 975 (1990) (no coercion where the de-
fendant was told officers would seek a search warrant if consent was not 
given to search the trunk of car); see generally 4 LaFave, supra § 8.2(c). 
On the other hand, police misrepresentation regarding the existence of a 
search warrant may invalidate consent to a search or seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548, 88 S. Ct. 1788; Rental 
Owners Ass’n v. Thurston Cnty., 85 Wn. App. 171, 183, 931 P.2d 208 
(1997) (threats to obtain a search warrant may invalidate consent when 
grounds for obtaining a warrant do not exist); State v. McCrorey, 70 Wn. 
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App. 103, 112 n.8, 851 P.2d 1234 (1993), abrogated on other grounds, 
State v. Head, 136 Wn.2d 619, 964 P.2d 1187 (1998). 
5.9(c) Coercive Surroundings 
If the officers make a show of force while seeking consent, or if the 
surroundings are coercive in other respects, the consent will generally 
not be considered voluntary. See McNear v. Rhay, 65 Wn.2d 530, 537, 
398 P.2d 732 (1965); State v. Dresker, 39 Wn. App. 136, 139, 692 P.2d 
846 (1984). For example, where officers placed a defendant under physi-
cal restraint, searched her home illegally without consent, and had 
searched her home illegally without consent two days prior, the defend-
ant did not voluntarily consent. State v. Werth, 18 Wn. App. 530, 
535−36, 571 P.2d 941 (1977); see supra § 1.4(a). However, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has held that surroundings were not coercive when police 
officers boarded a bus and obtained permission to search where “[t]here 
was no application of force, no intimidating movement, no overwhelm-
ing show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no 
threat, no command, [and] not even an authoritative tone of voice.” Unit-
ed States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 203−04, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed. 
2d 242 (2002). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
8.2(b) (5th ed. 2012). Coercive effects can, however, “be mitigated by 
requiring officers who conduct [knock and talk searches] to warn home 
dwellers of their right to refuse consent to a warrantless search.” State v. 
Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 116, 960 P.2d 927 (1998). 
The fact that a defendant is in custody when he consents to a search 
does not by itself establish coercion or involuntary consent. McNear, 65 
Wn.2d at 538, 398 P.2d 732; United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 
96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976). Custodial restraint is, however, a 
significant factor in assessing voluntariness. See State v. Avila-Avina, 99 
Wn. App. 9, 14−15, 991 P.2d 720 (2000). In Avila-Avina, the court con-
cluded that consent was invalid where the defendant was illegally de-
tained and held in a patrol car for four hours after the initial purpose of 
the detainment was satisfied. Id. at 16, 991 P.2d 720; see also Werth, 18 
Wn. App. at 535−36, 571 P.2d 941; State v. Rodriguez, 20 Wn. App. 
876, 881, 582 P.2d 904 (1978). 
Consent is likely voluntary even if, after arrest, the officers will not 
allow the defendant to return inside his dwelling unaccompanied to re-
trieve necessary belongings. In State v. Nelson, the court held the consent 
was voluntary and uncoerced where the defendant, arrested on the porch 
of his home in midwinter wearing only pants and a t-shirt, consented to 
officers accompanying him into his home; the arresting officers had giv-
en the defendant the alternative of proceeding to the police station as he 
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was, but indicated that if he returned inside, they would have to accom-
pany him. State v. Nelson, 47 Wn. App. 157, 163−64, 734 P.2d 516 
(1987). There, the court did not consider the defendant’s fear that his 
behavior might appear “crazy” if he accepted arrest without his jacket 
and keys equal to coercion. Id. at 163, 734 P.2d 516. 
5.9(d) Awareness of the Constitutional Right to Withhold Consent 
Although courts consider an individual’s knowledge of the right to 
refuse a search when determining whether consent is voluntary, the State 
may prove that consent was voluntary without establishing such 
knowledge. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S. Ct. 
2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973); State v. Shoemaker 85 Wn.2d 207, 212, 
533 P.2d 123 (1975); State v. Rodriguez, 20 Wn. App. 876, 880−81, 582 
P.2d 904 (1978) (consent was voluntary despite the defendant’s assertion 
that he was not told and did not know of the right to refuse consent). See 
generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(i) (5th ed. 
2012). Where police seek to justify a warrantless search of a private 
home, however, knowledge of the right to refuse consent is an essential 
element. State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 116, 960 P.2d 927 (1998) 
(“[T]he only sure way to give such a protection substance is to require a 
warning of its existence.”). But informing occupants of their right to re-
fuse might not be required when the officers are simply providing back-
up for another investigatory agency. State v. Bustamante-Davila, 138 
Wn.2d 964, 984, 983 P.2d 590 (1999) (no Ferrier warning required 
when officers were simply providing backup to a requesting INS agent 
and suspect permitted agent and officers into home in which officers saw 
rifle in plain sight). 
5.9(e) Prior Illegal Police Action 
A prior illegal act by the police may suggest that the defendant’s 
consent was involuntary. See, e.g., State v. Werth, 18 Wn. App. 530, 535, 
571 P.2d 941 (1977) (“In view of the additional circumstance that two 
days before, Werth’s home had been searched illegally without her con-
sent, it is apparent that overall, the situation was rife with coercion.”). 
See generally generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(d) 
(5th ed. 2012). Thus, a prior illegal search or arrest may taint the subse-
quent consent and thereby render the consent invalid. See generally State 
v. McCrorey, 70 Wn. App. 103, 111−12, 851 P.2d 1234 (1993) (prior 
illegal police activity is one factor when considering the totality of the 
circumstances); 4 LaFave, supra § 8.2(d). 
The State has the burden of proving that consent was not obtained 
by the exploitation of a prior illegal search. State v. Bustamante-Davila, 
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138 Wn.2d 964, 981, 983 P.2d 590 (1999). In State v. Jensen, the court 
found that the State had met this burden when it showed that although 
only two hours intervened between the search and the consent, the con-
sent was valid because, in the intervening period, the defendant was ad-
vised of his right to refuse consent, had verbally consented twice, and 
was allowed to call his sister, and there was no evidence that police did 
anything to frighten or intimidate defendant. 44 Wn. App. 485, 488, 723 
P.2d 443 (1986); see also State v. Tijerina, 61 Wn. App. 626, 629, 811 
P.2d 241 (1991); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690, 102 S. Ct. 2664, 
73 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1982). 
5.9(f) Maturity, Sophistication, and Mental or Emotional State 
In assessing the voluntariness of the consent, the court always con-
siders the sophistication and the emotional state of the defendant. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 
2d 854 (1973) (“The traditional definition of voluntariness we accept 
today has always taken into account evidence of minimal schooling [and] 
low intelligence.”); State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wn.2d 207, 212, 533 P.2d 
123 (1975) (determination of voluntariness should include consideration 
of “the degree of education and intelligence of the consenting person”); 
see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558, 100 S. Ct. 
1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980). See generally generally 4 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(e) (5th ed. 2012). While the mental 
condition of a defendant is a significant factor in determining voluntari-
ness, the presence of mental illness itself is insufficient to render a con-
sent to search invalid. See State v. Sondergaard, 86 Wn. App. 656, 662, 
938 P.2d 351 (1997); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 
107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986) (voices directing the psychotic 
defendant to confess to murder were not the result of police coercion). 
5.9(g) Police Deception as to Identity or Purpose 
The use of deception by a police officer does not necessarily affect 
the voluntariness of consent to a search. Police may use a ruse to gain 
entry to a residence to conduct a criminal investigation if they have a 
justifiable and reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity within the 
residence. State v. Hastings, 119 Wn.2d 229, 233, 830 P.2d 658 (1992) 
(the defendant had no constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in 
the residence where undercover officers had purchased cocaine); State v. 
Hashman, 46 Wn. App. 211, 216, 729 P.2d 651 (1986) (a police officer 
disguised as a building contractor gained entry into a residence after an-
other officer, who had lawfully been within the residence, reported evi-
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dence of a marijuana-growing operation). See generally 4 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(m)–(n) (5th ed. 2012).  
5.10 SCOPE OF CONSENT 
A consensual search must be limited to the area covered by the au-
thority given by the consenting party. State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 
126, 133, 101 P.3d 80 (2004); State v. Davis, 86 Wn. App. 414, 423, 937 
P.2d 1110 (1997). The consenting party, expressly or implicitly, may 
limit the scope of consent by only consenting to a search with reduced 
duration, area, or intensity. Davis, 86 Wn. App. at 423, 937 P.2d 1110. 
Any search exceeding the scope of consent is invalid, because exceeding 
the scope of consent is comparable to exceeding the scope of a search 
warrant. Id. See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
8.1(a) (5th ed. 2012). 
“A general and unqualified consent to search an area for a particular 
type of material permits a search of personal property within the area in 
which the material could be concealed.” State v. Mueller, 63 Wn. App. 
720, 722, 821 P.2d 1267 (1992). For example, in State v. Jensen, the de-
fendant consented to a “complete” search of his vehicle for materials of 
any evidentiary value. Officers conducting the search found cocaine in 
the pocket of a jacket in the back seat of the defendant’s car. State v. Jen-
sen, 44 Wn. App. 485, 486, 723 P.2d 443 (1986). The court held that the 
officers had not exceeded the scope of consent since the defendant did 
not expressly or implicitly limit his consent. Id. at 492, 723 P.2d 443. 
Furthermore, the defendant consented to the search for evidence that 
could have reasonably been kept in a jacket pocket. Id. A consensual 
search is not invalidated if it results in the discovery of evidence that the 
consenting party did not expect to be discovered. State v. Johnson, 40 
Wn. App. 371, 382–83, 699 P.2d 221 (1985). A general, unqualified con-
sent does not extend to locked containers, which have additional privacy 
expectations under article I, section 7. State v. Monaghan, 165 Wn. App. 
782, 791, 266 P.3d 222 (2012) (citing State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 
720 P.2d 436 (1986)) (finding that the search of a locked container in the 
trunk of defendant’s car was without warrant or the defendant’s consent 
and was therefore without the authority of law required in Washington). 
To determine whether consent to one search is extended to a later 
search, courts consider: (1) whether the search is conducted by the same 
officers; (2) whether the second search has the same objectives; and (3) 
whether the time elapsed between the two searches suggests an aban-
donment or completion of the initial search. State v. Koepke, 47 Wn. 
App. 897, 905−06, 738 P.2d 295 (1987) (citing State v. Gallo, 20 Wn. 
App. 717, 725, 582 P.2d 558 (1978)). 
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Lastly, consent to a search or seizure may be implied by statute. For 
example, drivers of motor vehicles in Washington give implied consent 
to a blood test if they are arrested for vehicular homicide. RCW 
46.20.308(3); State v. Brokman, 84 Wn. App. 848, 850−51, 930 P.2d 354 
(1997). 
5.11 CONSENT BY THIRD PARTIES 
In some situations, third parties may give consent for searches, and 
evidence discovered as a result of such searches may be used against a 
non-consenting defendant. See State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 543, 688 
P.2d 859 (1984). The relationship between the defendant and the third 
party, among other considerations, affects the validity of third-party con-
sent. 
Under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, third-
party consent may be valid under the “common authority,” or actual au-
thority standard articulated in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 
170, 94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed. 2d. 242 (1974); Mathe, 102 Wn.2d at 543, 
688 P.2d 859. Actual authority requires a sufficient relationship to, or 
mutual use of, property by people with joint access or control. State v. 
Rison, 116 Wn. App. 955, 961, 69 P.3d 362 (2003). Under this standard, 
if the non-consenting party is absent, (1) the consenting party must be 
able to permit the search in her own right, and (2) it must be reasonable 
to find that the defendant had assumed the risk that a person with joint 
control might permit a search. State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 
803−04, 92 P.3d 228 (2004); Mathe, 102 Wn.2d at 543−44, 688 P.2d 
859. 
Under article I, section 7, if the person only appears to have au-
thority to consent and in fact does not, the search is invalid. See State v. 
Eisfeldt, 163 Wn.2d 628, 638−39, 185 P.3d 580 (2008) (repairman 
lacked actual authority to consent to search of home, and police officers’ 
reasonable belief that he did was irrelevant); State v. Holmes, 108 Wn. 
App. 511, 518–19, 31 P.3d 716 (2001). The Fourth Amendment imposes 
a lesser standard, which is satisfied when consent is given by one who 
only appears to have authority to consent, and so long as the police rea-
sonably believe that the individual has this authority. See Illinois v. Ro-
driguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990). 
This “apparent authority” doctrine is grounded in the reasonableness of 
the search whereas the “common” or “actual authority” doctrine is 
grounded in reasonable expectations of privacy and the appropriate scope 
of the consent. State v. Morse, 156 Wn.2d 1, 8, 123 P.3d 832 (2005). See 
generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.3(g) (5th ed. 
2012).  
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The following sections discuss the relationships between a defen-
dant and a third party that may give rise to third-party consent, including 
family members, co-tenants, landlords, employers, bailees, and guests. 
5.11(a) Defendant’s Spouse 
Washington cases involving spousal consent are consistent with the 
“common authority” approach of State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 543, 
688 P.2d 859 (1984). For example, a defendant’s spouse, having an equal 
right to use an object or occupy the property, may consent to a search of 
the object or premises, regardless of whether the area is kept for the ex-
clusive use of the non-consenting spouse. See State v. Gillespie, 18 Wn. 
App. 313, 317, 569 P.2d 1174 (1977). However, also consistent with the 
“common authority” standard, the consent of a spouse is only valid 
against the non-consenting spouse if the non-consenting spouse is not 
present at the time of the search. State v. Walker, 136 Wn.2d 678, 679, 
965 P.2d 1079 (1998). When police request entry pursuant to “knock and 
talk” in conducting a search pursuant to a warrant, see supra § 3.7, either 
spouse may validly allow police entry. State v. Hartnell, 15 Wn. App. 
410, 417−18, 550 P.2d 63 (1976). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 8.4(a) (5th ed. 2012). 
5.11(b) Defendant’s Parents 
A parent has authority over all rooms in his or her home and conse-
quently can consent to a search of a dependent child’s room regardless of 
whether the child is a minor. State v. Summers, 52 Wn. App. 767, 772, 
764 P.2d 250 (1988); see also State v. Cotten, 75 Wn. App. 669, 685, 
879 P.2d 971 (1994) (finding that the defendant’s mother could give val-
id consent to seizure of a shotgun found in defendant’s bedroom). Fur-
thermore, an adult child living rent-free with his parents does not create 
the type of relationship that would prevent his parents from consenting to 
a search. State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 807, 92 P.3d 228 (2004) 
(finding that police did not need defendant’s consent to search his par-
ents’ boathouse, which he used while living with his parents rent-free). 
However, when the child pays rent and the status of the parent is similar 
to that of a landlord rather than a custodial parent, the relationship is 
more akin to a landlord and tenant relationship, leaving the parent with-
out authority to consent to a search of a child’s room. Summers, 52 Wn. 
App. at 771−73, 764 P.2d 250. 
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5.11(c) Defendant’s Child 
The defendant’s child, in appropriate circumstances, may consent to 
police entry of the parent’s home but not police search of the home. See, 
e.g., State v. Jones, 22 Wn. App. 447, 451−52, 591 P.2d 796 (1979) (rea-
soning that a minor child may consent to entry but declining to rule on 
the legal question of consent to search). For a general discussion of the 
scope and limitations of a child’s consent to a search of the parent’s 
house, see generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.4(c) 
(5th ed. 2012).  
5.11(d) Co-Tenant or Joint Occupant 
A co-tenant or joint occupant of the defendant’s dwelling with 
common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or 
effects sought to be inspected may give valid consent to a search of the 
premises or effects. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S. 
Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974); see State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 
543, 688 P.2d 859 (1984); see also State v. Jeffries, 105 Wn.2d 398, 414, 
717 P.2d 722 (1986) (common authority rule applicable to validate con-
sent to search a “hobo” camp located outside the city of Wenatchee). See 
generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.5(c) (5th ed. 
2012). But when the non-consenting cohabitant is actually present on the 
premise, Washington courts have held that a cohabitant cannot give con-
sent if the non-consenting cohabitant has equal or greater control over 
the premises. State v. Morse, 156 Wn.2d 1, 13, 123 P.3d 832 (2005) 
(“[T]hat consent remains valid against a cohabitant, who also possesses 
equal control, only while the cohabitant is absent.” (quoting State v. 
Leach, 113 Wn.2d 735, 744, 782 P.2d 1035 (1989))); State v. Floreck, 
111 Wn. App. 135, 142−43, 43 P.3d 1264 (2002); see also Mathe, 102 
Wn.2d at 541, 688 P.2d 859. Although a cohabitant cannot give valid 
consent to bedrooms or private areas when a non-consenting cohabitant 
is present, a cohabitant can give valid consent to police officers to enter 
the living room or an area that customarily receives visitors. State v. 
Hoggatt, 108 Wn. App. 257, 269, 30 P.3d 488 (2001); see Leach, 113 
Wn.2d at 744, 782 P.2d 1035. 
The courts have not extended the dual consent rule for cohabitants 
to the common authority shared by a driver and passenger in an automo-
bile. State v. Cantrell, 124 Wn.2d 183, 192, 875 P.2d 1208 (1994) (pas-
senger’s consent to search automobile was sufficient to support warrant-
less search even though the defendant driver did not consent to the 
search; the court noted that a situation where a co-occupant overtly ob-
jected to search was not before the court). 
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5.11(e) Landlord, Lessor, or Manager 
A landlord lacks authority to consent to a search when a tenant has 
the sole or undisputed possession of leased premises. State v. Birdsong, 
66 Wn. App. 534, 537−39, 832 P.2d 533 (1992). This rule also applies to 
limited rental arrangements such as those found in motels, boarding 
homes, and room rentals. State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 544, 688 P.2d 
859 (1984); see also George L. Blum, Annotation, Admissibility of Evi-
dence Discovered in Warrantless Search of Rental Property Authorized 
by Lessor of Such Property—State Cases, 61 A.L.R. 5th 1, 124 (1998). 
However, the lessor or manager of an apartment building may consent to 
a search of an area that is not within the lessee’s exclusive possession. 
State v. Talley, 14 Wn. App. 484, 487, 543 P.2d 348 (1975) (finding the 
common areas of a property were not under exclusive control of the les-
see-defendant). See generally State v. Kreck, 86 Wn.2d 112, 123, 542 
P.2d 782 (1975) (finding that the rental manager could consent to a 
search of an unrented half of a garage). Upon expiration of the tenancy, a 
tenant abandons his or her interest in the property and, likewise, an ex-
pectation of privacy. State v. Christian, 95 Wn.2d 655, 659, 628 P.2d 
806 (1981). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
8.5(a), at 279−80 (5th ed. 2012). 
Tenants, conversely, may consent to searches of common areas un-
der the “common authority” rule, even over the objection of the landlord. 
State v. Cranwell, 77 Wn. App. 90, 103−04, 890 P.2d 491 (1995). For 
additional discussion of consent by a lessee, see generally 4 LaFave, su-
pra § 8.5(b). 
5.11(f) Bailee 
A bailee may consent to a search of the bailor’s belongings when 
the bailee has a sufficient relationship to or degree of control over the 
chattel. See State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 127, 139−40, 559 P.2d 970 (1977) 
(when hospital had joint control over patient-defendant’s clothing, hospi-
tal ward clerk could consent to police seizure of the clothing); see also 
State v. Bobic, 140 Wn.2d 250, 259, 996 P.2d 610 (2000) (manager of 
storage units facility could give police permission to enter; officers sub-
sequently viewed contraband through existing hole in container). See 
generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.6(a), (5th ed. 
2012). For a discussion of consent by a bailor, see generally id. § 8.6(b). 
5.11(g) Employee and Employer 
An employer may consent to a search of the place of employment, 
even when the search would affect the belongings of an employee. Thus, 
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under the common authority rule analysis, see supra § 5.11, an employer 
may validly consent to a search of that portion of the employer’s premis-
es used by an employee for personal purposes. State v. Kendrick, 47 Wn. 
App. 620, 632−33, 736 P.2d 1079 (1987) (finding that the defendant 
shared the area but knew that his employer had greater authority and ac-
cess to the area, decreasing his expectation of privacy). Further, under 
some circumstances, an employee may give consent to a search of an 
employer’s premises. For a discussion of the rules governing consent 
within the employer–employee relationship, see 4 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 8.6(c)−(d) (5th ed. 2012).  
5.11(h) Hotel Employee 
A hotel or motel employee may not grant valid consent to a search 
of a guest’s room because a motel guest generally has the same expecta-
tion of privacy during his or her tenancy as the renter of a private resi-
dence. State v. Davis, 86 Wn. App. 414, 419, 937 P.2d 1110 (1997). 
However, the hotel guest’s expectation of privacy generally expires at 
checkout time. See id. at 419, 937 P.2d 1110 (finding that a motel guest 
loses expectation of privacy at the expiration of tenancy, unless late 
payment has been accepted by the motel or the motel has tolerated previ-
ous overtime stays). In Washington, courts require particularized suspi-
cion to search a hotel registry, even if the hotel employee consents to 
such a search. See State v. Jorden, 160 Wn.2d 121, 130, 156 P.3d 893 
(2007); see also In re Nichols, 171 Wn.2d 370, 376, 256 P.3d 1131 
(2010); see supra § 1.3. 
5.11(i) Host and Guest 
Generally, a host has the authority to consent to a search of a 
guest’s bedroom and any other room occupied by the guest. See State v. 
Rodriguez, 65 Wn. App. 409, 414−15, 828 P.2d 636 (1992); State v. 
Koepke, 47 Wn. App. 897, 903−04, 738 P.2d 295 (1987) (host–guest re-
lationship found between lessee and defendant temporarily using one of 
lessee’s rooms such that lessee’s consent to search the room was valid). 
However, when numerous guests are present and police do not inquire 
about ownership of property, a host’s consent to search may not be valid 
against guests’ personal property. See State v. Rison, 116 Wn. App. 955, 
962, 69, P.3d 362 (2003), review denied, 151 Wn.2d 1008, 87 P.3d 1184 
(2004). For additional discussion, 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Sei-
zure § 8.5(e) (5th ed. 2012). See also supra § 5.11 (common authority 
rule). 
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5.12 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES: INTRODUCTION 
The exigent circumstances exception justifies a warrantless search 
when law enforcement officers establish probable cause but have a press-
ing need for an immediate search or seizure that would be delayed by 
securing a warrant. See State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 405−06, 47 
P.3d 127 (2002); State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d 51, 101, 804 P.2d 577 
(1991). Washington courts use the following six factors as a guide in de-
termining whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry and 
search: 
(1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the sus-
pect is to be charged; 
(2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; 
(3) whether there is reasonably trustworthy information that the 
suspect is guilty; 
(4) whether there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is on 
the premises; 
(5) the likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly appre-
hended; and 
(6) whether the entry is made peaceably. 
Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d at 406, 47 P.3d 127 (citing State v. Terrovona, 105 
Wn.2d 632, 644, 716 P.2d 295 (1986)); see Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d at 101, 
804 P.2d 577 (same factors used in determining justification of warrant-
less home arrest). Not every factor must be present to find that exigent 
circumstances justified the officer’s entry, only those factors necessary to 
show that the officer needed to act quickly. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d at 408, 
47 P.3d 127; see, e.g., State v. Patterson, 112 Wn.2d 731, 736, 774 P.2d 
10 (1989) (no single factor is conclusive; weight varies with circum-
stances); State v. Flowers, 57 Wn. App. 636, 644, 789 P.2d 333 (1990) 
(the fact that some factors are not present is not controlling). 
The courts have identified five situations in which exigent circum-
stances support a departure from the warrant requirement: “(1) hot pur-
suit; (2) fleeing suspect; (3) danger to arresting officer or to the public; 
(4) mobility of the vehicle; and (5) mobility or destruction of the evi-
dence.” State v. Counts, 99 Wn.2d 54, 60, 659 P.2d 1087 (1983); State v. 
Pressley, 64 Wn. App. 591, 598, 825 P.2d 749 (1992) (police may seize 
evidence without a warrant if probable cause exists and the actions of the 
detainee give rise to a reasonable suspicion that evidence is in danger of 
loss or destruction); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.1(b), at 
566–73 (5th ed. 2012); see also State v. Carter, 151 Wn.2d 118, 128, 85 
1726 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1581 
P.3d 887 (2004) (no warrant needed to seize a gun placed in open view 
because of exigent circumstances); Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d at 644–45, 
716 P.2d 295. However, exigent circumstances are not created merely 
because a serious offense has been committed. See State v. Stevenson, 55 
Wn. App. 725, 732, 780 P.2d 873 (1989); see also Counts, 99 Wn.2d at 
59−61, 825 P.2d 749. 
When a crime is committed in an officer’s presence after the officer 
has been admitted into a residence, exigent circumstances need not exist 
in order for the officer to lawfully make a warrantless arrest in the resi-
dence. See State v. Dalton, 43 Wn. App. 279, 286−87, 716 P.2d 940 
(1986). In Dalton, an officer who obtained entry into a student’s college 
dormitory room under the pretense of buying drugs, but with the actual 
intent of making an arrest, could make an arrest under RCW 10.31.100, 
which permits an arrest without a warrant where the police officer has 
reasonable cause to believe a felony was or is being committed. Id. 
5.13 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING WARRANTLESS  
ENTRY INTO THE HOME 
An arrest on the street does not create an exigent circumstance justi-
fying a warrantless search of an arrestee’s house. See Vale v. Louisiana, 
399 U.S. 30, 35, 90 S. Ct. 1969, 26 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1970). Both the 
Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 draw a firm line at the en-
trance of the house, and “that threshold may not reasonably be crossed 
without a warrant.” State v. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89 
(1985) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 
63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980)). Police may, however, make a warrantless entry 
into a home under the following circumstances: (1) when they attempt to 
arrest the suspect in a public place and the suspect retreats into the home; 
and (2) when the police reasonably fear that delay will result in the sus-
pect’s escape, in injury to the officers or to the public, or in the destruc-
tion of evidence. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99, 87 S. Ct. 
1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967); United States v. Weaklem, 517 F.2d 70, 
72 (9th Cir. 1975) (injury); United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 
F.2d 4, 8−9 (9th Cir. 1973) (escape; destruction of evidence). While po-
lice are on the premises, the scope of the intrusion is limited to its pur-
pose; if the purpose is to prevent escape or harm, for example, the search 
is limited to finding the suspect or weapons that could be used against 
the police. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 299, 87 S. Ct. 1642. 
Washington courts hold that the location of the arrestee, not the lo-
cation of the arresting officer, is critical in determining whether an arrest 
takes place in a home. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d at 429, 693 P.2d 89. Ac-
cordingly, absent exigent circumstances such as hot pursuit, an officer 
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may not arrest a suspect without a warrant—and, subsequently, conduct a 
warrantless search incident to arrest—if the suspect is standing in the 
doorway to his or her home. Id.; see also supra § 3.7 (knock and an-
nounce rule). The unenclosed front porch of a home, however, is a public 
place for purposes of arrest once probable cause has been established. 
State v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d 688, 699, 861 P.2d 460 (1993). A police 
officer can arrest a suspect who voluntarily exits his or her home onto the 
unenclosed porch, even in the absence of exigent circumstances. See id. 
at 700, 861 P.2d 460; see also State v. Bockman, 37 Wn. App. 474, 481, 
682 P.2d 925 (1984). 
5.13(a) Hot Pursuit 
In determining whether a warrantless entry into a home is justified 
by the exigent circumstance of hot pursuit, courts have focused on the 
immediate need to continue a promising criminal investigation, in addi-
tion to the factors listed in Cardenas. State v. Patterson, 112 Wn.2d 731, 
736, 774 P.2d 10 (1989); see supra § 5.13; see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 
466 U.S. 740, 752–53, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1984) (no hot 
pursuit when police did not engage in immediate or continuous pursuit of 
defendant from the scene of the crime); State v. Counts, 99 Wn.2d 54, 
60, 659 P.2d 1087 (1983) (no hot pursuit when police stood outside de-
fendant’s home for one hour after defendant retreated therein). Other 
Washington cases involving hot pursuit include State v. Bessette, 105 
Wn. App. 793, 21 P.3d 318 (2001); State v. Griffith, 61 Wn. App. 35, 
808 P.2d 1171 (1991) (escape, destruction of evidence); State v. Hen-
dricks, 25 Wn. App. 775, 610 P.2d 940 (1980) (escape); and State v. Gal-
lo, 20 Wn. App. 717, 582 P.2d 558 (1978) (intent to kill). 
5.13(b) Imminent Arrest 
Even when a suspect has not been arrested, police officers may 
make a warrantless entry into a home when they reasonably believe that 
the suspect has been alerted to his or her imminent arrest and is likely to 
destroy evidence or escape. United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 
1356 (9th Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds by United States v. 
McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1984). The exception also applies 
when the police reasonably believe that the suspect is either armed or 
sought in connection with a violent crime. State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 
400, 412, 47 P.3d 127 (2002) (holding that officers were excused from 
complying with knock and announce statute where officers suspected 
defendants were dangerous, evidence was easily destructible, and offic-
ers observed defendants rushing toward back of the motel room fol-
lowing their knock); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–300, 87 S. 
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Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967). In addition, police officers may make 
a warrantless entry when they believe a suspect has alerted another ac-
complice of the arrest and the crime was one of violence. State v. Reid, 
38 Wn. App. 203, 209−10, 687 P.2d 861 (1984). Police may not, howev-
er, make a warrantless entry when the likelihood of escape is slight, the 
offense is minor, and the police do not believe that the suspect is armed. 
State v. Dresker, 39 Wn. App. 136, 139−40, 692 P.2d 846 (1984). 
Probable cause to believe a home contains contraband does not 
constitute an exigent circumstance justifying the absence of a warrant; 
police must have reason to believe the contraband will be destroyed be-
fore they are able to obtain a warrant. See State v. Carter, 127 Wn.2d 
836, 840, 904 P.3d 290 (1995) (exigent circumstances justified war-
rantless entry of motel room where there was a risk of drugs being de-
stroyed if persons in motel room were alerted to police presence by nois-
es and scuffle in hallway). A belief that contraband will be destroyed 
must be based upon sounds or activities observed at the scene or specific 
prior knowledge that a particular suspect has a propensity to destroy con-
traband; mere presence of easily disposable drugs does not by itself con-
stitute an exigency. State v. Jeter, 30 Wn. App. 360, 362, 634 P.2d 312 
(1981). 
Police may enter a home without a warrant in response to an emer-
gency (including the imminent destruction of evidence) so long as they 
do not themselves create the exigency through conduct that violates the 
Fourth Amendment. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1859−60, 179 L. 
Ed. 2d 865 (2011) (officers do not create an exigency by conducting a 
knock and talk instead of obtaining a warrant even when it is reasonably 
foreseeable that their investigative tactics would “lead a drug suspect to 
destroy evidence”); see State v. Drumhiller, 36 Wn. App. 592, 596–97, 
675 P.2d 631 (1984) (exigent circumstances existed when police ob-
served occupants in the process of inhaling what police reasonably be-
lieved to be cocaine); see also supra § 3.7 (knock and announce rule). 
5.13(c) Less Intrusive Alternatives 
Courts have held warrantless home entries illegal when police of-
ficers could have kept the residence under surveillance until they ob-
tained a warrant. State v. Bessette, 105 Wn. App. 793, 799−800, 21 P.3d 
318 (2001). For example, exigent circumstances do not justify entry into 
a home when there is no threat to the health, safety, and welfare of citi-
zens, or no risk of escape by a suspect once the suspect enters his or her 
home. State v. Werth, 18 Wn. App. 530, 536−37, 571 P.2d 941 (1977); 
State v. Peele, 10 Wn. App. 58, 63–64, 516 P.2d 788 (1973) (search war-
rant necessary when the suspect was not fleeing, but might be expected 
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to hide out on the premises until morning). See generally 3 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.5(c) (5th ed. 2012) (discussing the im-
poundment alternative). 
Similarly, police officers are sometimes required to keep the occu-
pants of a home under surveillance, instead of searching them, until they 
procure a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Grummel, 542 F.2d 789, 
791 (9th Cir. 1976); State v. Lewis, 19 Wn. App. 35, 40, 573 P.2d 1347 
(1978). Police may use methods that do not involve a search in order to 
secure premises in which they are legally present while awaiting the is-
suance of a search warrant. Non-search activity may include brief deten-
tion of a defendant while awaiting a warrant if there is sufficient proba-
ble cause and a risk that potential evidence would be destroyed. Illinois 
v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331−33, 121 S. Ct. 946, 148 L. Ed. 2d 838 
(2001); see also State v. Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d 632, 645−46, 716 P.2d 
295 (1986) (prior warrantless entry and arrest of defendant in his resi-
dence was justified by exigent circumstances; nothing observed by the 
police contributed to the issuance of the search warrant, nor was anything 
in “plain view” used as evidence). 
5.14 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING WARRANTLESS SEARCH  
AND SEIZURE OF THE PERSON 
Warrantless searches and seizures of persons may be justified by 
the exigent circumstances exception when police reasonably fear injury 
to themselves or the public, flight, or the destruction of evidence. With 
regard to the officer and public safety exception, a pat-down search is 
unconstitutional absent a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and 
currently dangerous. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92−93, 100 S. Ct. 
338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979); see, e.g., State v. Smith, 165 Wn.2d 511, 
199 P.3d 386 (2009) (finding exigencies to justify detaining suspect upon 
exiting home because of the grave and imminent safety risk posed by a 
tanker truck filled with a dangerous chemical parked next to a house in 
which a rifle had been seen). In addition, “even without probable cause 
or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, it is reasonable for an officer 
executing a search warrant at a residence to briefly detain occupants of 
that residence, to ensure officer safety and an orderly completion of the 
search.” State v. King, 89 Wn. App. 612, 618−19, 949 P.3d 856 (1998). 
Regarding the destruction-of-evidence exception, the brief seizure 
of a person outside his home is permissible when police have probable 
cause to believe that the home contains illegal drugs and a reasonable 
belief that the person could destroy evidence before police could obtain a 
search warrant. See State v. Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836, 840, 904 P.3d 290 
(1995); see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331−33, 121 S. Ct. 
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946, 148 L. Ed. 2d 838 (2001); Michael Gall, Note, Illinois v. McArthur: 
Forcing Consent and Creating a “Backdoor” to the Warrant Require-
ment for the Home, 35 U. Tol. L. Rev. 455 (2003). For a definition of 
what constitutes a seizure, see supra § 1.4. As explained in section 
5.12(b), the officers must have concrete facts to back up their belief that 
the evidence is in fact in danger. State v. Jeter, 30 Wn. App. 360, 362, 
634 P.2d 312 (1981). 
As the following sections discuss, exigent circumstances are used to 
justify the following three kinds of warrantless searches of persons: (1) 
fresh pursuit of a suspect fleeing from police; (2) searches that penetrate 
the body, such as blood tests and other invasive medical procedures; and 
(3) searches of persons located on the premises being searched. 
5.14(a) Hot Pursuit 
The court in City of Wenatchee v. Durham, 43 Wn. App. 547, 718 
P.2d 819 (1986), identified the five criteria to be used when analyzing 
hot pursuit: (1) a felony must have occurred in the area; (2) the suspect 
must be attempting to flee or know that he is being pursued; (3) the po-
lice must pursue the suspect without delay; (4) the pursuit must be con-
tinuous; and (5) there must be a relationship between the time the crime 
was committed, the beginning of the pursuit, and the apprehension of the 
suspect. Id. at 550−51, 718 P.2d 819. Although the statutory definition of 
hot pursuit, or “fresh pursuit,” relies in part on the common law, City of 
Tacoma v. Durham, 95 Wn. App. 876, 878−79, 978 P.2d 514 (1999), 
“courts are not limited by the common law definition, but may consider 
the Legislature’s overall intent to use practical considerations in deciding 
whether a particular arrest across jurisdictional lines was reasonable.” 
Vance v. Dep’t of Licensing, 116 Wn. App. 412, 416, 65 P.3d 668 
(2003), review denied, 150 Wn.2d 1004, 77 P.3d 651 (2003). 
Police officers in Washington may engage in fresh pursuit of any-
one “who is reasonably believed to have committed a violation of traffic 
or criminal laws.” RCW 10.93.070(6), 10.93.120. However, barring the 
presence of exceptional circumstances, a passenger may walk away from 
or stay at the traffic stop scene. State v. Rehn, 117 Wn. App. 142, 149, 69 
P.3d 379 (2003). 
5.14(b) Warrantless Searches Involving Intrusion into the Body 
A medical procedure performed without a warrant under exigent 
circumstances must be reasonable and performed in a reasonable manner. 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767−68, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. 
Ed. 2d 908 (1966); see 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.3(c), 
at 215−16 (5th ed. 2012). In addition, the state must show more than 
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probable cause because of the intrusive nature of the search. Schmerber, 
384 U.S. at 770−72, 86 S. Ct. 1826. The fact that evidence is likely to be 
destroyed will not automatically justify an intrusive medical procedure; 
the evidence must be essential to a conviction. See Winston v. Lee, 470 
U.S. 753, 765−66, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1985) (no need to 
retrieve bullet from defendant’s body where other substantial evidence 
was available to convict him). 
 Where a serious crime involving intoxication is at issue, the natural 
dissipation of alcohol in the blood of a suspect may be an exigent cir-
cumstance justifying the nonconsensual extraction of a blood sample to 
determine the suspect’s blood alcohol level. See State v. Curran, 116 
Wn.2d 174, 185, 804 P.2d 558 (1991); see also Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 
770−71, 86 S. Ct. 1826. But see Missouri v. McNeely, No. 11–1425, slip 
op. (U.S. Apr. 17, 2013) (dissipation of blood alcohol not sufficient per 
se to conduct a warrantless blood draw). Blood tests without a warrant 
have been upheld as reasonable searches under both the Fourth Amend-
ment and article I, section 7 as long as a trained medic performs the test 
in a reasonable manner. Curran, 116 Wn.2d at 185, 804 P.2d 558. 
In Washington, blood tests for alcohol intoxication are also justified 
by statutory implied consent under RCW 46.20.308(3). Curran, 116 
Wn.2d at 185, 804 P.2d 558 (no violation of article I, section 7 when a 
blood sample is taken pursuant to RCW 46.20.308(3)); see also State v. 
Baldwin, 109 Wn. App. 516, 518, 37 P.3d 1220 (2001). Notably, the law-
ful arrest of a motorist is a prerequisite for operation of the implied con-
sent statute; otherwise, express consent is required for the blood test of a 
motorist who is not under arrest. State v. Wetherell, 82 Wn.2d 865, 
870−71, 514 P.2d 1069 (1973). The exigent circumstance of dissipation 
of blood alcohol has also been used to justify a warrantless and noncon-
sensual entry into a residence to arrest a suspect and seize a blood sam-
ple. State v. Komoto, 40 Wn. App. 200, 211−13, 697 P.2d 1025 (1985) 
(officer used a passkey to enter an apartment and arrest suspect following 
felony hit and run). But, as stated above, the natural dissipation of blood 
alcohol does not provide an exigency per se in every case. See McNeely, 
No. 11–1425. 
In order to deter recidivism and identify persons who commit 
crimes, no warrant is required under the Fourth Amendment to collect a 
DNA sample from every adult or juvenile convicted of a felony, harass-
ment, stalking, or communication with a minor for immoral purposes, or 
adjudicated guilty of an equivalent juvenile offense. See RCW 
43.43.754(1); State v. Surge, 122 Wn. App. 448, 450, 94 P.3d 345 (2004) 
(holding that State v. Olivas, 122 Wn.2d 73, 856 P.2d 1076 (1993), is 
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controlling on this issue); see also King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 42 A.3d 
549 (2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594, 184 L. Ed. 2d 390 (2012) 
5.14(c) Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Persons Located on Prem-
ises Being Searched 
In limited instances, police may conduct a search of a person on the 
premises but not named in the warrant. State v. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d 289, 
301, 654 P.2d 96 (1982), abrogated on other grounds by Minnesota v. 
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993). To 
detain or search an individual other than the occupant, there must be 
“presence plus.” Id. In other words, the officers must have “reasonable 
cause” to believe that the person is concealing evidence sought and im-
mediate seizure is necessary to prevent its destruction. State v. Halver-
son, 21 Wn. App. 35, 38, 584 P.2d 408 (1978) (although a specific war-
rant to search premises cannot automatically be converted into a general 
one to search individuals, defendant’s suspicious conduct gave the police 
reasonable cause to search his person). “Reasonable cause” requires that 
the person engage in some type of suspicious activity. Broadnax, 98 
Wn.2d at 301, 654 P.2d 96. Officers may also conduct a limited search 
for weapons to protect themselves during the execution of the warrant. 
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 
(1979); State v. Allen, 93 Wn.2d 170, 172, 606 P.2d 1235 (1980). For a 
more complete discussion of when occupants may be searched during the 
execution of a search warrant for premises, see supra § 3.8(b). 
5.15 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF MOTOR VEHICLES: 
INTRODUCTION 
The court treats automobiles and other motor vehicles as a special 
category in search and seizure law for two reasons. First, the reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a vehicle is less than that in a home or an article 
on a person. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424, 124 S. Ct. 885, 
157 L. Ed. 2d 843 (2004) (“The Fourth Amendment does not treat a mo-
torist’s car as his castle.”). Second, the mobility of a vehicle may make 
obtaining a warrant prior to a search or seizure impractical. See id.; State 
v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 449, 453−54, 909 P.2d 293 (1996). Under 
both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, the fact that it is pos-
sible to sleep in a vehicle does not give rise to the same privacy rights 
that attach to fixed dwellings. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393, 
105 S. Ct. 2066, 2070, 85 L. Ed. 2d. 406, 414 (1985); Johnson, 128 
Wn.2d at 449, 909 P.2d 293 (lessened privacy interest for sleeper com-
partment of a tractor-trailer rig); State v. Cantrell, 124 Wn.2d 183, 190, 
875 P.2d 1208 (1994). The reasonable expectation of privacy in motor 
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vehicles is discussed in section 1.3(e). See also 3 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 7.2(b), at 731−49 (5th ed. 2012). 
A vehicle may be the subject of a warrantless search when the cir-
cumstances of the search are consistent with other exceptions to the war-
rant requirement, such as the search incident to arrest or the Terry stop-
and-frisk exceptions. See 3 LaFave, supra § 7.1(b), at 673–96; see also 2 
LaFave, supra § 4.9(d) (discussing the Terry stop-and-frisk search). 
Courts have also held that police may enter a vehicle to aid a person in 
distress or to seek information about a person in distress, United States v. 
Haley, 581 F.2d 723, 725−26 (8th Cir. 1978), but no Washington case 
has directly addressed the issue. 
The search of a motor vehicle and its contents are treated differently 
under the Fourth Amendment than they are under article I, section 7. Ari-
zona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 
(2009) (holding police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occu-
pant’s arrest to obtain evidence of the crime of arrest), with State v. Val-
dez, 167 Wn.2d 761, 779, 224 P.3d 751 (2009) (holding that only preser-
vation of evidence and officer safety are valid reasons to search a vehicle 
incident to arrest). The next sections set forth the standards under article 
I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment. Then, the general principles 
governing automobile impoundment and inventory searches are ad-
dressed. 
5.16 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF A VEHICLE UNDER THE WASHINGTON 
STATE CONSTITUTION 
The warrantless search of a vehicle is much more restricted under 
article I, section 7 than it is under the Fourth Amendment. First, Wash-
ington does not allow warrantless searches of vehicles on probable cause 
grounds, the “automobile exception” applied in federal court. State v. 
Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 397, 219 P.3d 651 (2009). Second, exigent cir-
cumstances will be found only where obtaining a warrant is not practical 
because the delay inherent in securing a warrant would compromise of-
ficer safety, facilitate escape, or permit the destruction of evidence. State 
v. Tibbles, 169 Wn.2d 364, 373, 236 P.3d 885 (2010). Lastly, search of a 
vehicle incident to arrest is only proper if there are concerns for officer 
safety or destruction of the evidence. State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 
197, 275 P.3d 289 (2012); State v. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761, 779, 224 P.3d 
751 (2009); State v. Glenn, 140 Wn. App. 627, 636, 166 P.3d 1235 
(2007) (holding that a credible report that a gun has been displayed from 
a vehicle justifies a search of that vehicle under the officer safety excep-
tion). 
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Once the immediate danger of harm to police or destruction of evi-
dence is removed by arrest and police control of the vehicle, police must 
obtain a warrant or have another exception to search the vehicle. State v. 
Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 179, 233 P.3d 879 (2010) (holding that the 
search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant is unlawful 
absent a reasonable basis to believe that the arrestee poses a safety risk). 
In State v. Snapp, the court held that because the defendant was in custo-
dy and removed from the vehicle, there could be no concerns for officer 
safety; therefore, the officers exceeded the scope of the search incident to 
arrest when they searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle. 174 
Wn.2d at 197, 275 P.3d 289. 
Even if the officers may properly search the passenger compart-
ment, they may not open locked containers. State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 
144, 152, 720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Valdez, 
167 Wn.2d 761, 224 P.3d 751. This contrasts with the federal standard, 
which permits the warrantless search incident to arrest of both locked 
and unlocked containers. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
7.1(c), at 697−707 (5th ed. 2012). “The rationale for this departure from 
the federal standard is that use of a lock demonstrates the individual’s 
expectation of privacy and the presence of a lock minimizes the danger 
of an arrestee gaining access to the contents of the container.” State v. 
Johnson, 77 Wn. App. 441, 446, 892 P.2d 106 (1995), aff’d, 128 Wn.2d 
431, 909 P.2d 293 (1996) (discussing Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 720 P.2d 
436). Therefore, police in Washington must obtain a search warrant prior 
to searching any locked glove compartment or other locked container. 
Police officers may make a limited entry and investigation into a 
vehicle that they have probable cause to believe has been the subject of a 
burglary, tampering, or theft. State v. Lynch, 84 Wn. App. 467, 477−78, 
929 P.2d 460 (1996). Officers may search those areas they reasonably 
believe to have been affected and those areas reasonably believed to con-
tain some evidence of ownership. Id. at 477−78, 929 P.2d 460. Officers 
may also make a warrantless entry into a vehicle to look in places where 
registration papers might be kept if the driver has fled the vehicle and the 
officer reasonably believed the vehicle had been stolen. State v. Orcut, 
22 Wn. App. 730, 734−35, 591 P.2d 872 (1979). 
5.17 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF A VEHICLE UNDER THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
In contrast to article I, section 7, the Fourth Amendment includes 
the “automobile exception,” which allows officers to search a vehicle 
without a warrant so long as they have probable cause to believe that the 
vehicle contains contraband. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 483, 
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105 S. Ct. 881, 885, 83 L. Ed. 2d 890 (1985) (citing Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 162, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925)); 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 
572 (1982). A warrant is not required because “the vehicle can be quick-
ly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be 
sought.” Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153, 45 S. Ct. 280. Because the vehicle it-
self presents an exigency, the officers do not need a separate exigency to 
perform a warrantless search. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467, 
119 S. Ct. 2013, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999) (no need for a separate finding 
of exigency in addition to probable cause); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 
U.S. 42, 51−52, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970) (actual exigent 
circumstances not be necessary to justify warrantless probable cause 
search). 
A search may extend to a vehicle in its entirety, including any of 
the vehicle’s contents, both locked and unlocked. Ross, 456 U.S. at 821, 
825, 102 S. Ct. 2157; California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579, 111 S. 
Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 
U.S. 405, 407, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 842 (2005) (warrantless search 
of car trunk valid where narcotics-detection dog alerted on trunk when 
police lawfully pulled the car over for a traffic stop). Furthermore, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has held that, even prior to arrest, police officers 
with probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers’ belongings 
found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search. 
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 143 L. Ed. 
2d 408 (1999). The scope of the permissible search is limited to the size 
and shape of the items sought, and police may only search where it is 
reasonable to believe the items sought may be hidden. See id. at 307, 119 
S. Ct. 1297. 
A warrantless search of a vehicle may occur even after the police 
have taken the vehicle into custody and its contents are in no danger of 
removal or disturbance. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153−54, 45 S. Ct. 280; Flor-
ida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 382, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 80 L. Ed. 2d 381 
(1984). The rationale is that the initial justification for the warrantless 
search does not disappear after impoundment. Johns, 469 U.S. at 484, 
105 S. Ct. 881. The vehicle, however, must have been initially mobile at 
the time of impoundment for the Carroll rule to apply. Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460–62, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 
(1971) (holding that a warrant was required when defendant had been 
arrested in his home and had no access to a vehicle after arrest); see also 
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390–91, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L. Ed. 
2d. 406 (1985). As discussed in section 5.15, Washington State has re-
jected the “automobile exception.” 
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Under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, officers may 
also search a vehicle absent probable cause incident to the lawful arrest 
of an occupant. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 
L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009). However, the difference between the Fourth 
Amendment application and article I, section 7 is in the scope of the ex-
ception. Under the Fourth Amendment, officers may search the vehicle 
when there are concerns for officer safety, when there are concerns for 
destruction of the evidence, and when it is reasonable to believe that evi-
dence relevant to the crime of arrest will be found in the vehicle. Id. The 
first two instances apply when the arrestee is unsecured and within 
reaching distance of the passenger compartment. Id. Thus, these two in-
stances will rarely justify a search. The third prong, allowing officers to 
search when evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be found in the 
vehicle, is allowed only under the Fourth Amendment, not under article 
I, section 7. State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 197, 275 P.3d 289 (2012) 
(allowing search incident to arrest only under the “unrestrained” excep-
tions). 
5.18 WARRANTLESS VEHICLE SEARCHES BASED ON GENERALIZED 
SUSPICION: SPOT CHECKS OF MOTORISTS 
Under the Fourth Amendment, a reasonable vehicle roadblock, or 
spot check, may be another exception to the warrant requirement. See 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 
(1979); see also Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 
449−50, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990); United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555−56, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 
1116 (1976). To determine the reasonableness of spot checks or vehicle 
checkpoints, the court will weigh the government’s interest in the check-
points, the extent to which the program advances the government’s goals, 
and the amount of intrusion on the individual motorist. Illinois v. Lidster, 
540 U.S. 419, 427, 124 S. Ct. 885, 157 L. Ed. 2d 843 (2004). For police 
to institute general spot check procedures, the procedures must constitute 
“a sufficiently productive mechanism to justify the intrusion.” State v. 
Marchand, 104 Wn.2d 434, 437, 706 P.2d 225 (1985). In addition, the 
spot check procedures must be such that “the exercise of discretion by 
law enforcement officials [is] sufficiently constrained.” Id. at 438, 706 
P.2d 225. 
Article I, section 7 prohibits sobriety checkpoints that impose no 
statutory constraints on officers’ discretion to conduct intrusive searches 
involving extensive invasions of privacy, such as smelling suspect’s 
breath, visual inspections of automobile, and tests of physical dexterity. 
Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 459–60, 755 P.2d 775 (1988); see 
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also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48, 121 S. Ct. 447, 
148 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2000) (a highway drug checkpoint is unconstitutional 
where officers and drug-detecting canine would examine, through open 
view, a predetermined number of drivers). Lastly, roadblocks randomly 
enforced or implemented to detect ordinary criminal wrongdoing are un-
reasonable. City of Indianapolis, 531 U.S. at 41, 121 S. Ct. 447. In the 
absence of a valid spot check program, police officers may stop a motor 
vehicle to check for valid registration or possible automobile violations 
only when they have a reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. Prouse, 
440 U.S. at 663, 999 S. Ct. 1391 (randomly stopping drivers to check 
registration violated the Fourth Amendment). 
The Washington Supreme Court has held sobriety checkpoint pro-
grams unconstitutional under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth 
Amendment. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d at 458, 460, 755 P.2d 775. Relying on 
article I, section 7’s explicit recognition of the privacy rights of the 
state’s citizens and requirements that all searches be conducted under 
“authority of law,” the court rejected the City’s argument that the stops 
fell within an exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 457–58, 755 
P.2d 775. In one of the cases relied upon by the city, State v. Silvernail, 
25 Wn. App. 185, 605 P.2d 1279 (1980), the court permitted a warrant-
less search when there was information that a serious felony had recently 
been committed. Id. at 190, 605 P.2d 1279. The Mesiani court distin-
guished Silvernail, stating that notice that a felony had recently been 
committed “is far different from an inference from statistics that there are 
inebriated drivers in the area.” Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d at 458 n.1, 755 P.2d 
775. This differs from the Fourth Amendment, which permits sobriety 
checkpoints if all vehicles passing though are detained. Sitz, 496 U.S. 
444, 110 S. Ct. 2481. 
 
5.19 FORFEITURE OR LEVY 
Courts in Washington, while recognizing that “searches and sei-
zures of motor vehicles used in drug transactions are an everyday occur-
rence,” have held that warrantless inventory searches of vehicles for-
feited under drug laws are permitted under article I, section 7. State v. 
McFadden, 63 Wn. App. 441, 449, 820 P.2d 53 (1991), overruled on 
other grounds, State v. Adel, 136 Wn.2d 629, 965 P.2d 1072 (1998). In 
Lowery v. Nelson, the court held that, under the Fourth Amendment, po-
lice are not required to obtain a search warrant before exercising the au-
thority granted by the Uniform Controlled Substances Act to seize a ve-
hicle used to transport a controlled substance. 43 Wn. App. 747, 750, 719 
P.2d 594 (1986) (discussing RCW 69.50.505(1)(d)); see also Rozner v. 
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Bellevue, 116 Wn.2d 342, 350, 804 P.2d 24 (1991); State v. Gwinner, 59 
Wn. App. 119, 123, 796 P.2d 728 (1990) (upholding seizure under Fed-
eral Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 
U.S.C. § 881 (2000)). Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, 
section 7, police may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle seized 
pursuant to the forfeiture statute on the theory that the search is a valid 
inventory or evidentiary search. McFadden, 63 Wn. App. at 449, 820 
P.2d 53; see 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.5(c), at 892−98 
(5th ed. 2012). 
5.20 IMPOUNDMENT 
“Impoundment is a seizure because it involves the governmental 
taking of a vehicle into its exclusive custody.” State v. Coss, 87 Wn. 
App. 891, 898, 943 P.2d 1126 (1997). The facts of each case determine 
the reasonableness of each particular impoundment. Id. A vehicle may be 
impounded without a warrant in three circumstances: (1) when the vehi-
cle itself is evidence of a crime; (2) when the removal of the vehicle is 
necessary as part of “community caretaking”; and (3) when the driver 
has committed one of the traffic infractions that authorizes impound-
ment. State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 189, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980); see 
also State v. Lynch, 84 Wn. App. 467, 477−78, 929 P.2d 460 (1996). Of-
ficers do not need the defendant’s consent to conduct an inventory search 
of an impounded vehicle. State v. Tyler, 166 Wn. App. 202, 205, 269 
P.3d 379 (2012), review granted, 174 Wn.2d 1005, 278 P.3d 1112 
(2012). 
A vehicle lawfully parked at one’s home or even on a public street 
may not be impounded simply because its owner has been arrested. Mi-
randa v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 864−66 (9th Cir. 2005). Simi-
larly, impoundment is improper when the arrestee’s release is imminent, 
and the vehicle does not pose a safety hazard. See State v. Bales, 15 Wn. 
App. 834, 836, 552 P.2d 688 (1976). Also, when police conduct warrant-
less impoundments and subsequent inventory searches, see generally 3 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.5(e) (5th ed. 2012), the 
searches may not form a pretext for a search that the police otherwise 
could not have made. State v. White, 83 Wn. App. 770, 774−75, 924 P.2d 
55 (1996), rev’d on other grounds, 135 Wn.2d 761, 958 P.2d 982 (1998). 
5.20(a) Evidence of Crime 
“A car may be lawfully impounded as evidence of a crime if an of-
ficer has probable cause to believe that it was stolen or used in the com-
mission of a felony.” State v. Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d 632, 647, 716 P.2d 
295 (1986). In Terrovona, the Washington Supreme Court held that po-
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lice properly impounded a vehicle that they had probable cause to be-
lieve was used in the commission of a felony, where the defendant had 
lured the victim to the murder site by telephoning him and asking him to 
bring gasoline to the defendant’s empty vehicle. Id. at 647−48, 716 P.2d 
295. Furthermore, an officer who has probable cause to believe a vehicle 
contains contraband or evidence of a crime may seize and hold the car 
for the reasonable time needed to obtain a search warrant, and the car 
may be towed to an impound yard during seizure. State v. Huff, 64 Wn. 
App. 641, 653, 826 P.2d 698 (1992). 
5.20(b) Community Caretaking Function 
The “community caretaking function” permits impoundment when 
an abandoned vehicle impedes traffic, poses a threat to public safety and 
convenience, or is itself threatened by vandalism or theft of its contents. 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368−69, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. 
Ed. 2d 1000 (1976); State v. Sweet, 44 Wn. App. 226, 236, 721 P.2d 560 
(1986). For example, in State v. Sweet, the court held that impoundment 
was proper under the community caretaking exception when the arrestee 
was unconscious, items of value were visible inside the vehicle, and the 
vehicle was in a high-crime area. 44 Wn. App. at 236−37, 721 P.2d 560. 
Under the community caretaking exception, police do not need to 
have a reasonable belief that the vehicle is connected with criminal activ-
ity. See State v. Chisholm, 39 Wn. App. 864, 866−67, 696 P.2d 41 
(1985). However, police should first make an inquiry as to the availabil-
ity of the owner or the owner’s spouse or friends to move the vehicle. 
See State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 743, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984); State 
v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 153, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980). Police should also 
consider the alternative of parking and locking the car. Williams, 102 
Wn.2d at 743, 689 P.2d 1065. 
5.20(c) Enforcement of Traffic Regulations 
Officers may impound a vehicle as part of enforcing traffic regula-
tions only when constitutionally reasonable and necessary to prevent a 
continuing violation of a traffic offense for which the legislature has spe-
cifically authorized impoundment. See State v. Hill, 68 Wn. App. 300, 
305, 842 P.2d 996 (1993). Impoundment is unreasonable and improper if 
a reasonable alternative to impoundment exists, such as when the owner 
of the vehicle, or a passenger in the vehicle, is available to transport it. 
Id. at 306, 842 P.2d 996. Police officers are to use discretion when decid-
ing to impound a vehicle and, while an officer need not exhaust all pos-
sibilities, the officer must at least consider alternatives to impoundment. 
State v. Coss, 87 Wn. App. 891, 899, 943 P.2d 1126 (1997) (impound-
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ment improper where officer failed to consider alternatives to impound-
ment; a validly licensed passenger could have driven vehicle from scene 
of traffic stop); see also State v. Reynoso, 41 Wn. App. 113, 119, 702 
P.2d 1222 (1985). 
5.20(d) Warrantless Detention 
Officers may make a warrantless detention of a vehicle by deflating 
its tires during the time when officers are in pursuit of a suspect. State v. 
Burgess, 43 Wn. App. 253, 259, 716 P.2d 948 (1986). In Burgess, the 
court held that, because the detention was unaccompanied by an ex-
ploratory search, the detention was reasonably restricted in time and 
place and was necessary to prevent the suspect’s flight from the scene. 
Id. 
5.21 INVENTORY SEARCHES OF IMPOUNDED VEHICLES 
When a vehicle is lawfully impounded, police are permitted to con-
duct a warrantless inventory search. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 
371, 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987) (inventory searches are a 
well-defined exception to the warrant requirement); State v. Morales, 
154 Wn. App. 26, 48, 225 P.3d 311 (2010), rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 173 Wn.2d 560, 269 P.3d 263 (2012); State v. White, 135 
Wn.2d 761, 766−67, 958 P.2d 982 (1998) (limiting scope of inventory 
search to those areas necessary to fulfill its purpose). Routine inventory 
searches are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when police fol-
low standard practices and the search is not a pretext for obtaining evi-
dence the police would not be able to obtain otherwise. South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976); 
State v. White, 83 Wn. App. 770, 775, 958 P.2d 982 (1996), rev’d on 
other grounds, 135 Wn.2d 761, 958 P.2d 982 (1998). The officer does 
not need to obtain the defendant’s consent before performing an invento-
ry search. State v. Tyler, 166 Wn. App. 202, 205, 269 P.3d 379 (2012), 
review granted, 174 Wn.2d 1005, 278 P.3d 1112 (2012). 
Washington courts have long held that a non-investigatory invento-
ry search of an automobile is proper when conducted in good faith for 
the purposes of (1) finding, listing, and securing property from loss dur-
ing detention that belongs to a detained person and (2) protecting police 
and temporary storage bailees from liability due to dishonest claims of 
theft. State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 154, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980); White, 
83 Wn. App. at 777, 958 P.2d 982. An inventory search does not violate 
the owner’s Fourth Amendment rights when the search follows written, 
standardized inventory procedures. State v. Mireles, 73 Wn. App. 605, 
612−13, 871 P.2d 162 (1994). 
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The scope of an inventory search is “limited to those areas neces-
sary to fulfill its purpose”—that is, “limited to protecting against sub-
stantial risks to property.” Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 155, 622 P.2d 1218. For 
example, police in Washington may not open and examine a locked trunk 
“absent a manifest necessity for conducting such a search.” Id. at 156, 
622 P.2d 1218 (no great danger of theft to property left in trunk); White, 
135 Wn.2d at 765−67, 958 P.2d 982 (police may not search a locked 
trunk, despite the fact that the trunk could be opened by a switch located 
inside the passenger compartment). Police also may not open luggage lo-
cated in an impounded vehicle absent consent or exigent circumstances. 
Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 158, 622 P.2d 1218. 
In State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984), the 
court suggested that police must obtain the owner’s consent before con-
ducting an inventory search of an impounded vehicle pursuant to the 
community caretaking exception. 102 Wn.2d 733, 743, 689 P.2d 1065 
(1984). However, an inventory search of a vehicle impounded pursuant 
to the community caretaking exception without the owner’s consent was 
held to be valid in State v. Sweet, 44 Wn. App. 226, 721 P.2d 560 (1986). 
In Sweet, the owner was unconscious and unable to either give or with-
hold his consent; there was also no evidence suggesting that the search 
was conducted in bad faith or that it was a mere pretext for an investiga-
tory search. Id. at 237, 721 P.2d 560. The court is revisiting the issue in 
Tyler, 166 Wn. App. at 205, 269 P.3d 379, review granted, 174 Wn.2d 
1005, 278 P.3d 1112. 
5.22 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES IN SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS 
The court has permitted warrantless searches in special environ-
ments when the danger to the public is severe and the degree of intrusion 
small. For example, the court permitted warrantless magnetometer (metal 
detector) searches at airports to prevent hijackings and bombings. United 
States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2007). Conversely, the 
Washington Supreme Court has rejected as unconstitutional the warrant-
less pat down of patrons at rock concerts. Jacobsen v. Seattle, 98 Wn.2d 
668, 673−74, 658 P.2d 653 (1983). The court reasoned that there is a 
greater risk of danger at airports and courthouses than at rock concerts, 
and pat-down searches constitute a higher degree of intrusion than mag-
netometer and typical courthouse searches. Id. For a discussion of war-
rantless searches in other special environments, see infra § 6. 
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5.23 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF OBJECTS IN THE  
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MAILS 
Law enforcement officers may seize first-class mail and packages 
transported by private carriers when they have probable cause to believe 
that the mail or packages contain contraband. See United States v. Van 
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251−52, 90 S. Ct. 1029, 25 L. Ed. 2d 282 
(1970); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 121−22, 104 S. 
Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984). The contents of such mail or packages 
may not be examined without a warrant, however, unless the reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents no longer exists, or the examina-
tion consists of a test that will only disclose the presence of the contra-
band. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 121−22, 104 S. Ct. 1652; see also State v. 
Wolohan, 23 Wn. App. 813, 820, 598 P.2d 421 (1979). A canine sniff 
may be used to establish probable cause that a package lawfully held by 
police contains contraband. State v. Jackson, 82 Wn. App. 594, 606, 918 
P.2d 945 (1996). 
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CHAPTER 6 
 Special Environments 
This chapter first discusses the differences in reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy, burdens of proof, and warrant requirements in three 
special environments: (1) public schools, (2) detention and correctional 
facilities, and (3) international borders. Next, it discusses special consid-
erations in administrative searches. 
6.1 SCHOOLS 
A student’s legitimate expectation of privacy must be balanced 
against the school’s legitimate need to provide an environment condu-
cive to learning. Consequently, schools are considered a special environ-
ment in which the usual burdens of proof and warrant requirements are 
slightly relaxed. Section 6.1(a) discusses how this balance permits a 
school official to search a student without a warrant or even probable 
cause so long as a reasonable suspicion exists. Section 6.1(b) discusses 
this standard in the context of drug-testing programs for athletes. 
6.1(a) Burden of Proof and Warrant Requirements 
Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, school 
authorities may conduct a warrantless search of a student without proba-
ble cause if, under all of the circumstances, the school official has a rea-
sonable suspicion of criminal activity. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 341, 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985); State v. Meneese, 174 
Wn.2d 937, 943, 282 P.3d 83 (2012). School officials may search a stu-
dent with less than probable cause because their “primary duty [is] to 
maintain order and discipline at school, not discover and prevent crime 
like a police officer.” Meneese, 174 Wn.2d at 943, 282 P.3d 83. Howev-
er, if the search is conducted by a police officer and not a school official, 
the school exception does not apply and the officer must have a warrant. 
Id. (finding search of student’s backpack by officer on school grounds 
unconstitutional without warrant or other exception). Of course, the 
school official still must have particularized suspicion with respect to 
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each individual searched. Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 103 
Wn.2d 594, 599, 694 P.2d 1078 (1985) (individualized suspicion re-
quired for search of school band members’ luggage). See generally 5 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.11(b), at 491−513 (5th ed. 
2012). 
A search is reasonable if (1) it is justified at its inception and (2) it 
is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the inter-
ference in the first place. State v. B.A.S., 103 Wn. App. 549, 553, 13 P.3d 
244 (2000) (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S. Ct. 733). Additionally, 
there must be a nexus between the item sought and the infraction being 
investigated. Id. at 554, 105 S. Ct. 733 (holding that no connection exist-
ed between school’s closed campus policy that provided for searches of 
students found violating the policy and the likelihood that a student was 
bringing contraband onto school property). A search is unconstitutional if 
it exceeds the scope of initial reasonable suspicion. Safford Unified Sch. 
Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 174 L. Ed. 2d 
354 (2009) (holding that a strip search of a 13-year-old student suspected 
of possessing illegal drugs was excessively intrusive).   
Although Washington allows for school searches on less than prob-
able cause, the Washington State Supreme Court has not adopted a “spe-
cial needs” exception as appears under the Fourth Amendment. Compare 
York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 312, 178 P.3d 
995 (2008) (no general special needs exception under article I, section 7), 
with Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 97 L. Ed. 
2d 709 (1987), and Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 
109 S. Ct. 1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989) (drug testing under special 
needs exception). Thus, the court has “not created a general special needs 
exception or adopted a strict scrutiny type analysis that would allow the 
State to depart from the warrant requirement whenever it could articulate 
a special need beyond the normal need for law enforcement.” York, 163 
Wn.2d at 314, 178 P.3d 995. Thus, a school cannot conduct a general, 
suspicionless search. Id. 
6.1(b) Drug Testing of Student Athletes 
The Washington Supreme Court has held that random and 
suspicionless drug testing of student athletes is not permissible under 
article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. York v. Wahkia-
kum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 310, 178 P.3d 995 (2008). Con-
versely, the Fourth Amendment allows random drug testing without in-
dividualized suspicion. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 
664−65, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1995); see also Bd. of Educ. 
of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 
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153 L. Ed. 2d 735 (2002) (holding mandatory drug testing as a condition 
of participating in extracurricular sports is constitutional).   
Specifically, the Washington State Supreme Court held that a stu-
dent athlete’s fundamental privacy interest in controlling his or her bodi-
ly functions required school officials to meet a “reasonableness” or “in-
dividualized” suspicion standard. York, 163 Wn.2d at 308, 178 P.3d 995 
(citing State v. McKinnon, 88 Wn.2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977) (holding 
school officials must have some “reasonable” or “individualized” suspi-
cion to protect students from unreasonable searches)). In State v. McKin-
non, the court set forth several factors for determining the reasonableness 
of a search: “the child’s age, history, and school record, the prevalence 
and seriousness of the problem in the school to which the search was di-
rected, the exigency to make the search without delay, and the probative 
value and reliability of the information used as a justification for the 
search.” 88 Wn.2d at 81, 558 P.2d 781 (citations omitted). Because 
Washington has not adopted any general special needs exception, a 
search without reasonable and individualized suspicion is unconstitution-
al. York, 163 Wn.2d at 308, 178 P.3d 995. 
6.2 PRISONS, CUSTODIAL DETENTION, AND POST-CONVICTION  
ALTERNATIVES TO PRISON 
Incarceration affects all aspects of an individual’s search and sei-
zure protections: the reasonable expectation of privacy, the levels of 
proof required for intrusions, and warrant requirements. This section 
provides a sampling of some of the ways incarceration or even con-
viction alone alters search and seizure protections. 
6.2(a) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Prisoners are not accorded the same expectations of privacy in their 
cells and effects that citizens generally enjoy in their homes and effects. 
Matter of Personal Restraint of Benn, 134 Wn.2d 868, 909, 952 P.2d 116 
(1998) (holding convicted “prisoners have no legitimate expectation of 
privacy and . . . the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable 
searches does not apply [to] prison cells” (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 
468 U.S. 517, 530, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984))). Pretrial 
detainees, like prisoners, may be subjected to unannounced searches of 
their living areas. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 589−91, 104 S. Ct. 
3227, 82 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 555−57, 99 
S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979). Additionally, jailed suspects have 
no expectation of privacy in property located in the property room at the 
prison. State v. Cheatam, 112 Wn. App. 778, 785−87, 51 P.3d 138 
(2002), aff’d, 150 Wn.2d 626, 81 P.3d 830 (2003). This holds true when 
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the defendant is transferred to a hospital along with his personal effects. 
State v. Puapuaga, 164 Wn.2d 515, 523−24, 192 P.3d 360 (2008) (no 
privacy interest in personal effects when transferred to mental institu-
tion). 
A convicted sex offender has only a minimal expectation of privacy 
in personal body fluids; thus, the State may remove blood for testing 
without the defendant’s consent. In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121 
Wn.2d 80, 92−93, 96, 847 P.2d 455 (1993) (upholding constitutionality 
of RCW 70.24.340, which mandates HIV testing for adults and juveniles 
who have been convicted of a sexual offense under RCW 9A.44). Addi-
tionally, under RCW 43.43.754, the state may obtain blood samples and 
perform DNA tests without the defendant’s consent following convic-
tion. State v. Olivas, 122 Wn.2d 73, 98, 856 P.2d 1076 (1993) (upholding 
the statute’s constitutionality upheld under Fourth Amendment). 
After a defendant has been convicted of an offense and released, his 
or her privacy interests remain diminished. For example, the warrantless 
search of the home of a convict released pending appeal does not violate 
constitutional protections. State v. Lucas, 56 Wn. App. 236, 240−41, 783 
P.2d 121 (1989) (“[O]ne released pending appeal . . . should expect close 
scrutiny.”). And, as discussed below, police may search a parolee’s vehi-
cle based on a “well-founded” suspicion of criminal activity. State v. 
Coahran, 27 Wn. App. 664, 666, 620 P.2d 116 (1980). 
6.2(b) Warrantless Searches and Seizures 
Warrants are not required for searches of prisoners or pretrial de-
tainees. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 591, 104 S. Ct. 3227, 82 
L. Ed. 2d 438 (1984); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526, 104 S. Ct. 
3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984). Probable cause and individualized suspi-
cion are also not required for such searches. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 
520, 555−60, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979) (pretrial detain-
ees); State v. Baker, 28 Wn. App. 423, 424−25, 623 P.2d 1172 (1981) 
(prisoners). Permitting routine and warrantless searches of inmates’ cells 
is reasonable because security interests of the correctional institution 
outweigh the minimal intrusion into inmates’ privacy. State v. Rainford, 
86 Wn. App. 431, 438, 936 P.2d 1210 (1997) (“Washington courts have 
held that an inmate’s expectation of privacy is necessarily lowered while 
in custody and that warrantless searches may be conducted if reasona-
ble.”).  
Warrants are also not required for searches of parolees, probation-
ers, work release inmates, and convicts released pending appeal, or for 
any of these groups’ homes and effects. See generally United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S. Ct. 587, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2001) (dis-
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cussing whether a parole condition permitting the search of the “person, 
property, place of residence, vehicle, [and] personal effects . . . with or 
without a search warrant” satisfies the Fourth Amendment); see also 
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 857, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 165 L. Ed. 2d 
250 (2006) (neither probable cause nor warrant required for search of 
parolee stopped by police officer in public); State v. Campbell, 103 
Wn.2d 1, 22–23, 691 P.2d 929 (1984); State v. Lucas, 56 Wn. App. 236, 
243−44, 783 P.2d 121 (1989). Furthermore, persons residing with pris-
oners who are released to a home-detention program are required to sign 
consent forms that allow for warrantless searches and seizures of the 
property where the person and the prisoner reside. State v. Cole, 122 Wn. 
App. 319, 323, 93 P.3d 209 (2004). 
6.2(c) Strip and Body Cavity Searches of Arrestees and Detainees 
In Washington, routine strip searches are governed by statute and 
administrative regulation. See RCW 10.79.060−170; WAC §§ 289-02-
020, -100, -200. A defendant’s state protections from a strip search under 
article I, section 7 are coextensive with the defendant’s Fourth Amend-
ment rights. State v. Audley, 77 Wn. App. 897, 904, 908, 894 P.2d 1359 
(1995) (holding that RCW 10.79.130(1)(a) is constitutional under article 
I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment and that such searches are per-
missible where they are supported by reasonable suspicion that an ar-
restee is concealing contraband that poses a threat to jail security). Only 
a reasonable suspicion is required to conduct a “dry cell search” of a 
prisoner. State v. Rainford, 86 Wn. App. 431, 433, 435 n.1, 936 P.2d 
1210 (1997) (“dry cell search” typically involves placing prisoner in pri-
vate room under 24-hour observation until prisoner has undergone three 
bowel movements and then examining the feces for signs of drug use). 
For strip and body cavity searches conducted prior to a detainee’s 
first court appearance, probable cause and a warrant are required unless 
(1) the detainee is charged with a violent offense; (2) the detainee is 
charged with an offense involving escape, burglary, use of a deadly 
weapon, or contraband; or (3) police have a reasonable suspicion that the 
detainee is concealing on his or her person contraband, weapons, or fruits 
or instrumentalities of crime. WAC §§ 289-16-100 to -200; cf. State v. 
Brown, 33 Wn. App. 843, 848, 658 P.2d 44 (1983) (reasonable suspicion 
for strip search of prisoner found after prisoner had personal contact with 
visitor); State v. Hartzog, 96 Wn.2d 383, 396−97, 635 P.2d 694 (1981) 
(visual and body cavity searches of prisoners leaving penal institution for 
court appearance are permissible). A pending U.S. Supreme Court case 
may shed further light on this issue. See King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 42 
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A.3d 549 (2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594, 184 L. Ed. 2d 390 (U.S. 
Nov. 9, 2012). 
6.3 INTERNATIONAL BORDERS 
Searches and seizures of travelers at or near the international bor-
ders fall within the scope of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 
7, but courts generally do not require such intrusions to meet the strict 
levels of proof and warrant requirements of ordinary searches and sei-
zures. This section briefly describes some of the situations in which tra-
ditional proof and warrant requirements have been relaxed. 
6.3(a) Permanent Border Checkpoints 
Customs officials may search persons and vehicles crossing the 
border at permanent checkpoints into the United States under 19 U.S.C. § 
1467. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154, 124 S. 
Ct. 1582, 158 L. Ed. 2d 311 (2004) (“[A]utomobiles seeking entry into 
this country may be searched.”); see also United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (“[S]tops 
for brief questioning routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by 
warrant.”); York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 345, 
178 P.3d 995 (2008) (recognizing border exception). Although border 
agents do not need a warrant to conduct a search at a border crossing, the 
statute does not obviate the requirement that a particular search or sei-
zure be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 37 
L. Ed. 2d 596 (1973) (holding that although a statute authorizes customs 
searches without probable cause or mere suspicion, no act of Congress 
can authorize a violation of the Constitution). Race or color is not a suf-
ficient basis for making an investigatory stop by border patrol agents. See 
State v. Almanza-Guzman, 94 Wn. App. 563, 567, 972 P.2d 468 (1999). 
The scope of a Terry stop at the border may be relatively intrusive 
when smuggling of narcotics is suspected. See United States v. Montoya 
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381 
(1985) (individual fitting courier profile of alimentary canal smuggler 
may be detained for 16 hours pending bowel movement). But if the 
search is intrusive—for example, as intrusive as a body cavity search—
the Ninth Circuit requires a showing of “a real suspicion, directed specif-
ically to that person,” supported by specific and articulable facts before 
the officials may search the suspect. United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 
421 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1970); Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 
805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967). If agents have only reasonable suspicion, they 
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may not hold the suspect for an unreasonable amount of time. Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502−03, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983) 
(officers who had only reasonable suspicion that airport traveler was 
smuggling narcotics could not detain traveler in a special room and seize 
his tickets and luggage); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709−10, 
103 S. Ct. 2637, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1983) (90-minute detention of lug-
gage at international airport unreasonable when law enforcement officers 
had only reasonable suspicion of smuggling). 
6.3(b) Roving Patrols: Illegal Aliens and Searches Away from the Border 
To stop a vehicle, officers conducting roving patrols near borders 
must have a reasonable suspicion, based on “specific articulable facts,” 
that the vehicle contains illegal aliens. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975). Washington 
has declined to follow the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on this mat-
ter, allowing a search away from a border only with probable cause. See 
York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 312, n. 19, 178 
P.3d 995 (2008) (discussing State v. Quick, 59 Wn. App. 228, 232, 796 
P.2d 764 (1990), and its deviation from the Brignoni–Ponce federal 
standard). 
6.4 ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES 
The Fourth Amendment governs searches conducted for adminis-
trative purposes, regardless of whether criminal prosecution is anticipat-
ed. See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 291−93, 104 S. Ct. 641, 
78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984) (determining that Fourth Amendment applies to 
inspection of home that was partially damaged by fire, even when pur-
pose of inspection is to determine fire’s origin and no criminal conduct is 
suspected); Bosteder v. City of Renton, 155 Wn.2d 18, 35, 117 P.3d 316 
(2005) (superseded by statute on other grounds); Dodge City Saloon, Inc. 
v. Washington State Liquor Control Bd., 168 Wn. App. 388, 288 P.3d 
343 (2012), review denied, 290 P.3d 994 (2012).  
The following sections examine the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy the subject of a warrantless search has, the warrant requirements in 
administrative searches, and the various level of proof requirements. 
6.4(a) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
An individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not affected by 
the fact that a search is part of an administrative or regulatory program or 
has a purpose other than criminal prosecution. See Camara v. Mun. 
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532−33, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967) 
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(search of home for housing code violations); See v. City of Seattle, 387 
U.S. 541, 545−46, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1967) (search of 
commercial premises for fire code violations). As with other searches, 
however, if there is no expectation of privacy in the area searched, the 
search does not fall under Fourth Amendment protections. Centimark 
Corp. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 129 Wn. App. 368, 375, 119 P.3d 865 
(2005) (no expectation of privacy in roofing job site when inspector 
could readily see that the workers were not wearing fall protection). An 
administrative search would also not fall under constitutional protections 
if those conducting the search are not state actors. See City of Pasco v. 
Shaw, 161 Wn.2d 450, 166 P.3d 1157 (2007) (finding that neither the 
Fourth Amendment nor article I, section 7 is violated when a landlord 
and a privately engaged inspector inspect a rental property for code vio-
lations that impact health and safety). 
Although a few pervasively regulated industries are not permitted 
reasonable expectations of privacy, the Fourth Amendment protects 
against civil and criminal searches as well as commercial and residential 
premises. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313, 98 S. Ct. 
1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978) (except for particular industries, such as 
those involving liquor and firearms where no reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists, the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable ad-
ministrative searches of commercial premises); see also Michigan v. 
Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 291, 104 S. Ct. 641, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984). If 
the industry is granted only a limited expectation of privacy, that interest 
must be balanced against the need for a particular administrative search. 
See Murphy v. State, 115 Wn. App. 297, 313, 62 P.3d 533 (2003) (hold-
ing a patient has a limited expectation of privacy in prescription records 
that is outweighed by the government’s statutorily mandated interest in 
monitoring the flow of drugs from pharmacies to patients). However, 
there is no general “heavily regulated industry” exception in Washington. 
See State v. Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236, 248–51, 156 P.3d 864 (2007); see 
also Bosteder v. City of Renton, 155 Wn.2d 18, 29, 117 P.3d 316 (2006). 
Finally, certain government employees have a reduced expectation 
of privacy given the special needs and legitimate workplace purpose. See 
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 177 L. Ed. 2d 216 (2010) 
(holding that a police officer’s Fourth Amendment rights were not vio-
lated when a supervisor read his personal text messages on a department-
issued pager). 
6.4(b) Warrant Requirements 
Warrants generally are required for administrative searches of both 
private and commercial premises. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 
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523, 532−33, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967). When the tradi-
tional exceptions to the warrant requirement apply, however, a warrant is 
unnecessary. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294−95, 104 S. Ct. 
641, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984) (warrant not required for entry onto prem-
ises when consent given or exigent circumstances present because “evi-
dence of criminal activity . . . discovered during the course of a valid 
administrative search . . . may be seized under the ‘plain view’ doctrine” 
(citation omitted)). 
Warrants are not required in certain limited situations when the 
searches are made pursuant to comprehensive and predictable legislative 
schemes. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598−99, 101 S. Ct. 2534, 
69 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1981). Such situations are characterized by a substan-
tial federal interest in inspection, as in the case of hazardous industries, 
and by the necessity of a warrantless inspection to enforce the legislative 
purpose. See id. at 598−99, 101 S. Ct. 2534 (congressional scheme au-
thorizing warrantless inspections of mines found constitutional); see also 
Murphy v. State, 115 Wn. App. 297, 307−08, 62 P.3d 533 (2003) (state 
statute requiring pharmacies to keep records of dispensed prescriptions 
and to make them available for inspection by state pharmacy board or 
other law enforcement officer does not violate search and seizure provi-
sions of either state or federal constitutions). In addition, the scheme 
must prove to be an adequate substitute for a warrant by imposing cer-
tainty and regularity in the inspections and by accommodating special 
privacy concerns. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S. Ct. 2534. 
In Washington, there is no general administrative search warrant 
exception for “heavily regulated industries”; instead, any administrative 
exception must be expressly stated in an applicable statute or regulation. 
See State v. Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236, 248–51, 156 P.3d 864 (2007); see 
also Bosteder v. City of Renton, 155 Wn.2d 18, 29, 117 P.3d 316 (2006) 
(holding that administrative warrants are not constitutional under the 
Fourth Amendment except when made pursuant to an authorizing statute 
or rule). 
Warrants are also not always required for license, registration, and 
equipment spot checks of vehicles. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 
496 U.S. 444, 455, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (holding 
that a highway sobriety checkpoint program, under which all motorists 
passing through the checkpoint were stopped and examined for signs of 
intoxication, did not violate the Fourth Amendment). Some random spot 
checks, however, require warrants if the officer has discretion over which 
vehicles to stop. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 
59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979) (warrant required for random spot check of ve-
hicles). Importantly, Washington has held sobriety checkpoints to be un-
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constitutional. City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 456, 755 P.2d 
775 (1988). Additionally, Washington courts found a statute unconstitu-
tional because it allowed state patrol officers to stop any motor vehicle 
and require the driver to display his or her driver’s license and submit the 
vehicle to an inspection to ascertain whether the vehicle complied with 
minimum requirements. State v. Marchand, 104 Wn.2d 434, 441, 706 
P.2d 225 (1985). 
6.4(c) Level of Proof Requirements 
To obtain an administrative warrant to search commercial or resi-
dential premises, law enforcement officers must either offer specific 
proof of a violation, or show that “reasonable legislative or administra-
tive standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with respect 
to a particular [establishment].” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 
307, 320−21, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978) (brackets in origi-
nal) (citation omitted) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 
538, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967)). When an administrative 
warrant, however, is sought to determine the recent cause of a fire, “fire 
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has occurred 
on the premises, that the scope of the proposed search is reasonable and 
will not intrude unnecessarily on the fire victim’s privacy, and that the 
search will be executed at a reasonable and convenient time.” Michigan 
v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294, 104 S. Ct. 641, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984). 
When officers seek a warrant based on a general administrative 
program, they must set forth sufficient details of the program to enable 
the magistrate to determine whether the program is reasonable. Seattle v. 
Leach, 29 Wn. App. 81, 85, 627 P.2d 159 (1981). Conclusory statements 
are inadequate. Id. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The Exclusionary Rule 
Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in violation of a 
person’s constitutional rights must be suppressed in a defendant’s crimi-
nal trial. State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 176, 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State 
v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 393, 5 P.3d 668 (2000). The exclusionary rule 
applies both to federal and state violations of the Fourth Amendment, see 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 
(1961), as well as violations of article I, section 7, State v. Winterstein, 
167 Wn.2d 620, 633, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009) (the general rule is that “vio-
lation of a constitutional immunity automatically implies exclusion of the 
evidence seized” (quoting State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571, 800 P.2d 
1112 (1990))). 
This chapter addresses five topics: first, general considerations of 
the exclusionary rule; second, the good-faith exception to the exclusion-
ary rule; third, the rule’s operation in different, non-trial settings; fourth, 
searches by private individuals; and finally, exclusion of evidence as 
fruit of the poisonous tree and various exceptions to the rule. 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
As stated above, the exclusionary rule operates to suppress any evi-
dence found as a result of unconstitutional government action. State v. 
Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 176, 43 P.3d 513 (2002). The exclusionary rule 
also prohibits the use of “derivative evidence,” real or testimonial, that is 
the “fruit,” or product, of the illegally obtained evidence. Murray v. 
United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 101 L. Ed. 2d 472 
(1988); State v. Smith, 165 Wn. App. 296, 309, 266 P.3d 250 (2011); see, 
e.g., State v. Faford, 128 Wn.2d 476, 488, 910 P.2d 447 (1996); State v. 
Salinas, 121 Wn.2d 689, 697, 853 P.2d 439 (1993). If the evidence, 
however, will be used only as impeachment evidence and not in the gov-
ernment’s case-in-chief, the evidence may be admissible for the limited 
purpose of impeachment. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64–65, 
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74 S. Ct. 354, 98 L. Ed. 503 (1954); State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 
179–80, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980); see also United States v. Havens, 446 
U.S. 620, 627–28, 100 S. Ct. 1912, 64 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1980) (defendant’s 
statements in cross-examination also subject to impeachment by illegally 
obtained evidence that is inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt). 
Although most of the discussion in this section centers upon the ex-
clusion of evidence when compelled by the federal or state constitutions, 
statutory law can also provide the basis for exclusion of evidence. See, 
e.g., State v. Williams, 94 Wn.2d 531, 541, 617 P.2d 1012 (1980) (re-
cordings made in violation of Washington privacy statute, although per-
mitted under federal wiretap statute, are inadmissible in state court pro-
ceedings); see 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.5(b) (5th ed. 
2012) (state may compel exclusion of illegally seized evidence even 
when the federal constitution does not require such exclusion). 
7.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This section first explores the standing requirements under article I, 
section 7. Next it examines the broad differences between the application 
of the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment and the rule under 
article I, section 7. Lastly, the section discusses the criticisms of a broad-
reaching exclusionary rule. 
7.1(a) Difference in Purpose Between the Fourth Amendment and  
Article I, Section 7 
The differences between the federal and state exclusionary rules are 
largely based on the difference in wording and intent between the Fourth 
Amendment and article I, section 7. Historically, the exclusionary rule 
served (1) to deter unreasonable searches and seizures, Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 656, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961); (2) to pre-
serve judicial integrity by preventing courts from becoming accomplices 
to the willful disobedience of the Constitution, id. at 659, 81 S. Ct. 1684; 
and (3) to sustain the public’s belief that the government will not profit 
from lawless behavior. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357, 94 
S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Currently, 
the U.S. Supreme Court considers deterrence of police misconduct to be 
the most important justification to the rule. United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 916−18, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). 
Conversely, the primary purpose of article I, section 7 underlying 
the exclusionary rule is the protection of individual privacy interests 
against unreasonable governmental intrusions. See State v. Winterstein, 
167 Wn.2d 620, 631−32, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009); see also State v. Afana, 
169 Wn.2d 169, 180, 233 P.3d 879 (2010); State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 
2013] Chapter 7: The Exclusionary Rule 1757 
166, 176–77, 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Rife, 133 Wn.2d 140, 148, 943 
P.2d 266 (1997). As a secondary concern, the rule also deters unlawful 
police activity and preserves the integrity of the judiciary by excluding 
evidence that has been obtained through illegal means. See Afana, 169 
Wn.2d at 180, 233 P.3d 879; Rife, 133 Wn.2d at 148, 943 P.2d 266. 
Thus, while the Fourth Amendment is primarily concerned with deter-
rence of police conduct, article I, section 7 is more concerned with indi-
vidual privacy. Compare State v. Crawley, 61 Wn. App. 29, 35, 808 P.2d 
773 (1991), and State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 109–12, 640 P.2d 1061 
(1982), with Leon, 468 U.S. at 916−18, 104 S. Ct. 3405. 
7.1(b) Standing 
A defendant must have standing to object to a search or seizure, but 
while the U.S. Supreme Court has abandoned the automatic standing 
doctrine, United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 65 L. 
Ed. 2d 619 (1980), a Washington defendant may rely on automatic stand-
ing if the challenged police action produced the evidence sought to be 
used against him. See State v. Jones, 146 Wn.2d 328, 331–35, 45 P.3d 
1062 (2002); State v. Williams, 142 Wn.2d 17, 21–23, 11 P.3d 714 
(2000). Still, a defendant asserting automatic standing must assert his 
own rights, not those of a third party. State v. Libero, 168 Wn. App. 612, 
619, 277 P.3d 708 (2012) (holding that while a defendant could chal-
lenge the legality of a search through asserting automatic standing, he 
still must show a violation of his own rights to suppress the challenged 
evidence). For a general discussion of standing, see supra § 1.6. 
To invoke the exclusionary rule, a defendant must make a timely 
objection. State v. Valladares, 31 Wn. App. 63, 76, 639 P.2d 813 (1982), 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 99 Wn.2d 663, 664 P.2d 508 (1983). 
7.1(c) Criticism of the Exclusionary Rule 
A number of judges and legal scholars have opposed a broad-
reaching exclusionary rule. See generally 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 1.2(a) (5th ed. 2004). First, commentators argue that the 
rule handcuffs the police by handicapping the detection and prosecution 
of crime. Id. § 1.2(a), at 27. The counterargument is that the Fourth 
Amendment itself, not the rule, has that effect. Id. This very argument 
was rejected when the Amendment was adopted. See id. In fact, com-
mentators suggest that illegally issued warrants cause the loss of only a 
negligible portion of felony arrests. See id. § 1.3(c), at 61. 
Second, commentators argue that the rule aids only the guilty and 
does not deter illegal police action. Id. § 1.2(b), at 29−32. After the rule’s 
creation, however, there was a dramatic increase in the number of war-
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rant applications as well as the number of police academy classes offer-
ing instruction on obtaining evidence in a manner that does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492, 96 S. Ct. 
3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976). As a result of the rule’s deterrent effect, 
innocent persons are spared intrusive, illegal police procedures. 1 
LaFave, supra § 1.2(a). Suggested alternatives to the exclusionary rule 
include providing civil damages as the sole remedy, limiting the rule to 
knowing violations, or limiting the rule to minor crimes. See generally 
id. § 1.2(a)−(f), at 26–54; see also Samuel Estreicher & Daniel P. Weick, 
Opting for a Legislative Alternative to the Fourth Amendment Exclu-
sionary Rule, 78 UMKC L. REV. 949 (2010) (proposing legislation 
providing for comprehensive overview by the Department of Justice of 
agency-by-agency constitutional compliance programs); L. Timothy Per-
rin, If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 83 
IOWA L. REV. 669 (1998) (providing an empirical study of the exclusion-
ary rule and suggesting a civil administrative remedy to partially replace 
the rule); Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363 (1999) (suggesting an administra-
tive damages regime wherein Fourth Amendment violations could be 
brought directly against police). 
7.2 UNLAWFUL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES CONDUCTED IN GOOD FAITH 
While federal courts have adopted a good-faith-reliance exception 
to the exclusionary rule, Washington courts have rejected such an excep-
tion. See State v. Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 184, 233 P.3d 879 (2010); State 
v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 212, 720 P.2d 838, 844 (1986) (declining to ap-
ply “good faith” exception under the Washington constitution). This dis-
tinction stems from the fact that, unlike the Fourth Amendment, article I, 
section 7 of the Washington State Constitution “clearly recognizes an 
individual’s right to privacy with no express limitations.” Afana, 169 
Wn.2d at 180, 233 P.3d 879 (quoting State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 110, 
640 P.2d 1061 (1982)). Thus, even if an officer acts in good faith reli-
ance on an invalid warrant, the evidence must be suppressed. State v. 
Crawley, 61 Wn. App. 29, 35, 808 P.2d 773 (1991). 
Under the federal good-faith exception, the exclusionary rule does 
not apply when evidence is seized in reasonable, good faith reliance on a 
search warrant that the court later finds to be unsupported by probable 
cause. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919–21, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 
82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). This good-faith exception applies because “the 
marginal or nonexistent benefits of suppressing evidence obtained in ob-
jectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search war-
rant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” Id. at 922, 104 S. 
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Ct. 3405. Likewise, if the warrant is technically invalid, the evidence 
may be admitted when the police reasonably believed that the search was 
valid. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987–88, 104 S. Ct. 
3424, 82 L. Ed. 2d 737 (1984). Moreover, when police mistakes are the 
result of negligence rather than systemic error or reckless disregard, the 
exclusionary rule does not dictate suppression. Herring v. United States, 
555 U.S. 135, 129 S. Ct. 695, 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009). 
7.3 APPLICATIONS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN CRIMINAL  
PROCEEDINGS OTHER THAN TRIALS 
During a trial, the exclusionary rule applies in full force. State v. 
Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 176, 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Kinzy, 141 
Wn.2d 373, 393, 5 P.3d 668 (2000). The rule, however, is likely not to 
apply in other portions of the trial process. The following sections dis-
cuss applications of the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings other 
than trials. The next section examines both pre- and post-trial applica-
tions. 
7.3(a) Application of the Exclusionary Rule to Pre-Trial Matters 
A person testifying before a grand jury may not refuse to answer 
questions on the ground that the questions are based on evidence derived 
from an illegal search. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349–50, 
94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974). The exclusionary rule is not ap-
plied to grand jury proceedings because its application would have only a 
marginal deterrent effect. Id. at 351–52, 94 S. Ct. 613. In determining 
whether to employ the rule, courts weigh the deterrent value of applying 
the rule against the costs of excluding the type of evidence in question. 
Id. at 349, 94 S. Ct. 613. 
The exclusionary rule does not apply to indictments based on ille-
gally obtained evidence. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 350, 78 S. 
Ct. 311, 2 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1958). Again, excluding the evidence, even if it 
means dismissing an indictment, would have only marginal deterrent 
value. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351–52, 94 S. Ct. 613. 
Illegally seized evidence may be considered in determining whether 
there is probable cause to believe that the accused committed the crime 
charged. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 488, 78 S. Ct. 1245, 
2 L. Ed. 2d 1503 (1958) (holding that it would not be sound judicial ad-
ministration to send the case back to the district court for a special hear-
ing regarding probable cause because illegally seized evidence was in-
troduced at trial). For example, recordings made by federal agents in a 
matter inconsistent with state law, and are therefore inadmissible at trial, 
nevertheless may be used to furnish probable cause for a court-
1760 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1581 
sanctioned search. State v. O’Neill, 103 Wn.2d 853, 867–72, 700 P.2d 
711 (1985). 
The Washington Supreme Court has not yet decided whether ille-
gally obtained evidence must be suppressed at a bail hearing. Other ju-
risdictions that have considered the issue suggest that the evidence may 
not be suppressed. See State v. Tucker, 101 N.J. Super. 380, 383, 244 
A.2d 353 (1968) (no need to go into detail concerning admissibility of 
the evidence for purposes of bail application when state makes prima 
facie showing of admissibility); Steigler v. Super. Ct., 252 A.2d 300, 305 
(Del. 1969). 
7.3(b) Application of the Exclusionary Rule to Post-Trial Matters 
Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, which became ef-
fective July 1, 1984, structured, but did not eliminate, discretionary deci-
sions affecting sentencing. RCW 9.94A.010. Under this provision, the 
sentencing process is limited to the present conviction and the defend-
ant’s prior convictions. As a result, there is no question as to whether 
illegally obtained evidence may be admitted. This contrasts slightly to 
sentencing under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which remain 
slightly unsettled. The majority of circuits have maintained that the ex-
clusionary rule does not apply in sentencing hearings. See United States 
v. Kim, 25 F.3d 1426, 1432–36 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Mon-
toya-Ortiz, 7 F.3d 1171, 1181–82 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jen-
kins, 4 F.3d 1338, 1344–45 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Tejada, 956 
F.2d 1256, 1260–61 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 
1226, 1234 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Torres, 926 F.2d 321, 324–
25 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Washington courts are divided on whether article I, section 7 re-
quires the application of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation 
hearings. State v. Murray, 110 Wn.2d 706, 708−09, 757 P.2d 487 (1988) 
(recognizing the division and uncertainty that exists around article I, sec-
tion 7’s exclusionary rule in revocation hearings, but not resolving the 
uncertainty). Compare, e.g., State v. Kuhn, 7 Wn. App. 190, 194, 499 
P.2d 49 (1972) (rule excluding evidence obtained as result of an illegal 
search is not applicable to probation revocation hearings), with State v. 
Lampman, 45 Wn. App. 228, 232, 724 P.2d 1092 (1986) (requiring ap-
plication without exception to probation revocation proceedings). Nota-
bly, because of the lower expectation of privacy that a parolee experienc-
es, less evidence will be illegally obtained while the parolee is on release. 
State v. Parris, 163 Wn. App. 110, 117, 259 P.3d 331 (2011). 
Under the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule does not apply 
to parole revocation hearings. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 
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U.S. 357, 365–66, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1998). The Court 
has reasoned that applying the exclusionary rule would both hinder the 
functions of the state parole systems and alter the traditionally flexible 
administrative nature of parole revocation proceedings, while providing 
only minimal deterrence benefits. Id. at 364, 118 S. Ct. 2014. 
7.4 APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN QUASI-CRIMINAL 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
While Washington courts have rarely addressed the matter, the ex-
clusionary rule has been applied in quasi-criminal and administrative 
proceedings as well. First, the exclusionary rule has generally been ap-
plied in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In Washington, criminal court 
rules are automatically applied to juvenile proceedings. JuCR 1.4(b) 
(“Criminal Rules. The Superior Court Criminal Rules shall apply in ju-
venile offense proceedings when not inconsistent with these rules and 
applicable statutes.”). Other jurisdictions have also taken this approach. 
See In re Robert T., 8 Cal. App. 3d 990, 993, 88 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1970); In 
re Marsh, 40 III. 2d 53, 55, 237 N.E.2d 529 (1968). It might be, howev-
er, unwise to apply the rule in dependency hearings based on the possible 
damage to the child. See, e.g., In re Christopher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 
615, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1978). Along the same reasoning, the rule has 
not been applied to other conservatorship proceedings because of con-
cern for the individual’s well-being and society’s safety. See Conserva-
torship of Susan T., 8 Cal. 4th 1005, 1019–20, 884 P.2d 988, 40 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 40 (1994). 
Second, whether the exclusionary rule is applied in an administra-
tive proceeding depends on the nature of the proceeding. If the proceed-
ing is closer to criminal in nature, then the rule will be applied. For ex-
ample, the exclusionary rule is applied in forfeiture proceedings, requir-
ing the suppression of any illegally seized evidence used to prove the 
criminal violation justifying the forfeiture. See, e.g., One 1958 Plymouth 
Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 702, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L. Ed. 2d 
170 (1965) (exclusionary rule is applicable to forfeiture proceedings); 
Deeter v. Smith, 106 Wn.2d 376, 378−79, 721 P.2d 519 (1986) (holding 
that the exclusionary rule applies because civil forfeitures are quasi-
criminal in nature). 
Courts have also applied the exclusionary rule when the disposition 
is relatively significant and when application of the rule is likely to deter 
unlawful searches and seizures. See New Brunswick v. Speights, 157 N.J. 
Super. 9, 20−21, 384 A.2d 225 (1978) (policy of deterring unlawful gov-
ernmental conduct may be significant when subsequent disciplinary hear-
ing directed at police officer charged with criminal violations was fore-
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seeable at time of search or seizure). In contrast, the exclusionary rule is 
generally not applied to administrative proceedings. I.N.S. v. Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 82 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1984) 
(exclusionary rule not applied in civil deportation hearings held by INS); 
see also Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365, 118 S. Ct. 
2014, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1998) (exclusionary rule incompatible with 
traditionally flexible administrative procedure). However, in the Ninth 
Circuit, “administrative tribunals are still required to exclude evidence 
that was ‘obtained by deliberate violations of the Fourth Amendment or 
by conduct a reasonable officer should know is in violation of the Consti-
tution.’” Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
7.5 SEARCHES BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS 
Both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment apply only to 
searches that are conducted by government actors. Thus, evidence gained 
during a search by a private actor need not be excluded if the search fails 
to conform to constitutional requirements. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 
U.S. 465, 475, 41 S. Ct. 574, 65 L. Ed. 1048 (1921) (papers obtained 
through theft by a private individual and delivered to federal prosecutors 
admissible against defendant); State v. Clark, 48 Wn. App. 850, 855, 743 
P.2d 822 (1987). But the evidence must have come from an actively con-
ducted search; if the private individual merely observes incriminating 
evidence, article I, section 7 protection will apply. See State v. Eisfeldt, 
163 Wn.2d 628, 635–39, 185 P.3d 580 (2008) (rejecting the private 
search doctrine under article 1, section 7); State v. Faford, 128 Wn.2d 
476, 488–89, 910 P.2d 447 (1996) (independent basis required for police 
search made pursuant to information obtained by the police from a nosey 
neighbor who was eavesdropping on the defendant’s cordless telephone 
conversations). 
Importantly, once the evidence is given to the government, the gov-
ernment search may not exceed the scope of the search previously con-
ducted by the private party. In re Teddington, 116 Wn.2d 761, 766, 808 
P.2d 156 (1991) (police properly read letter when sergeant had invento-
ried defendant’s locker and turned over incriminating letter to police); 
State v. Walter, 66 Wn. App. 862, 866, 833 P.2d 440 (1992) (no violation 
when photo lab turns pictures over to police). The intrusion is considered 
of the same scope even if officers test a substance that was merely 
looked at by the private party. State v. Bishop, 43 Wn. App. 17, 20, 714 
P.2d 1199 (1986) (no violation when police reopened packets and tested 
substance that was found by private security guard in the telephone 
mouthpiece of defendant’s hospital room). 
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7.5(a) Government Involvement 
For a search to be truly “private” and therefore not subject to con-
stitutional limitations, the actor must not be a government actor and must 
not be acting under the authority of the state. Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist. 
No. 403, 103 Wn.2d 594, 600, 694 P.2d 1078 (1985) (when private per-
son acts under authority of state, Fourth Amendment applies; thus, 
school search of students’ luggage must conform to constitutional re-
quirements). If the actor is a private individual, the defendant has the 
burden of proving that he or she conducted the search as an agent or in-
strumentality of the state. State v. Swenson, 104 Wn. App. 744, 754, 9 
P.3d 933, 938 (2000); State v. Clark, 48 Wn. App. 850, 856, 743 P.2d 
822 (1987). 
Under an agency theory, a search is not private if ordered or re-
quested by a government officer. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 
474−75, 41 S. Ct. 574, 65 L. Ed. 1048 (1921). For example, a search by 
an airline employee was not private when conducted at the request and 
under the supervision of government agents. Corngold v. United States, 
367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 
336, 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985) (holding that school offi-
cials act as representatives of the state and as such are government ac-
tors). No agency relationship exists unless the state actively encourages 
or instigates the citizen’s actions. See Clark, 48 Wn. App. at 855−56, 743 
P.2d 822. Courts consider the State’s knowledge of and acquiescence in 
the search and whether the citizen’s intent was to assist law enforcement 
efforts or to further his or her own end as factors. Swenson, 104 Wn. 
App. at 753, 9 P.3d 933 (father intended to assist police by obtaining de-
fendant’s phone records, and although police knew of the father’s efforts, 
there was no evidence that they instigated, encouraged, counseled, or 
directed the father to obtain the phone records). 
Under a joint endeavor theory, when the police accompany a citizen 
on a search, the search becomes a government search. Corngold, 367 
F.2d at 5−6 (contraband discovered by airline agents inadmissible when 
government agents actively joined in search). “It is immaterial whether 
the official originates the idea, or simply joins the search while it is in 
progress.” Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79, 69 S. Ct. 1372, 93 L. 
Ed. 1819 (1949). But even if the police are summoned before the search 
begins and are present as it occurs, the search may still be considered 
private if a private purpose is served. United States v. Lamar, 545 F.2d 
488, 490 (5th Cir. 1977) (heroin admissible when discovered by airline 
agent who opened unclaimed bag to determine its owner, because it was 
a private search even though a police officer was present during search). 
1764 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1581 
The fact that the person conducting the search may be a public em-
ployee does not lend an element of state action to the search if the search 
is not related to the employee’s official duties and is undertaken solely in 
his capacity as a private citizen. State v. Ludvik, 40 Wn. App. 257, 263, 
698 P.2d 1064 (1985) (state game warden, residing across the street from 
defendant, observed suspected drug transactions and informed police). 
Searches by off-duty police officers are considered private if the officers 
acted as private citizens and if the search or seizure was unconnected 
with their duties as police officers. People v. Wachter, 58 Cal. App. 3d 
911, 920–21, 130 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1976) (deputy sheriff acted as private 
citizen when he notified law enforcement officials of defendant’s mariju-
ana plants). When a private party, however, acts as a police officer, has a 
strong interest in obtaining convictions, and is familiar with search and 
seizure law, the purposes of the exclusionary rule are served by suppres-
sion and the rule will apply. See Commonwealth v. Eshelman, 477 Pa. 
93, 100, 383 A.2d 838 (1978). 
Lastly, a majority of jurisdictions have decided that when evidence 
is seized to aid the government and the government had prior knowledge 
that the seizure would occur, the taint of the illegal action is transferred 
to the government. See United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1327–
28 (5th Cir. 1975) (copies of fraudulent claims allowed into evidence 
because defendant failed to prove that federal investigators knew nurse 
had illegally copied records for government use).  
7.6 VIOLATION OF WARRANT PROCEDURE 
“[A]bsent a showing of prejudice to the defendant, procedural non-
compliance does not compel invalidation of an otherwise sufficient war-
rant or suppression of its fruits.” State v. Aase, 121 Wn. App. 558, 567, 
89 P.3d 721 (2004). For example, when a defendant resident was not 
given a copy of the warrant before commencing an otherwise lawful 
search, the evidence was still admissible because the defendant was not 
prejudiced by receiving the warrant several minutes after the search be-
gan, and the search would not have been less intrusive had the defendant 
been able to immediately see the warrant. State v. Kern, 81 Wn. App. 
308, 311, 914 P.2d 114 (1996). 
7.7 DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE AS “FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE”: 
GENERAL RULE 
The extent to which evidence related to an illegal search or seizure 
may be suppressed depends on the extent to which the evidence derives 
from exploitation of the illegality. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963) (“[T]he . . . question . . . 
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is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence 
to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of 
that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be 
purged of the primary taint.” (internal quote omitted)); Silverthorne 
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 
319 (1920); State v. Byers, 88 Wn.2d 1, 10, 559 P.2d 1334 (1977) (de-
fendants’ confessions inadmissible when obtained as a result of defend-
ants being in custody after an unlawful arrest and being confronted with 
illegally obtained evidence); State v. McReynolds, 104 Wn. App. 560, 
571, 17 P.3d 608 (2002) (court remanded for lack of findings regarding 
whether subsequently obtained evidence from valid warrants was tainted 
by an illegal search); State v. Magneson, 107 Wn. App. 221, 226–27, 26 
P.3d 986 (2001) (evidence was not admissible under the plain view doc-
trine when officers entered home with what was later determined to be an 
invalid search warrant and seized drugs from a third person in the home 
at the time of the search). The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is not 
limited to violations of the Fourth Amendment; it has been applied to 
violations of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Nix v. Williams, 467 
U.S. 431, 442, 104 S. Ct. 2508, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1984). The following 
sections discuss three exceptions that have been used to determine 
whether a given piece of evidence constitutes derivative “fruit of the poi-
sonous tree” and should therefore be suppressed. See generally 6 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4 (5th ed. 2004). 
7.7(a) Attenuation Test 
The attenuation test suggests that where there are intervening inde-
pendent factors along the chain of causation, the taint of illegally ob-
tained evidence becomes so dissipated as to preclude suppression of de-
rivative evidence as “fruit” of the illegal police action. State v. Warner, 
125 Wn.2d 876, 888, 889 P.2d 479 (1995) (remanded for determination 
of whether both sources of information were compelled; if only one was 
compelled, other would constitute independent source and any “fruits” 
need not be excluded); 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4 
(5th ed. 2012). Put another way, the detrimental consequences of exclud-
ing the evidence become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the ex-
clusionary rule no longer justifies its cost. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 
590, 608−09, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., con-
curring); State v. Spotted Elk, 109 Wn. App. 253, 262, 34 P.3d 906 
(2001) (finding that the defendant’s and parole officer’s testimony was 
insufficiently attenuated from a law enforcement officer’s Miranda vio-
lation because the defendant’s improperly admitted incriminatory state-
ments regarding heroin compelled her to explain and later testify about 
1766 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1581 
why she was carrying the substance); State v. Reid, 38 Wn. App. 203, 
213, 687 P.2d 861 (1984). 
For example, in Reid, the police arrested the defendant shortly after 
he emerged from his apartment building and got into a car. 38 Wn. App. 
at 205, 687 P.2d 861. When the defendant refused to identify which 
apartment unit he had exited, police seized the defendant’s keys from the 
car, entered the building, and used the keys to unlock the door to one of 
the apartments. Id. at 205−06, 687 P.2d 861. The police then entered the 
apartment, observed evidence in plain view, and later returned and seized 
the evidence pursuant to a warrant. Id. at 206, 687 P.2d 861. The court 
reasoned that even if the initial seizure of the keys was unlawful, the evi-
dence taken from the apartment would be admissible because the seizure 
of the evidence “was so attenuated that the taint of the seizure of the keys 
had dissipated.” Id. at 208–09, 687 P.2d 861. “Bystanders had identified 
the door through which the defendant had often entered and exited. 
[Thus,] the keys were not utilized in the manner of a divining rod to lo-
cate [the defendant’s] apartment but rather to facilitate access to [the] 
residence and to confirm from which door the defendant had exited.” Id. 
at 209, 687 P.2d 861. 
Washington courts have not explicitly adopted the attenuation doc-
trine, but they have applied it. See State v. Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 907, 919, 
259 P.3d 172 (2011) (evaluating the challenged evidence to see if it was 
“fruit of the poisonous tree” or so “attenuated as to dissipate the taint”). 
The court in Eserjose held that the defendant’s confession obtained at the 
sheriff’s office following an illegal arrest at the defendant’s home was an 
act of free will sufficient to purge the primary taint of the illegal arrest. 
Id. at 929, 259 P.3d 172. 
7.7(b) Independent Source Test 
Under the independent source exception, illegally obtained evi-
dence is not suppressed under the exclusionary rule when the evidence 
was ultimately obtained pursuant to a valid warrant or other lawful 
means independent of the unlawful government action. State v. Gaines, 
154 Wn.2d 711, 718, 116 P.3d 993 (2005). Thus, “where an unlawful 
[action] has given investigators knowledge of facts x and y, but fact z has 
been learned by other means, fact z can be said to be admissible because 
[it is] derived from an ‘independent source.’” Murray v. United 
States, 487 U.S. 533, 538, 108 S. Ct. 2533, 101 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1988). Put 
another way, when evidence is lawfully obtained, the fact that police also 
came by the evidence unlawfully does not make the evidence suppressi-
ble. State v. O’Bremski, 70 Wn.2d 425, 429−30, 423 P.2d 530 (1967) (a 
missing child’s testimony was admissible because she was not dis-
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covered solely as a result of unlawful search). The underlying policy is 
that although the government should not profit from illegal activity, it 
should not end up in a worse position than it otherwise would have been 
if it had not performed the illegal activity. Murray, 487 U.S. at 542, 108 
S. Ct. 2533. 
The independent source exception has been held to comply with ar-
ticle I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. Gaines, 154 
Wn.2d at 722, 116 P.3d 993 (probable cause existed to search trunk in-
dependent of initial, illegal search and police would have sought a war-
rant for the trunk even absent the initial, illegal search). Under the excep-
tion, unlawful police activity does not invalidate a later search if (1) the 
search warrant was based on independently obtained information, and (2) 
the police were not motivated by the prior unlawful activity in seeking 
the search warrant. State v. Miles, 159 Wn. App. 282, 284, 244 P.3d 
1030 (2011); see also State v. Smith, 165 Wn. App. 296, 266 P.3d 250 
(2011), review granted, 173 Wn.2d 1034, 277 P.3d 669 (2012) (police 
entry into motel room was based on independent information because 
victim sought police assistance as community caretakers and the emer-
gency need was an intervening factor that allowed emergency aid excep-
tion to the warrant requirement). 
7.7(c) Inevitable Discovery Doctrine 
The last exception to the exclusionary rule is the inevitable discov-
ery doctrine. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 81 L. 
Ed. 2d 377 (1984). Unlike federal courts, Washington courts do not rec-
ognize the inevitable discovery doctrine. State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 
620, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009). This is attributed to article I, section 7’s ex-
press protection of individual privacy and the Washington State Supreme 
Court’s dislike of the doctrine’s speculative analysis. See id. at 635, 220 
P.3d 1226; State v. Hilton, 164 Wn. App. 81, 91−92, 261 P.3d 683 
(2011) (“Washington courts will not entertain the speculative question 
about whether the police ultimately would have obtained the same in-
formation by other, lawful means.”). 
Under the federal exception, the inevitable discovery doctrine is an 
extrapolation of the independent source doctrine: if evidence is admissi-
ble because it was discovered through an independent source, then it 
should be admissible if it would have inevitably been discovered through 
an independent source. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539, 108 
S. Ct. 2535, 101 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1988); see also Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, 104 
S. Ct. 2501 (location of murdered child’s body derived from coerced 
statement was not suppressed when searchers would have located child 
anyway). Under the doctrine, originally tainted evidence is admissible if 
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the police, while following routine procedure, would inevitably have un-
covered the evidence. United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 721 (9th 
Cir. 2009). This reasoning requires a “speculative analysis” of police 
behavior. State v. Smith, 165 Wn. App. 296, 310, 266 P.3d 250 (2011). 
Specifically, the doctrine examines the police’s actions and their motiva-
tions to take such actions. Hilton, 164 Wn. App. at 92, 261 P.3d 683. The 
doctrine, however, does not excuse police failure to obtain a search war-
rant where the police had probable cause but simply did not seek to ob-
tain a warrant. Young, 573 F.3d at 723 (inevitable discovery doctrine did 
not apply when police failed to secure a warrant to search defendant’s 
hotel room after defendant was arrested, but before defendant had 
checked out). 
7.8 EVIDENCE DISCOVERED AS A RESULT OF ILLEGAL ARREST OR 
DETENTION 
7.8(a) Confession as Fruit of Illegal Arrest 
Generally, when a defendant confesses voluntarily, a court may 
admit the defendant’s confession into evidence consistent with the Fifth 
Amendment. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 379, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. 
Ed. 2d 908 (1964). When a confession, however, is the fruit of an illegal 
seizure, the court must ensure that the confession is admissible despite 
the constitutional violation. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600−03, 95 
S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975); see State v. Dane, 89 Wn. App. 
226, 233−34, 948 P.2d 1326 (1997). In many cases, the temporal location 
of the illegal arrest in relation to the confession will be a deciding factor. 
For example, a confession made immediately upon an illegal entry and 
arrest is excludable, but when a suspect is released after an illegal arrest 
and later returns to the police station to make a confession, the confes-
sion is admissible because its taint has dissipated. Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 491, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). 
There are three other factors to determine whether the taint of a 
confession has dissipated. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603−05, 95 S. Ct. 2254. 
First, the giving of Miranda warnings may indicate sufficient attenua-
tion. Id. However, the fact that a defendant received and understood Mi-
randa warnings is not sufficient by itself to purge the taint of an illegal 
seizure. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216−17, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 60 
L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979). When a person is unlawfully detained because 
probable cause is lacking, but is not formally arrested, the confession is 
inadmissible even if the person was first given Miranda warnings so long 
as his or her confession is causally connected to the detention. Id. at 117–
18, 99 S. Ct. 2248. 
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Second, the presence of any intervening circumstances may provide 
sufficient attenuation. The court in State v. Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 907, 
919−29, 259 P.3d 172 (2011), held that the defendant’s confession ob-
tained at the sheriff’s office following an illegal arrest at the defendant’s 
home was an act of free will sufficient to purge the primary taint of the 
illegal arrest. Id. The arrest was illegal because of lack of consent, but the 
defendant only confessed later at the police station upon hearing that his 
co-conspirator had implicated him. Id. Thus, the fact that the confession 
was elicited due to his co-conspirator’s confession, and not the illegal 
arrest, was an intervening circumstance sufficient to purge the taint of the 
illegal arrest. Id. 
Lastly, the officer’s purpose and the level of the constitutional vio-
lation are also instructive in determining whether the confession should 
be suppressed. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603−05, 95 S. Ct. 2254; see also State 
v. Johnston, 38 Wn. App. 793, 800−01, 690 P.2d 591 (1984). 
7.8(b) Search as Fruit of Illegal Arrest or Detention 
When a search is incidental to an illegal arrest, the fruits of the 
search are suppressible unless intervening factors, such as a valid arrest, 
occur between the illegal arrest and the search. United States v. Walker, 
535 F.2d 896, 898−99 (5th Cir. 1976). The search may also be purged of 
the taint by voluntary consent to the search; the voluntariness of the con-
sent may be determined by reference to the Brown factors, as outlined in 
section 7.8(a) above. See generally 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Sei-
zure § 11.4(b) (5th ed. 2012); see also State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wn.2d 
207, 212, 533 P.2d 123 (1975). 
Voluntariness of consent, however, is not proven by the mere fact 
that the defendant voluntarily made the statement. State v. Avila-Avina, 
99 Wn. App. 9, 15–16, 991 P.2d 720, 724 (2000), abrogated on other 
grounds by State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009); 
4 LaFave, supra § 8.1(a)−(c). Washington courts have considered the 
totality of the circumstances to determine whether consent to a search 
incident to arrest was voluntary. State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 
588−89, 62 P.3d 489 (2003) (stating that repeated requests for consent is 
one factor to consider); State v. Tagas, 121 Wn. App. 872, 876, 90 P.3d 
1088 (2004) (agreeing that totality of circumstances is normally the ap-
propriate test); cf. supra § 5.9−5.10 (Ferrier warnings). 
7.8(c) Identification of the Suspect as Fruit of Illegal Arrest 
Whether illegally obtained evidence may be used to identify the de-
fendant varies based on the means of identification. Washington courts 
have rarely considered the issue, but courts in other jurisdictions have 
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excluded evidence of post-arrest identifications, at-trial identification, 
photo identification, and fingerprinting. First, in Washington, a court has 
found that a post-arrest identification by one officer immediately after a 
warrantless arrest was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest 
and therefore had to be suppressed. State v. Le, 103 Wn. App. 354, 
362−65, 12 P.3d 653 (2000) (admitting the identification would “conven-
iently assum[e] that the police would eventually effect a lawful arrest of 
the defendant . . . . [S]uch a result would eviscerate the exclusionary rule 
by readily excusing police failure to obtain a warrant”). Under the Fourth 
Amendment, the evidence may be admitted if, under the Brown factors, 
see supra § 7.8(a), the link between the illegal action and the identifica-
tion is broken. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365, 92 S. Ct. 
1620, 32 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1972) (defendant may consent to lineup and 
hence purge taint of illegal action). See generally 6 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 11.4(a)−(j) (5th ed. 2012). Of course, if police 
make flagrantly illegal arrests for the purpose of securing identifications 
that otherwise could not have been obtained, the identifications are in-
admissible. United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 584 (2d Cir. 1970). 
The second issue arises when a witness identified the defendant in 
court but had also previously identified the defendant at a line-up follow-
ing the illegal arrest. Because the arrest was illegal, the initial line-up 
identification was illegal. If both the police officer’s knowledge of the 
accused’s identity and the victim’s independent recollection of the ac-
cused predate the unlawful arrest, the victim’s in-court identification of 
the accused is untainted by either the arrest or the pretrial identification 
arising therefrom. State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 546−47, 688 P.2d 859 
(1984). A basic attenuation test is applied but with additional factors spe-
cific to in-court identification. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 
100 S. Ct. 1244, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537 (1980). The court should also consider 
(1) the witness’s prior opportunity to observe the criminal act; (2) any 
discrepancy between the defendant’s pre-lineup description and the de-
fendant’s actual description; (3) the identification of someone else prior 
to the lineup; (4) identification of the defendant’s picture before the 
lineup; (5) failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion; and (6) 
the time between the criminal act and the lineup identification. United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 
(1967). 
Courts have excluded other types of evidence identifying the de-
fendant if the evidence was associated with an unlawful arrest. A photo 
identification produced by an unlawful arrest is not admissible. Crews, 
445 U.S. at 474, 100 S. Ct. 1244. And fingerprints must be suppressed 
when the suspect was unlawfully arrested for the purpose of obtaining 
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the suspect’s fingerprints so as to prosecute the suspect for the crime of 
arrest. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727, 89 S. Ct. 1394, 22 L. Ed. 
2d 676 (1969). 
7.9 TYPES OF EVIDENCE DISCOVERED AS A RESULT OF AN ILLEGAL 
SEARCH 
7.9(a) Confession as Fruit of Illegal Search 
Attenuation, including the Brown factors, see supra § 7.8(a), does 
not apply to a confession following an unlawful search, as opposed to 
one following an unlawful arrest, because a suspect is more likely to con-
fess as a result of a search. People v. Robbins, 54 Ill. App. 3d 298, 
304−05, 369 N.E.2d 577, 12 Ill. Dec. 80 (1977); see also State v. 
Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 907, 259 P.3d 172 (2011) (defendant’s confession 
following illegal arrest not suppressed “since ‘[a]n illegal arrest, without 
more, has never been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution, nor as a 
defense to a valid conviction.’” (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 
U.S. 463, 474, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537 (1980))). Thus, a con-
fession is suppressible if it would not have been made but for the illegal 
search. See State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 102−04, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982). 
7.9(b) Search or Arrest as Fruit of Illegal Search 
When a search warrant or arrest warrant is based upon untainted ev-
idence, the fact that an illegal search took place prior to securing the val-
id warrant will not invalidate the execution of that warrant, and evidence 
seized during the execution will be admissible. Segura v. United States, 
468 U.S. 796, 814, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1984) (second 
search of home is not tainted by prior illegal entry). But if the search 
warrant for the second search is supported by both tainted and untainted 
evidence, and the untainted evidence alone does not establish probable 
cause, evidence seized pursuant to the warrant must be excluded. State v. 
Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304, 314−15, 4 P.3d 130 (2000); see also United States 
v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 1001−02 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. 
DiMuro, 540 F.2d 503, 515 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Nelson, 459 
F.2d 884, 889 (6th Cir. 1972). 
7.9(c) Testimony of Witness as Fruit of Illegal Search 
Testimony and physical evidence are treated differently for pur-
poses of the exclusionary rule. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 
277−79, 98 S. Ct. 1054, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1978). Verbal testimony car-
ries with it an exercise of free will, and the costs of excluding the evi-
dence are great. Consequently, the ability to suppress a derivative wit-
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ness’s testimony depends on several of the following factors. First, sup-
pression depends on whether the search and testimony were close in 
time. See id. at 277−78, 98 S. Ct. 1054 (witness testimony not excluded 
where “substantial periods of time” had elapsed between the illegal 
search and the government’s first contact with the witness). 
Second, suppression depends on whether the witness testified 
freely. See United States v. Karathanos, 531 F.2d 26, 35 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(testimony by illegal aliens obtained as result of illegal search inadmissi-
ble because testimony was prompted by government statements concern-
ing future prosecution). This may also depend on whether the fruits of 
the illegal search were used in questioning the witness. See State v. Rog-
ers, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 105, 198 N.E.2d 796, 806 (1963) (testimony about 
gun suppressed because witness would not have been questioned about 
gun but for unlawful search). Testimony concerning an object seized dur-
ing an illegal search is inadmissible when the identification of the object 
is established by use of the illegally seized object. State v. Swaite, 33 
Wn. App. 477, 484 n.4, 656 P.2d 520 (1982). 
Third, suppression may depend on the officer’s intent and prior 
knowledge of the existence of the witnesses. If the intent of an illegal 
search was to find witnesses, the evidence should be excluded. See Peo-
ple v. Martin, 382 Ill. 192, 201, 46 N.E.2d 997 (1942) (testimony of wit-
nesses suppressed when witness’s names were obtained from papers 
found during illegal search). See generally Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S. 
Ct. 1054. Admission of the testimony is also more likely if the officers 
knew of the witness’s existence before the search. See State v. O 
‘Bremski, 70 Wn.2d 425, 429−30, 423 P.2d 530 (1967) (although girl 
was found during illegal search, her testimony was admissible because 
her whereabouts were discovered through independent information). 
7.10 CRIME COMMITTED DURING ILLEGAL ARREST OR SEARCH 
Generally, evidence that the defendant attempted to bribe or attack 
an officer is admissible even if the arrest was illegal. State v. Mierz, 127 
Wn.2d 460, 473−475, 901 P.2d 286 (1995). In addition, evidence of a 
suspect speeding away from an unlawful traffic stop has been found ad-
missible at trial because it is considered sufficiently distinguishable from 
the unlawful intrusion. State v. Owens, 39 Wn. App. 130, 135, 692 P.2d 
850 (1984). 
The rationale for admitting this evidence is that acts of free will 
purge the taint of the illegal police activity; thus, the application of the 
exclusionary rule would only marginally deter illegal police behavior. In 
addition, exclusion would permit persons unlawfully arrested to assault 
officers without risk of criminal liability. Mierz, 127 Wn.2d at 474, 901 
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P.2d 286. The evidence would be inadmissible, however, if it were the 
product of questionable police action. See id. at 475, 901 P.2d 286. 
7.11 WAIVER OR FORFEITURE OF OBJECTION 
A defendant may waive or forfeit his or her constitutional objection 
and thus render the objectionable evidence admissible in three ways: (1) 
by failing to make a timely objection, (2) by testifying at trial about the 
evidence, and (3) by entering a guilty plea. See 6 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure §§ 11.1(a), (c)−(d) (5th ed. 2012). 
7.11(a) Failure to Make a Timely Objection 
Jurisdictions have different rules for what constitutes a timely ob-
jection. Washington court rules provide that a defendant’s failure to ob-
ject at the omnibus hearing may constitute a waiver of the objection if 
the party had knowledge of the illegality of the search or seizure prior to 
the hearing. See Wash. CrR 4.5(d); see also State v. Lee, 162 Wn. App. 
852, 857, 259 P.3d 294 (2011), review denied, 173 Wn.2d 1017, 272 
P.3d 247 (2012) (“Under RAP 2.5(a), a party may raise manifest error 
affecting a constitutional right for the first time on appeal. ‘A failure to 
move to suppress evidence, however, constitutes a waiver of the right to 
have it excluded.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting State v. Mierz, 72 Wn. 
App. 783, 789, 866 P.2d 65, 875 P.2d 1228 (1994))). Thus, a defendant’s 
failure to move to suppress evidence at trial that he later contends was 
illegally gathered constitutes a waiver of any error associated with the 
admission of the evidence. Mierz, 127 Wn.2d at 468, 875 P.2d 1228. 
 Importantly, a defendant may only appeal suppression issues on 
the bases raised during the trial. State v. Garbaccio, 151 Wn. App. 716, 
731, 214 P.3d 168 (2009), review denied, 168 Wn.2d 1027, 230 P.3d 
1060 (2010) (because a defendant’s “present contention was not raised in 
his suppression motion, and because he did not seek a ruling on this issue 
from the trial court, we will not consider it for the first time on appeal.”). 
7.11(b) Testimony by Defendant Concerning Suppressed Evidence 
A defendant may not raise a Fourth Amendment claim on appeal 
challenging the admission of evidence, notwithstanding a timely objec-
tion, if the defendant gave testimony at trial admitting to the possession 
of that evidence. See State v. Peele, 10 Wn. App. 58, 67, 516 P.2d 788 
(1973). A claim may be raised, however, if the defendant’s testimony 
was induced by the erroneous admission of the evidence. Id. at 67–68, 
516 P.2d 788; see also Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 224−25, 
88 S. Ct. 2008, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1047 (1968). The rationale for the general 
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rule is that the testimony may make the admission of the illegal evidence 
harmless error. See Peele, 10 Wn. App. at 66, 516 P.2d 788. See general-
ly 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.1(c) (5th ed. 2004). 
7.11(c) Guilty Plea 
A defendant who has knowingly and voluntarily entered a guilty 
plea may not thereafter obtain post-conviction relief on Fourth Amend-
ment grounds even though he or she made a timely motion to suppress 
the evidence in advance of the plea. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 
258, 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1973). Courts recognize this 
limitation because “[w]hen a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted 
in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is 
charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the 
deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the 
guilty plea.” State v. Butler, 17 Wn. App. 666, 676, 564 P.2d 828 (1977) 
(citing Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602). But if the plea itself can 
be characterized as the fruit of illegally obtained evidence and, conse-
quently, should have been suppressed upon the defendant’s timely mo-
tion, then the plea was not entered voluntarily or knowingly. See Tollett, 
411 U.S. at 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602 (defendant may attack the voluntariness 
of the plea under the factors set forth in McMann v. Richardson, 397 
U.S. 759, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970)); see also State v. Wil-
son, 162 Wn. App. 409, 414–15, 417, 253 P.3d 1143 (2011) (“[A] ‘guilty 
plea waives or renders irrelevant all constitutional violations that oc-
curred before the guilty plea, except those related to the circumstances of 
the plea or to the government’s legal power to prosecute regardless of 
factual guilt.’” (quoting State v. Brandenburg, 153 Wn. App. 944, 948, 
223 P.3d 1259 (2009))). 
7.12 HARMLESS ERROR 
Even when illegally seized evidence has been improperly admitted 
at trial, a conviction will not be reversed if the defendant would have 
been convicted without its admission. See State v. Smith, 93 Wn.2d 329, 
352−53, 610 P.2d 869 (1980); State v. Flicks, 91 Wn.2d 391, 396, 588 
P.2d 1328 (1979). Where an error infringes on a constitutional right, the 
error is presumed prejudicial, and the State bears the burden of proving 
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Thomp-
son, 151 Wn.2d 793, 808, 92 P.3d 228 (2004); State v. McReynolds, 117 
Wn. App. 309, 326, 71 P.3d 663 (2003); State v. Spotted Elk, 109 Wn. 
App. 253, 261, 34 P.3d 906 (2001). A constitutional error is harmless if 
the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that, in light 
of the overwhelming untainted evidence, a jury would have reached the 
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same result in the absence of the error. State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 
425, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985). 
CONCLUSION 
Particulars of search and seizure law may change based upon the 
circumstances of each case, but the types of issues raised and considered 
are likely to remain much the same. This survey attempts to expand upon 
basic search and seizure issues by referencing recent Washington search 
and seizure cases. While this survey is not comprehensive and will re-
quire continual updating, we hope it will continue to be a useful tool for 
practitioners and judges who must assess the scope of protection that the 
Washington State Constitution and the U.S. Constitution afford persons 
against unlawful searches and seizures. 
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abandoned property 
 expectation of privacy in, 1599, 1659 
 
adjoining lands  
 See premises 
 
administrative proceedings 
 application to exclusionary rule, 1761 
 
administrative searches 
 automobile spot checks as, 1603, 1736 
 of business and commercial premises, 1594 
 expectation of privacy pursuant to, 1751 
 generally, 1751 
 housing and fire code inspections as, 1590, 1752 
 level of proof in, generally, 1631, 1754 
 premises, privacy expectation in, 1751 
 vehicle checkpoints, level of proof in, 1753 
 vehicles, need for warrant in search of, 1753 
 warrant requirements for, 1642, 1752 
 See also warrantless searches; inspection of fire scenes 
 
admissions against interest  
informants, information as, 1626 
 
aerial surveillance 
 as constituting search, 1585 
 of open fields and privacy expectation in, 1593 
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affidavit for search warrant 
administrative warrants, requirements for, 1642 
challenging content in, generally, 1661 
challenging content of informant’s identity, 1661 
challenging content, misrepresentations and omissions in, 1662 
oath or affirmation in, 1639 
omissions in, 1639, 1662 
oral testimony or oral warrants in, 1641  
probable cause requirements for, 1612, 1639 
 
affirmation 
affidavit for search warrant, need for, 1639 
 
agency records  
reliability of, 1630 
 
airports 
warrantless searches at, 1741 
 
alcohol 
underage possession or consumption of,  
“in the presence” test for, 1675 
 
answering machines  
consent to search, 1586 
expectation of privacy in, 1586 
 
apartments 
expectation of privacy in, 1583, 1589  
search warrant description of, 1645 
 
appeal 
See harmless error 
 
arrest 
booking and crime charged in, 1677, 1678 
custodial for minor offense, propriety of, 1678, 1679 
effect of illegal arrest on prosecution, 1671 
2013] Washington Search and Seizure 1819 
fruit of illegal search, 1771 
“in the presence” requirement for, 1675 
judicial review of, 1678 
minor offenses, propriety of, 1678 
pretextual booking, use of, 1678 
probable cause for, 1609 
search prior to, 1701 
Terry stop distinguished from, 1679 
traffic violations, 1678, 1688 
use of force in, 1677 
warrantless, for felony, 1674 
warrantless for misdemeanor, 1674 
what constitutes, 1670 
with warrant, 1675 
without warrant, 1671 
See also warrantless arrest 
 
arrest warrant 
execution of, identification of arrestee in, 1676 
execution of, procedure for, 1676 
probable cause basis for, 1609 
standards, similarity to search warrants, 1635 
 
arrest record 
as probable cause for, 1616 
 
articulable and reasonable suspicion  
as basis for stop-and-frisk, 1632 
 
association 
as evidence of probable cause, 1620 
 
automatic standing  
See standing 
 
automobiles  
See vehicles 
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bail hearing 
exclusionary rule, applicability in, 1760 
 
bailee 
consent to search by, 1723 
 
bank records 
expectation of privacy in, 1597 
 
basis of knowledge 
for informants, generally, 1624  
for informants, hearsay as, 1625, 1627  
for police informants, 1629  
 
blood sample 
consent to, implied by driving vehicle, 1720, 1731 
exigent circumstances for, 1699, 1730  
expectation of privacy in, 1597  
probable cause for taking, 1665  
search incident to arrest pursuant to, 1700 
See also bodily intrusions 
 
bodily intrusions 
due process considerations for, 1665 
exigent circumstances for, 1727 
prisoners or pre-trial detainees, search of, 1666, 1749 
probable cause for, 1632 
search incident to arrest, pursuant to, 1700 
searches generally, 1664 
sex offenders, search of, 1748 
 
border crossing 
checkpoints, propriety of, 1750 
exception to individualized suspicion at, 1682 
questioning at checkpoint, propriety of, 1750 
roving patrols, vehicle search, standards for, 1751 
searches and seizures, requirements for, 1750 
smuggling as basis of suspicion, 1750 
2013] Washington Search and Seizure 1821 
 
brief detention 
See stop-and-frisk 
 
business and commercial premises  
expectation of privacy in, 1593 
 
canines 
illegal substances, probable cause for, 1620 
sniffing by dog as constituting search, 1585 
sniffing by dog, expectation of privacy in mail, 1599 
sniffing by dog of packages to establish probable cause, 1742 
 
Carroll rule 
vehicle search, application of, 1735 
 
checkpoints 
as form of seizure, 1603 
border searches at, 1750 
constitutionality of, 1736 
exception to individualized suspicion requirement at, 1614, 1682 
level of proof for, 1736, 1737 
sobriety for, 1736, 1737 
warrantless search, test for reasonableness of, 1736 
 
child 
consent to search parent’s property, propriety of, 1722 
 
citizen informants, 1627 
 
commercial premises 
See business and commercial premises 
 
common areas 
as protected area, 1590 
 
common authority rule 
See consent searches, third party 
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community caretaking 
See emergency and community caretaking 
 
community living rule 
See expectation of privacy 
 
concerts 
searches at, 1741 
  
confession 
as fruit of illegal arrest, 1768  
as fruit of illegal search, 1771 
 
computer 
expectation of privacy in, 1598 
 
consent and consent searches 
answering machine message as, 1586 
awareness of right to refuse, necessity of, 1714ԟ16 
behavior as, 1715 
consensual encounters as seizure, 1601 
coercive surroundings affecting, 1716 
generally, 1713 
implied consent, use of, 1720, 1731 
landlord, lessor, or manager giving, 1723 
maturity, sophistication, mental or emotional state affecting, 1718 
police claim of authority as affecting, 1715 
police deception as to identity or purpose affecting, 1718 
prior cooperation or refusal to cooperate affecting, 1715 
prior illegal police action tainting, 1717, 1718 
recording of communications as, 1585 
scope of, 1719, 1720 
search warrants, execution of, 1651 
statutorily implied use of, 1720, 1731 
third party 
bailee authority to give, 1723 
child authority to give, 1722 
2013] Washington Search and Seizure 1823 
common authority standard, 1720 
co-tenant or joint occupant authority to give, 1722 
employee or employer authority to give, 1723, 1724 
generally, 1720 
host or guest authority to give, 1724 
hotel employee authority to give, 1724 
landlord or manager authority to give, 1723 
parents authority to give, 1721 
spouse authority to give, 1721 
vehicle passengers’ authority to give, 1722 
voluntariness of, burden of proof, 1714 
voluntariness of, factors, 1714 
See also exigent circumstances 
 
constitutionally protected areas  
homes, generally, 1587 
open fields as, 1592 
plain view, discovery within, 1709 
plain view, seizure based on, 1709 
See also expectation of privacy; protected areas and interests 
 
containers 
canine sniffs of, 1742 
immediate control analysis affecting validity of search of, 1698 
inventory search of, 1702, 1703 
search incident to arrest, propriety of, 1698, 1699 
within vehicle, 1700, 1701 
expectation of privacy in, 1596 
 
contraband 
detection of, establishing probable cause for, 1619  
exigent circumstances warranting search for, 1728 
 
co-tenant 
consent to search given by, 1722 
 
courthouses 
warrantless search at, 1741 
1824 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1581 
 
curtilage 
business and commercial premises of, 1594 
defined, 1590 
determination of, factors, 1591 
expectation of privacy in, 1591 
plain view when searching, 1591 
search of, 1591 
vehicles as, 1660 
 
custodial arrest  
See arrest 
 
customs searches 
See border crossing 
  
danger 
as factor in Terry stop, 1683 
 
deadly force  
See force 
 
derivative standing  
See standing 
 
detention 
investigatory stop, 1685 
persons on premises during warrant execution, 1656 
persons in proximity to suspect, 1687 
searches after, 1701, 1702 
vehicle, warrentless, 1740 
 
DNA samples 
constitutionality of searches of, 1664, 1665, 1666  
expectation of privacy in, 1596  
seizure of, for certain crimes, 1731 
 
 
2013] Washington Search and Seizure 1825 
dogs 
See canines 
 
eavesdropping  
as evidence, 1712 
 
electrical consumption 
increased use of as evidence for probable cause, 1616 
 
e-mail 
expectation of privacy in, 1599 
 
emergency and community caretaking  
exception for warrantless arrest involving, 1673 
vehicle impoundment based on, 1739 
warrantless search, 1703, 1704  
warrantless vehicle search, inventory, 1740, 1741  
 
employee, employer  
consent to search by, 1723, 1724 
See also workplace 
 
enhancement devices 
eavesdropping with, 1712 
See canines, aerial surveillance 
 
exclusionary rule 
application of at 
administrative proceedings, 1761 
bail hearing, 1760 
forfeiture cases, 1761 
grand jury testimony, 1759 
indictment, 1759 
juvenile delinquency proceedings, 1761 
parole or probation revocation, 1760 
probable cause hearing, 1759 
sentencing hearings, 1760 
criticism of, 1757 
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generally, 1755 
good faith reliance on invalid warrant as exception to, 1758 
impeachment to evidence exception, 1755, 1756 
nonsubstantive use of illegally seized evidence, application of  for, 
1755, 1756 
private searches, generally, 1762 
private searches, government involvement, affecting application of, 
1763 
purposes for, 1755 
quasi-criminal and administrative proceedings, application of at, 
1761 
state-federal law relationship (Washington) in application, 1765 
See also fruit of the poisonous tree 
 
exigent circumstances 
bodily intrusions based on, 1730, 1731 
execution of search warrant, destruction of evidence based on, 1654 
execution of search warrant, police or public safety based on, 1654 
generally, 1725, 1726 
hot pursuit as, 1727, 1730 
imminent arrest as, 1727, 1728 
person, justifying warrantless search or seizure, based on, 1729, 
1730 
premises, warrantless arrest, based on, 1673 
premises, warrantless search, based on, 1726, 1727 
premises entry, justification, based on, 1726, 1727 
premises search, search of person in context of, 1732 
vehicles, search of based on, 1733 
warrantless arrest based on, 1673 
 
expectation of privacy 
in abandoned personal effects, 1599 
administrative search, as affecting, 1751 
in apartments, 1583, 1589 
in blood sample, 1597 
in business and commercial premises, 1593 
in common areas, 1590 
community living rule affecting, 1589 
2013] Washington Search and Seizure 1827 
in computer, 1598 
in curtilage structures, 1590 
in e-mail, 1599 
in garbage, 1598 
generally, 1584 
in handwriting, 1596 
in hotel rooms, 1583, 1589 
legitimacy of, 1584 
in mails, 1599  
in mobile motor home, 1589 
in motel registry, 1598 
observable activity as relinquishing, 1589 
in open fields, wooded areas, 1592 
open view and plain view, doctrine affecting, 1589, 1707, 1709 
of passenger, 1595 
in personal characteristics, 1596 
in personal effects and papers, 1597 
of prisoners, 1747 
reasonableness of, 1584 
in residential premises, 1588 
in telephone and telephone records, 1598 
in vehicles, 1595 
See also constitutionally protected areas 
 
expertise of officer 
 as establishing probable cause in search for illegal substances, 1612 
 
federal officers 
 compliance with state protections, necessity for, 1608 
 
feel 
 See plain view, smell and hearing 
 
fellow officer rule  
 See stop-and-frisk 
 
felony arrest 
 See warrantless arrest 
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fences 
effect on curtilage, 1591 
effect on open fields doctrine, 1593 
 
fingerprints and nail scraping  
as fruit of illegal arrest, 1770  
pursuant to Terry stop, 1685 
 
fire scenes 
See inspection of fire scenes 
 
flashlight 
as aid to observation, 1589 
 
flight 
See furtive gestures and flight 
  
force 
use of in arrest, 1677 
 
forfeiture of objection 
See waiver of objection 
 
forfeiture or levy of vehicles 
seizure without warrant, propriety of, 1737, 1738 
 
fresh pursuit 
See exigent circumstances; warrantless searches 
 
frisk 
See stop-and-frisk 
 
fruit of the poisonous tree 
arrest as fruit of illegal search, 1771 
attenuation test, as exception to application of, 1765 
confession as fruit of illegal arrest, 1768 
confession as fruit of illegal search, 1771 
2013] Washington Search and Seizure 1829 
crime committed during illegal arrest or search as constituting, 1772 
failure to make timely objection, as waiver to, 1773 
fingerprints as fruit of illegal arrest, 1770 
generally, 1764 
guilty pleas based on, 1774 
harmless error as grounds for affirming conviction based on, 1774 
identification of suspect as fruit of illegal arrest, 1769 
independent source test as exception to application of, 1766 
inevitable discovery test as exception to application of, 1767 
search as fruit of illegal arrest or detention, 1769 
testimony by defendant concerning suppressed evidence as waiver 
of, 1773 
testimony of witness, standards in applying as, 1771 
violation of warrant procedures, standards in applying as, 1764 
waiver or forfeiture of objection based on, 1773 
 
furtive gestures and flight 
observation of, as probable cause, 1621 
 
garbage 
expectation of privacy in, 1598 
 
glove compartment  
See containers 
 
global positioning system (GPS) 
See vehicles 
 
good faith 
as limitation to exclusionary rule, 1758 
searches, community caretaking function as exception to warrant 
requirement, 1703, 1704 
 
guilty pleas 
as fruit of poisonous tree, 1774 
 
handwriting 
expectation of privacy in, 1596 
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harmless error 
fruit of poisonous tree, discounted in affirming conviction based on, 
1774 
 
hearing 
See plain view, smell, and hearing 
 
hearsay 
as basis of knowledge, 1625 
as evidence to corroborate probable cause, 1615 
police information, use of multiple hearsay, 1630 
probable cause, as basis for, 1615 
 
homes 
See premises 
 
host 
consent by to search guest’s room, 1724 
 
hotels 
consent to search room by employee of, 17214 
expectation of privacy in, 1589 
lobby area, expectation of privacy in, 1594 
 
hot pursuit 
See exigent circumstances, premises, warrantless searches 
 
houses 
See premises 
 
identification 
fingerprints as fruit of illegal arrest, 1770 
as fruit of illegal arrest, 1769 
photo montage as fruit of illegal arrest, 1770 
refusal to supply, 1622, 1623 
request for as seizure, 1602 
Terry stops, legislation regarding, 1689 
See also lineup or photo montage 
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immediate control standard 
search incident to arrest, application of, 1698 
 
implied consent 
arrest as prerequisite for, 1731 
statutes governing, 1720, 1731 
 
impoundment 
use of enforcement of traffic regulations, 1739, 1740 
inventory searches, pursuant to, 1740 
vehicles, community caretaking function use of, 1739, 1741  
vehicles, evidence gathering, use of, 1738, 1739 
vehicles, warrantless, 1740 
 
independent source test 
See fruit of the poisonous tree 
 
individualized suspicion 
at checkpoints, lack of requirement of, 1736 
exceptions to requirement of, 1614 
prisoners or pre-trial detainees, lack of requirement of, 1748 
probable cause, requirement of, 1613 
students, generally, requirement of, 1746 
student athletes, lack of requirement of, 1746 
 
inevitable discovery test 
as exception to fruit of the poisonous tree, 1767 
 
informants 
admissions against interest by, 1626 
Aguilar-Spinelli test, applied to, 1623, 1624 
anonymous or unknown, tests for reliability, 1626, 1630 
basis of knowledge by, 1624, 1627, 1629 
citizens as, 1627 
corroboration of by independent investigation, 1624 
hearsay, use of by, 1615, 1625 
identity, challenge to, 1661 
named but unknown, reliability of, 1630 
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nature of (criminal, citizen, or police), 1623 
partial corroboration of information supplied by, 1628 
police as, 1629 
stops based on probable cause, information from, 1682, 1683 
sufficiency of information supplied by, 1629 
veracity of, 1626, 1628, 1629 
 
inspection of fire scenes 
administrative searches, level of proof required for, 1751 
warrantless entry, fireman’s discovery pursuant to, 1706  
 
“in the presence” requirement  
See arrest 
 
Internet 
computer, privacy interest in, 1599 
instant messaging, 1586 
 
interrogation 
See questioning 
 
inventory searches 
of impounded vehicles, 1740  
post detention use of, 1702, 1703 
scope of, 1701, 1702 
without probable cause, 1632 
 
joint occupant 
consent to search by, 1722 
 
judges 
See magistrate 
 
judicial review  
of arrests, 1678 
 
jurisdiction 
court boundary, warrant issued outside of, 1636 
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juvenile delinquency proceedings  
exclusionary rule, applicability to, 1761 
 
Katz test 
See expectation of privacy; constitutionally protected areas 
 
knock and announce requirement  
See search warrants 
 
knock and wait rules  
See search warrants 
 
landlord 
consent to search given by, 1723 
 
lessor 
consent to search given by, 1723 
 
lie detectors 
See polygraphs 
 
lineup or photo montage  
as fruit of illegal arrest, 1770 
as evidence for probable cause, 1629 
 
luggage 
See containers 
 
magistrate 
burden of proof as to neutrality, 1639 
district court (state) judge’s jurisdiction, 1636 
issuance of warrant by, 1636 
neutrality of, 1637 
prosecutor or investigator as, 1638 
qualifications of, 1637 
requirements for, 1636 
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mails 
expectation of privacy in, 1599  
warrantless searches of, 1742 
 
manager, apartment, building, or motel  
consent to search, 1723 
 
marital privilege 
statements supporting probable cause, 1614 
 
Miranda warnings 
necessity for, 1680 
 
misdemeanor arrest 
See warrantless arrest 
 
mistake or omission 
affecting findings of probable cause, 1608, 1609 
issuance of warrant based on, 1608, 1609 
 
motels 
registry, expectation of privacy in, 1598 
See hotels 
 
motive 
informant’s in establishing probable cause, 1626 
 
neutral and detached magistrate  
See magistrate 
 
“no trespassing” signs 
effect on open fields doctrine, 1593 
 
nongovernmental searches  
See private searches 
 
nonsuspect 
search warrant for evidence in possession of, 1666 
2013] Washington Search and Seizure 1835 
notice of authority requirement 
See search warrants; execution; notice requirement 
 
oath 
See affidavit for search warrant 
 
objections 
exclusionary rule, failure to make, 1773 
 
objective test 
See probable cause 
 
odor 
See plain view, smell, and hearing 
 
open fields 
as constitutionally protected area, 1592 
business and commercial premises, doctrine applied to, 1594  
expectation of privacy in, 1593 
 
open view 
See plain view, smell, and hearing 
 
papers 
See private papers 
 
parents 
consent to search given by, 1721 
 
parolees and probationers 
expectation of privacy for, 1748 
revocation hearing, exclusionary rule applicability for, 1760 
revocation hearing, exclusionary rule, Washington applications for, 
1760, 1761 
search and seizure of, 1748 
 
partial corroboration 
informant’s credibility, supported by, 1628 
1836 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1581 
particularity 
See search warrants, generally 
 
passengers and passenger compartments 
consent to search vehicle given by, 1722 
detention of pursuant to Terry stop, 1687 
expectation of privacy in vehicle by, 1595 
frisk of, 1692 
ordered to exit vehicle, 1692 
passenger compartment search, legality of, 1693 
request for identification of, 1632 
search incident to arrest of, 1700, 1734 
search of, generally, 1595 
search of, Washington applications for, 1734 
search with probable cause, federal law, applications for, 1734 
seizure of, 1603 
 
past performance  
by informants, 1626 
 
pen registers 
as constituting search, 1598  
defined, 1598 
for computer, 1599 
 
personal characteristics 
expectation of privacy in, 1596 
 
personal effects 
expectation of privacy in, 1597  
search warrants for, 1659 
 
personal privacy interest 
generally, 1606  
 
pharmacy records 
administrative searches of, 1753  
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phone 
See telephone 
 
photo montage 
See lineup or photo montage 
 
plain hearing 
See plain view, smell, and hearing 
 
plain smell 
See plain view, smell, and hearing 
 
plain touch  
generally, 1713 
 
plain view, smell, and hearing 
constitutionally protected areas, entry into based on, 1709 
of curtilage, 1591 
enhancement devices, used pursuant to, 1712 
feel, generally, 1713 
hearing, generally, 1712 
immediate knowledge of officer, application to, 1710, 1711 
inadvertent discovery, lack of requirement for, 1709 
incriminating discovery in constitutionally protected area,  
 application of, 1709 
justification of intrusion for application of, 1709, 1710 
odor as probable cause, 1619 
odor, generally, 1712, 1713 
plain view and open view distinguished, 1707 
premises, application of, 1589 
privacy interest relinquishment based on, 1589 
seizure based on, 1709 
seizure of unnamed items based on, 1660 
smell, generally, 1712, 1713 
 
poisonous tree 
See fruit of the poisonous tree 
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police 
action by as affecting consent, 1714, 1715 
as informants, 1629 
business premises, investigative entry by, 1594 
claim of authority by to search, 1715 
deception in obtaining consent, 1718 
plain view doctrine, utility by, 1709 
police information, multiple hearsay, use of, 1630 
seizure of unnamed items by, 1660 
See also expertise of officer 
 
polygraphs 
use of to establish probable cause, 1617 
 
power consumption 
See electrical consumption 
 
premises 
and adjoining lands, expectation of privacy in, 1590 
administrative searches of, privacy expectation in, 1752 
buildings within curtilage open to public by implication, 1591 
circumstances of warrantless arrest at, 1672 
curtilage, factors used to determine, 1591 
detention of persons on, 1655, 1656 
exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry of, 1726, 1727 
homes  
as constitutionally protected areas, 1587 
consent searches of, 1714 
expectation of privacy in, 1588 
plain view at, 1589 
search of absent less intrusive alternatives, 1728 
seizure within, 1601 
warrantless arrest at, 1672 
invitation to enter, 1590 
pre-Katz, applications to, 1583 
search incident to arrest at, 1698 
search of persons on, 1655 
 search under warrant  
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area included at, 1658 
scope and intensity at, 1657 
search warrants 
description in, 1643 
vehicles at, search of, 1646, 1660 
warrantless entry at 
community caretaking function, 1704, 1706 
exigent circumstances, 1726, 1728 
warrantless search at 
community caretaking function, 1704 
exigent circumstances, 1725, 1726 
See also business and commercial premises; inspection of fire 
 scenes; expectation of privacy; search warrants 
 
pretext 
arrest to obtain evidence of different offense as, 1678, 1698 
community caretaking or emergency as, 1704 
inventory search as, 1740, 1741 
traffic stops as, 1688 
 
prior arrests and convictions 
consideration of in probable cause determination, 1616 
 
prisoners or pre-trial detainees 
bodily intrusions of, 1666, 1748, 1749 
expectation of privacy by, 1747 
parole hearing for application of exclusionary rule, 1761 
searches, level of proof for, 1748 
warrantless searches or seizures of, 1748 
 
privacy 
See expectation of privacy 
 
private papers 
expectation of privacy in, 1597 
 
private searches 
exclusionary rule, application generally to, 1762 
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joint endeavor theory in, 1763 
agency theory in, 1763 
 security officers, as constituting, 1762 
 
probable cause 
administrative searches, necessity for, 1631 
affidavit requirements for, 1611, 1612 
Aguilar-Spinelli test for, 1623 
anonymous or unknown informants as supporting, 1630 
arrest, need for, 1609 
association, persons and places, as constituting, 1620 
bodily intrusions, need for, 1632 
characteristics of, 1607, 1611 
citizen informant, basis of knowledge supporting, 1627 
criminal reputation establishing, 1616 
electrical consumption as evidence of, 1616 
firsthand observation, stolen property, as evidence of, 1618 
flight or furtive gesture as element of, 1621 
generally, 1607 
hearing, application of exclusionary rule to, 1759 
hearsay supporting, 1615 
illegal substance detection as supporting, 1619 
individualized suspicion, necessity for, 1613 
informant’s information, as evidence of 
admissions against interest, 1626 
basis of knowledge, 1624, 1627, 1629 
corroboration by independent investigation, 1625 
partial corroboration, 1628 
past performance, 1626  
photo identification, 1629 
sufficiency of information, 1629 
generally, 1623 
needed to support, veracity, 1623, 1626, 1628 
information considered in determining, 1614, 1639, 1640 
inventory searches, necessity for, 1632 
judicial review of, 1678 
mistake or omission of facts as evidence of, 1608, 1609 
objective test for, 1611 
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observations by law enforcement officer as evidence of, 1618  
odor of illegal substance as evidence of, 1619 
police informants, generally, 1629 
police information, multiple hearsay, used to establish, 1630 
polygraphs, used to establish, 1617 
post-detention searches, necessity of, 1702 
power consumption establishing, 1616 
presence in high-crime area as evidence of, 1621 
prior arrests and convictions as evidence of, 1616 
quantum of evidence required to establish, 1612 
questioning, responses to as evidence of, 1622 
racial incongruity as evidence of, 1621 
reputation as evidence of, 1616 
requirements for, 1607 
search and arrest compared, necessity of, 1609 
staleness of information used to establish, 1639 
Terry stop-and-frisk, necessity for, 1632, 1679 
totality of the circumstances standard used to establish, 1620, 1623 
vehicle search at border crossing, necessity of, 1750 
vehicle search under federal law, necessity of, 1734, 1735 
vehicle search under Washington Constitution, 1733, 1734 
victim-witness information, generally, 1627 
victim-witness information, sufficiency of evidence to establish, 
1629 
warrantless arrest, generally, 1671 
See also informants 
 
probationers 
See parolees and probationers 
 
property 
expectation of privacy in, 1597  
seizure of, 1603, 1697 
 
protected areas and interests  
commercial property as, 1593  
homes, generally, 1587  
open fields as, 1592 
1842 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1581 
protective searches  
See stop-and-frisk 
 
purses 
See containers 
 
questioning 
compulsion to answer during Terry stop, 1689 
responses to as probable cause, 1622 
 
race 
as evidence of probable cause, 1621  
as basis for border stop, 1750  
as basis for reasonable suspicion, 1684 
 
reasonable belief standard  
See stop-and-frisk 
 
reasonable expectation of privacy  
See expectation of privacy 
 
reasonable suspicion standard  
See stop-and-frisk 
 
recording of conversation  
as constituting search, 1585 
 
reputation 
consideration of in probable cause determination, 1616 
 
residence 
See premises 
 
roadblock 
as seizure 1603 
 
roommate 
See co-tenant 
2013] Washington Search and Seizure 1843 
schools 
expectation of privacy in, 1745  
school officials as state agents, 1763  
warrantless searches at, 1745 
 
scope of consent 
See consent searches 
  
scrupulous exactitude standard 
See search warrants, targets to be seized 
 
search incident to arrest 
bodily intrusions as, 1700 
containers, applicability of, 1700, 1702 
custodial requirement for, 1697 
defined, 1696 
generally, 1695, 1696 
“immediate control” standard used in, 1698 
inventory searches as, 1702, 1703 
lawful arrest requirement for, 1696 
permissible scope of, 1698 
post-detention searches as, 1701, 1702 
premises, applications of in, 1698 
property seized, use of in, 1697 
scope of Washington applications, 1696, 1697, 1700 
“second look” searches as, 1702 
strip or body cavity search as, 1749 
test for, 1696 
vehicles and containers within, applicability of, 1700 
 
search warrants 
administrative searches, requirements for, 1642, 1753 
affidavit supporting, 1639 
affidavit supporting, challenging content for, 1661 
bodily intrusions, probable cause for, 1664 
burden on party challenging, 1643 
content of, 1639 
description of place or target of, generally, 1643 
1844 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1581 
documents, necessity for, 1658 
area, covered by, 1658 
consent to enter, 1651, 1652 
delivery of warrant, 1660 
detention of persons on, 1655 
entry by ruse or deception, 1652 
notice requirements, 1650, 1651 
personal effects, 1655ԟ1657 
reasonableness in, 1653 
scope and intensity, 1657 
search of persons on premises, 1655, 1656 
time of, 1641 
unnamed items, seizure of, 1660 
generally, 1635 
information considered in obtaining, 1639 
items searchable under, 1636 
exceptions, “knock and announce” 
exigent circumstances, 1654 
necessity of covert entry, 1654, 1655 
useless gesture, 1654 
execution of, “knock and announce,” 1650 
requirement, “knock and announce,” 1650 
purposes, “knock and announce,” 1650 
location, description of, 1643 
location, particularity of description and exceptions, 1645 
mere evidence as object under, 1636 
nonsuspects possessing evidence under, 1666 
oath or affirmation in, 1639 
oral and telephonic warrants as, 1641 
particular searches, exceptions, 1645 
persons, particularity of description in, 1646 
purposes of, 1635 
requirements for, 1635 
severability of multiple locations, 1644, 1645 
staleness of information in, 1639, 1641 
targets to be seized under 
documents or electronic communications, 1658 
generally, 1647, 1648 
2013] Washington Search and Seizure 1845 
particularity of description, 1647 
particularity of description, First Amendment applications,1663 
scrupulous exactitude requirement, 1663, 1664 
time of execution of, staleness, 1639 
vehicles at premises, applicability to, 1646, 1660 
vehicles, travel patterns of, GPS, 1643 
See also administrative searches; affidavit for search warrant; 
 neutral and detached magistrate 
 
searches 
bodily intrusions as, 1664 
bodily intrusions of prisoners, 1666, 1749  
bodily intrusions of sex offenders, 1748 
border crossing as, 1750 
defined 
pre-Katz, 1583 
post-Katz, 1584 
constitutionally protected areas, 1587 
as fruit of illegal arrest, 1769 
as fruit of illegal search, 1771 
of prisoners, 1747 
prisoners, bodily intrusions of, 1666, 1749 
reasonable expectation of privacy, pursuant to, 1584 
at schools, 1745 
in special environments, 1745 
standing to raise claim, challenging, 1604 
strip searches, execution of, 1666 
See also search warrants; protected areas and interests; warrantless 
 searches 
 
searches, unlawful 
See exclusionary rule 
 
secondary evidence 
See fruit of the poisonous tree 
 
security officers  
public function theory as applied to, 1762 
1846 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1581 
seizure 
constitutionally protected areas, when plain view used as basis for, 
1709 
forfeiture as basis for, 1737, 1738 
of items unnamed in search warrant, 1660 
lawful, factors, 1671, 1676 
of person, generally, 1600, 1669 
of person in automobile, 1602 
of person in home, 1601 
of person, what constitutes seizure, 1600 
plain view as basis for, 1709 
of prisoners, 1748, 1749 
of property, possessory interest defined, 1603 
within special environments, 1745 
spoliation of evidence as basis for, 1691 
standing to raise claim, challenging, 1604 
of vehicles, 1602 
warrantless, plain view as basis for, 1709 
within homes, 1601 
See also arrest; protected areas and interests; warrantless searches 
 
sensory-enhanced searches 
use of analysis, 1585 
use of hearing, generally, 1712 
thermal imaging device used in home, 1588 
 
sentencing 
exclusionary rule, applicability to hearings, 1760 
 
shared living quarters  
search of, 1589 
 
silence or inaction 
evidence for probable cause, 1622 
 
smell 
See plain view, smell, and hearing 
 
2013] Washington Search and Seizure 1847 
spouses 
consent to search given by, 1721 
 
standing 
automatic standing in Washington, 1604 
search and seizure claims, generally, 1604 
 
stolen property possession  
probable cause based on, 1618 
  
stop-and-frisk 
additional actions extending Terry search beyond, 1693 
compelled response to, 1689 
danger as factor in, 1689, 1691 
duration of, 1685 
individualized suspicion, reasonable suspicion standard required 
for, 1682 
“fellow officer” rule, in applying to, 1683 
fingerprinting during, 1686 
community caretaking function as grounds for, 1705 
grounds for, 1689 
proximity to suspect as grounds for, 1692 
scope of, 1691 
spoliation of evidence as grounds for, 1691 
Washington applications for, 1690 
generally, 1679 
incidental to premises search, 1655 
individualized suspicion requirement for, 1682 
individualized suspicion, exceptions to requirement, 1682 
information from informants as basis for, 1682, 1683 
intrusiveness of, 1679, 1683, 1685 
investigatory stop, generally, 1679 
level of proof required, 1632 
nature of the offense, applications to, 1681 
passenger compartment search, pursuant to, 1693 
of persons within suspect’s proximity,  1687, 1692 
probable cause considerations in, 1679 
protective measures other than frisk, 1692 
1848 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1581 
proximity to suspect as grounds for detention, 1687 
purpose of rule, 1679 
reasonable suspicion standard for, 1680, 1681, 1683 
scope of permissible frisk, 1691 
self-protective alternative to frisk, 1692 
standards generally, 1632 
time, place, and method, 1685 
traffic violations, detention related to, 1687 
transporting suspect, during, 1686 
 
store 
See business and commercial premises; premises 
  
street encounters  
See stop-and-frisk 
 
students 
See schools 
 
suppression of confessions and admissions  
See exclusionary rule 
 
telephone 
answering service, expectation of privacy in, 1587  
phone numbers, privacy interest in, 1598 
text messages, 1586, 1598, 1599 
See also pen registers 
 
Terry stop 
 See stop-and-frisk 
 
testimony 
defendant’s as fruit of poisonous tree, 1771, 1773  
as fruit of illegal search, 1771 
 
thermal imaging device 
See sensory-enhanced searches 
 
2013] Washington Search and Seizure 1849 
text messages 
expectation of privacy in, 1586, 1598, 1599 
 
touch 
See plain touch 
 
traffic violations 
pursuant to 
custodial arrest,1678, 1697 
detention, 1688 
impoundment of vehicle, 1739, 1740  
search incident to arrest, 1696, 1697 
hot pursuit following, 1730 
 
trespass 
effect on validity of police search, 1587, 1589, 1590 
 
trunk 
search of, 1741 
 
urine samples 
expectation of privacy in, 1596 
 
useless gesture exception 
See search warrants, knock and announce 
 
vehicles 
administrative searches, level of proof requirement for, 1753 
checkpoints, 1736, 1737, 1753 
checkpoints, level of proof for, 1750, 1753 
containers in, 1596, 1734  
exigent circumstances to search, 1735 
expectation of privacy in, 1595 
impounded auto, inventory search of, 1703, 1740, 1741 
impoundment, enforcement of traffic regulations as grounds for, 
1739, 1740 
impoundment, warrantless search of, 1738 
inventory searches of, 1703, 1740, 1741 
1850 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1581 
motor home, search of, 1589 
mobile home as, 1595 
personal privacy interest in, 1606 
scope of warrantless search of 
under Washington law, 1733 
under federal law, 1734 
global positioning system (GPS), 1585 
search of, 1595 
probable cause, 1733, 1734 
incident to arrest, 1700 
under warrant for premises, 1646, 1660 
seizure of persons in, 1602 
spot checks of, 1736, 1753 
spot checks of, administrative requirements for, 1753, 1754 
subject of criminal activity, warrantless search of, 1734 
trunk, search of, 1741 
warrantless detention, 1740 
warrantless impoundment of, community caretaking function, 1739 
warrantless impoundment of for evidence, 1738 
warrantless searches of 
generally 1732, 1733 
scope, Washington law, 1733 
scope, federal law, 1734 
warrantless seizure of, for forfeiture or levy, 1737 
See also search warrants; passengers 
 
veracity 
of anonymous or unknown informants, 1630 
as evidence of 
informants’ admissions against interest and motive, 1626 
informants’ past performance, 1626 
informants’ partial corroboration, 1628 
police informants 1629 
 
victim-witness information 
probable cause, basis for knowledge of, 1627  
probable cause, generally, 1627 
probable cause, sufficiency of information by, 1629 
2013] Washington Search and Seizure 1851 
 
view 
See plain view, smell, and hearing 
 
voice exemplars 
expectation of privacy in, 1596 
 
voluntariness 
awareness of right to refuse as affecting, 1717 
coerciveness in obtaining, 1716 
consent searches based on, 1713 
consent searches, police claim of authority, as affecting, 1715 
mental or emotional state in evaluating, 1718 
police deception as to identity or purpose as affecting, 1718 
prior cooperation or refusal as affecting, 1715 
 
waiver 
invitation to enter premises as, 1590 
  
waiver of objection 
failure to make timely objection as constituting, 1773 
guilty plea as, 1774 
testimony by defendant concerning suppressed evidence as, 1773 
 
warrantless arrest 
emergency exception as basis for, 1673 
requirements for 
misdemeanor arrest, 1674 
felony arrest, 1674 
premises, residence, 1672 
vehicle, detention of, pursuant to, 1740  
when permissible, 1671 
 
warrantless searches 
bodily intrusions, exigent circumstances for, 1700, 1730 
use of border crossing, 1750 
use of checkpoints, 1736, 1753 
community caretaking and medical emergency as basis for, 1703 
1852 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1581 
defined, 1695 
of DNA, 1702, 1731 
generally, 1695 
hot pursuit as basis for, 1726, 1727, 1730 
imminent arrest as exigent circumstance supporting, 1727 
inventory searches as, 1701, 1702 
mail inspections as, 1742 
of person based on exigent circumstances, 1729, 1732 
plain view, seizure based on, 1709 
post-detention, 1701 
premises 
community caretaking and emergency as basis for, 1704 
exigent circumstances justifying, 1726 
home, absence of less intrusive alternatives, 1728 
premises search, search of person in context of, 1732 
prior to arrest, 1701 
of prisoners or pre-trial detainees, 1747 
at schools, 1745 
as “second look” searches, 1702 
as search incident to arrest, 1695, 1696 
at special environments, 1741, 1745 
of vehicles  
generally, 1732 
inventory search, 1740 
federal law governing 
vehicles, probable cause, 1734 
vehicles, scope of search, 1735 
vehicles, subject of criminal activity, 1739 
vehicles, Washington applications in, 1733 
See also consent searches; exigent circumstances; search incident to 
 arrest; stop-and-frisk; plain view, smell and hearing 
 
warrants 
execution of, 1676, 1677 
invalid, effect of, 1676 
issuance of, 1607 
violations of procedure in obtaining, 1764  
See also arrest warrants; search warrants 
2013] Washington Search and Seizure 1853 
wiretapping 
as evidence, 1710 
 
witness-victim information 
See victim-witness information 
